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Summary
The recent financial crisis in 2008/2009 has highlighted the
need for macroprudential policy to ensure the functioning of
the financial system. One of the key aspects of macroprudential
regulation is reducing procyclicality in the financial intermedia-
tion process to dampen fluctuations in the supply of credit. This
thesis studies the potential benefits of countercyclical macro-
prudential policies for financial and macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion relying on a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model.
Chapter 2 examines the role of borrowers’ indebtedness for the
effectiveness of rules on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of bor-
rowers. With the rule, the maximum LTV ratio adjusts coun-
tercyclically to indicators of financial imbalance. My findings
suggest that during housing market booms countercyclical rules
that affect borrowers with tight credit constraints induce bor-
rowers to deleverage. Consequently, the regulation curbs macro-
economic activity and produces deflation. In contrast, the rule
implemented in mortgage markets with highly indebted bor-
rowers prevents extreme leverage and entails macroeconomic
stability. These results imply that countercyclical regulation on
highly leveraged borrowers is more efficient.
I
II
In chapter 3, I conduct a comparative analysis between end-
borrower regulation given by a countercyclical LTV-rule on
mortgage borrowers and a lender related instrument in form
of a countercyclical rule on the bank capital ratio. Simulating
the dynamics of a financial crisis, my findings illustrate that
a LTV-rule mitigates the drop of borrowing and enhances the
banks’ capability to provide loans. Thus, the LTV-rule is more
effective than a rule on bank capital. When the transmission
from the banking sector to the real economy proceeds over the
household mortgage market, I find no evidence for macroeco-
nomic stabilization with either rule.
Chapter 4, joint work with Jürgen Jerger, looks at the interac-
tion between the zero lower bound and rule-based, and there-
fore flexible macroprudential regulation. The simulations of a
demand driven recession show that a countercyclical LTV-rule
contributes to financial stability irrespective of the zero lower
bound and also to macroeconomic stabilization if the bound
binds.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The global financial crisis in 2008/2009 has demonstrated that
traditional regulation is insufficient to ensure the soundness of
the financial system. This recognition pushed forward a more
holistic approach to financial regulation known as macropru-
dential regulation. Macroprudential policy has the scope to
counter growing risks to the stability of the financial system
and complements existing microprudential policy. If the finan-
cial sector becomes overexposed to the same risk, so that the
risk is systemic, the functioning of the system to provide key
financial services to the economy is disrupted.1 Thus, resulting
financial imbalance can cause a credit crunch that in turn de-
presses overall economic activity. Therefore, macroprudential
1More precisely, systemic risk arises basically from credit risk, emanat-
ing from borrowers’ default, or, market risk, that stems from the decline
of collateral value, or, liquidity risk that arise from depressed refinancing
conditions.
1
2policy aims to mitigate the costs to the economy, in particular,
costs to tax payers that accrue from a financial crisis.
The Financial Stability Board, established to safeguard a global
financial regulation framework, highly promotes macropruden-
tial policy measures to its G-20 member states. Not only be-
cause of the lack of empirical experience with this rather new
form of regulation, relatively little is known about the spe-
cific policy design and the mechanisms through which these
tools affect the real economy. Over the past years, a fast grow-
ing body of theoretical literature has developed and proposes
a wide range of instruments to address the multitude sources
of systemic risk. While the implementation of macroprudential
policy tools for banks − the countercyclical capital buffer ad-
vocated by Basel III being the most prominent example − has
already progressed, tools beyond banking are still at an early
stage (ESRB, 2016). In particular, the design of tools to re-
duce systemic risk from boom and bust episodes in real estate
markets are at the center of recent policy debates. Against this
background, this dissertation explores the efficiency of macro-
prudential regulation on mortgage borrowers as stabilization
policy using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models.
Financial frictions have shown to be a key driver of business
cycle fluctuations (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke and
Gertler, 1989) making financial stability a relevant objective.
3For instance, collateral constraints tied to real estate value can
propagate small shocks. When collapsed house prices erode
borrowers’ net worth, borrowers are forced to fire sale their
collateral to repay their loan. This in turn feeds back to lower
house prices and even more fire sales. Contrary to this, in
booming housing markets the dynamic interaction between cre-
dit limits and asset prices leads to a build-up of leverage. Espe-
cially, countercyclical varying credit limits are a tool of macro-
prudential policy that aim to prevent the procyclicality of col-
lateral constraints by operating at business cycle frequencies.2
This dynamic instrument requires debtors to provide more eq-
uity in good times, so that the borrowers’ balance sheets are
better prepared to absorb losses that build during downturns.
Because of borrowers’ higher buffers to resist busts, the prob-
ability of default and overborrowing are reduced by the regu-
lation.3 As a result countercyclical credit limits alleviate credit
cycles. Since time-varying credit limits pose a rather innovative
approach, I confine my research to countercyclical macropru-
dential instruments.
For the implementation of a sound macroprudential framework,
it is also important to fully understand the interactions of macro-
prudential regulation with monetary policy since monetary pol-
2Non-time varying maximum caps on borrowers’ leverage are another tool
to constraint borrowing and thus excessive leverage.
3Moreover, tighter credit constraints restrict potential borrowers from credit
and hence from purchasing a property, which reduces property price fluc-
tuations.
4icy determines the overall conditions that affect the demand and
supply of credit. Nevertheless, the current period of historically
low nominal interest rates has led only to a small increase of
firms’ and households’ credit demand to the monetary expan-
sion. One reason for monetary policies’ limited efficiency on
credit demand is seen in the debt-deflation spiral enforced by
missing real interest stimulus. Therefore, this thesis also eval-
uates the repercussions of macroprudential policy inference on
the macroeconomy during a time period of zero interest rates.
1.2 Outline of the thesis
Comprising of three papers, this dissertation provides new in-
sights on the effects of rule-based, and therefore flexible macro-
prudential regulation (FMR). Each paper is given by one chap-
ter that build upon each other. All papers follow the strand
of literature surrounding the seminal work of Iacoviello (2005)
relying on a New Keynesian DSGE model with financial fric-
tions and costly external finance. Exploring the financial accel-
erator mechanism, Iacoviello (2005) provides evidence for the
propagation of demand shocks in the presence of housing col-
lateral constraints but not supply shocks. As this amplification
effect of credit limits constitutes the rational for macropruden-
tial policy interventions, several papers use a modification of
Iacoviello’s model for a macroprudential policy analysis, e.g.,
5Christensen (2011), Kolasa (2016) and Lambertini et al. (2013).
Among them are also Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego who have
published several papers analyzing a macroprudential rule on
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of borrowers in interaction with
monetary policy (Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014, 2015a,b).
In their model economy, the LTV ratio defined as the propor-
tion of the debt burden relative to the residential property value
governs the amount of loan that circulates between savers and
borrowers. The relatively simple model structure is extremely
feasible to scrutinize macroprudential policy instruments at-
tached to the LTV constraint, which is why the model builds
the foundation of the following chapters. Nonetheless, this the-
sis leaves Rubio and Carrasco’s debate on the optimal policy
mix of macroprudential and monetary policy aside and concen-
trates on the economic impact of countercyclical macropruden-
tial regulation taking monetary policy as given.
Chapter 2, based on Körner (2016a), studies the usefulness of
macroprudential LTV rules in dependence on the level of in-
debtedness of borrowers.4 The paper substantiates the intro-
duction of macroprudential regulation for this and the follow-
ing chapters by demonstrating the collateral effect and the in-
sight that the propagation increases with laxer LTV limits. De-
scribing the decision of the macroprudential authority, various
4Chapter 2 is slightly more detailed than the paper version currently under
review because the chapter outlines essential mechanisms of the model for
the subsequent papers. Additional parts are indicated by a horizontal line.
6countercyclical rules on the LTV ratio are parameterized to op-
timally smooth credit cycles since low credit volatility indicates
financial stability. More specifically, the paper analyzes the ef-
fects of these rules exercised on highly and low leveraged mort-
gage borrowers for meeting stabilization objectives. Stochastic
simulations of housing demand and technology shocks allow to
disentangle the channels of the rules on the macroeconomy.
The model used in chapter 2, however, lacks an authority that
conducts the financial intermediation between borrowers and
savers. Financial intermediaries contributed significantly to the
recent financial crisis as they failed to fulfill their basic func-
tion of supplying loans due to frictions in the system. One
regulation friction are bank capital requirements that are imple-
mented to insure the institution’s solvency, but sharpen a crisis
due to their procyclicality. Therefore, chapter 3, built on Körner
(2016b), resolves this shortcoming of chapter 2 by introducing
a monopolistically competitive banking sector á la Gerali et al.
(2010).
The endogenous bank capital accumulation of the banking sec-
tor allows to conduct a comparative analysis of a countercycli-
cal non-risk adjusted bank capital (BC) requirement ratio, a
countercyclical LTV ratio, and the implementation of both reg-
ulations. In contrast to the loss function optimization in chap-
ter 2, this chapter employs a welfare maximization procedure
to identify the optimal macroprudential feedback rules. The
7welfare approach has the benefit that it reflects the welfare ef-
fect through the introduction of countercyclical tools for each
economic agent, separately. By that the chapter evaluates the
regulations’ capability for enhancing financial resilience. This
paper also sheds light on the significance of particular rules for
the development of a comprehensive macroprudential policy
framework.
Unlike the previous two chapters, chapter 4, that will be pub-
lished as Jerger and Körner (2017 forthcoming), focuses on one
“rare” economic situation, namely when the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates binds. More precisely, the paper com-
pares the effects of FMR during zero interest rates to the situa-
tion when negative interest rates are feasible. Associated there-
with, the chapter applies the occasional binding algorithm of
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) on the smaller model of chap-
ter 2 to regard the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal inter-
est rates, which depicts a non-linear relation. In contrast, the
models in chapters 2 and 3 are solved using first and second
order perturbation methods with purely linear relations. While
several studies on policy coordination consider macropruden-
tial regulation a useful complement to monetary policy during
fluctuations stemming from the financial sector, e.g., Kannan
et al. (2012), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Bianchi
(2011), chapter 4 explores the role of countercyclical LTV reg-
ulation in mitigating the consequences of a constrained mone-
8tary policy. Comparing the outcomes obtained with and with-
out a binding ZLB delivers insights in additional stabilization
benefits of macroprudential regulation.
Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the main results of this
thesis.
2 Countercyclical collateral
constraints and borrowers’
leverage ratio
2.1 Introduction
Macroprudential real estate regulation is used to mitigate exten-
sive credit growth and to stabilize the financial system. In times
of a housing market boom collateral constraints can amplify
business cycles through the self-reinforcing effect of increas-
ing real estate prices and credit growth. As an instrument low
caps on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios reduce borrowers’ credit ac-
quisition and thus mitigate the propagation mechanism (Liu
et al., 2013; Walentin, 2014). Countercyclical varying LTV ra-
tios, however, change the borrowing limit according to the eco-
nomic situation. This paper analyzes the effects of countercy-
clial macroprudential rules on different fixed LTV levels of bor-
rowers within a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilib-
9
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rium (DSGE) framework and evaluates their impact on welfare.
Several papers have demonstrated that countercyclical rules im-
plemented on a pre-set level of debt can reduce macroeconomic
fluctuations (Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2015a; Lambertini
et al., 2013). Therefore, this paper investigates the relationship
between the leverage level of borrowers and the efficiency of
countercyclical macroprudential regulation. The results show
that the stabilization benefits of a countercyclical macropruden-
tial rule depend on the level of indebtedness of the borrower.
Only when borrowers are subject to a high credit limit, a rule
on the LTV ratio can reveal its countercyclical leverage effect
and mitigates credit cycles. These insights play a role for the
design of a macroprudential policy framework.
In several European countries national macroprudential policy
authorities have introduced fixed credit limits on LTV ratios
to avoid excessive mortgage lending.1 For instance, in Ger-
many the Finanzstabilitätsrat recently submitted a draft bill to
the government for the introduction of caps on the loan-to-real-
estate value (Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität, 2015). These LTV
limits and also the average LTV ratio of mortgage borrowers are
quite distinct across the European countries as table 2.1 docu-
ments. Maximum LTV ratios regardless of the limit still allow
for more borrowing in booming real estate markets through the
appreciated collateral value. Therefore, the European Systemic
1In the Netherlands, macroprudential authorities have decided to further
reduce the limit on the LTV ratio to 101% in 2017.
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Risk Board (ESRB) responsible for the macropudential over-
sight in the Eurozone recommends countercyclical, so called
time-variant LTV ratios. With countercyclical rules, the credit
limit tightens in an upswing of a cycle and loosens in a down-
turn to support credit growth and potentially help to avoid a
credit crunch (ESRB, 2014).
Collateral constraints are a relevant factor for macroeconomic
volatility: in the mortgage market, the LTV ratio − the fraction
of nominal debt and underlying real estate collateral value −
can amplify shocks that shift the demand for the collateral as-
set and inflation in the same direction (Liu et al., 2013). Thus,
inflation and rising house prices create a wealth effect for bor-
rowers whereby they can borrow more for consumption and
investment. This procyclical effect of LTV ratios in response
to demand shocks enhances business cycles.2 Since housing
boom-bust cycles are a common precursor to financial crises
(Christensen, 2011), regulating the leverage level of mortgage
borrowers is important to prevent spill-overs into the macroe-
conomy and reduce taxpayers’ costs of a crisis. Justiniano et al.
(2015) find that rather than credit liberalization house price
growth driven by changes in demand accounted for the large
debt increase in the recent crises. They propose that real house
2However, collateral constraints moderate the effect of shocks generated in
the real sector (Mendicino, 2012; Liu et al., 2013). This effect is partic-
ularly prevailing in models where the collateral asset is an input factor of
the production function.
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prices and their evolution are the primary source of credit cy-
cles, while this paper identifies optimal countercyclical rules
particularly to mitigate the effects of housing demand shocks.
Walentin (2014), Christensen (2011) and Gruss and Sgherri
(2009) provide evidence that macroeconomic volatility increases
with relaxation of collateral constraints (higher LTV ratios) due
to the larger demand effect of borrowers for a given change in
house prices. The studies reinforce a low maximum LTV ra-
tio to be a sound instrument for financial resilience. Estimating
a DSGE model for Sweden, Walentin (2014) states that with
a constant LTV ratio of 0.95 the effect of a housing demand
shock as much as doubles on most macroeconomic variables
compared to the outcome with a LTV ratio of 0.85. He finds
no amplification to a technology shock. Christensen (2011)
confirms that lowering the LTV ratio substantially reduces the
magnitude of consumption and debt growth while enhancing
financial stability. This paper evaluates if the introduction of a
countercyclical rule on low LTV ratios adds not only to finan-
cial but also to macroeconomic stabilization.
Several papers highlight the effectiveness of countercyclical rules
on LTV ratios. Levine and Lima (2015) show that the de-
ployment of macroprudential regulation together with standard
monetary policy improves total welfare even if both authori-
ties react to their own policy targets. Evaluating various pol-
icy regimes, Lambertini et al. (2013) document maximal total
13
welfare gains for savers and borrowers when monetary policy
follows a standard Taylor rule and the countercyclical LTV-rule
responds to credit growth. Further, they find an interest rule re-
acting to credit growth and a constant LTV ratio improves only
savers’ welfare. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a) introduce
a countercyclical LTV-rule reacting to output and house prices
in a model with financial frictions. If monetary policy ensures
solely price stability and the macroprudential authority’s ob-
jective is financial stability, they identify the rule that responds
relatively more to house price deviation than to output devia-
tion to be socially optimal. Angelini et al. (2012) indicate that
the optimal intensity of policy intervention depends on the in-
dicator variable and the origin of the shock. They uncover a
countercyclical LTV ratio responding to credit growth to be an
effective instrument to achieve stabilization in case of financial
shocks or more general demand shocks, as in a number of other
papers (Mendicino and Punzi, 2014; Gelain et al., 2013). How-
ever, Angelini et al. (2012) and Kannan et al. (2012) find little
stabilizing effects of macroprudential regulation in response to
technology booms.3
A main finding in the literature is the amplification effect of
fixed collateral constraints that increases with borrower’s lever-
3Supporting this finding, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) document
that monetary and macroprudential policy enter into conflict for supply
shocks. Monetary policy reacts to deflation by lowering the interest rate,
which facilitates credit growth. Macroprudential policy, however, operates
contrary by tightening the credit limit to reduce credit growth.
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age. In addition, several studies on macroprudential policy
detect welfare gains with countercyclical regulation through
smoothed credit cycles. This work combines both research
strands by evaluating the effects of countercyclical rules imple-
mented on different borrowers’ debt levels on macroeconomic
stabilization and welfare. The paper also contributes to the pol-
icy debate on the optimal calibration of macroprudential rules.
Following Iacoviello (2005) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego
(2015a), I use a New Keynesian DSGE model with a private
mortgage market calibrated to Eurozone data. As in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) borrowers are constrained by a constant LTV
limit, i.e., a cap on the fraction of debt service to the expected
liquidation value of the real estate collateral. In the framework,
savers lend directly to borrowers who fully exploit their debt
limit. The monetary policy is represented by an inflation tar-
geting interest rule independent from macroprudential policy
in line with the current policy situation in Europe.4
I assume two benchmark scenarios for the policy exercise. Name-
ly, a high household debt scenario where borrowers face a limit
on the LTV ratio of 90% that is always binding due to the linear-
ity of the model. In the low household debt scenario, debtors
borrow up to 65%, respectively. In the corresponding policy
scenarios, the LTV ratios remaining unchanged for the steady
4In the Eurosystem national macroprudential authorities, who are equipped
with regulatory power, act independently from the supranational monetary
policy regime.
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state are linked to a countercyclical rule. The linear LTV rule
tightens the borrowing capacity when house prices or when
credit growth increases as these indicators are recommended
by the ESRB. The policy rules are parameterized so that they
reduce credit growth in best way.
The policy exercise uncovers that in response to a housing pref-
erence shock a countercyclical rule on borrowers with a high
LTV ratio reduces macroeconomic fluctuations. Contrary, out-
put falls below the steady state value in the tight credit sce-
nario with a time-varying optimal rule. That is because after
the shock the wealth effect of borrowers with a low credit limit
and likewise the amplification effect is smaller. Subsequently,
the over-tight constraint with the rule reverses the effect on ag-
gregate demand and produces deflation. My findings suggest
that a mortgage market characterized by leveraged borrowers
offers regulators ample scope for regulatory inference, while in
markets with tight credit constraints countercyclical regulation
is redundant.
Moreover, I find welfare benefits through the introduction of
the specified rules: borrowers are the winners, while in both
scenarios an optimal countercyclical rule on house prices re-
duces savers’ welfare. Beyond, the best policy allocation is
a countercyclical rule responding to credit growth on relatively
leveraged borrowers because it improves welfare to both house-
holds. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature by indi-
16
Table 2.1: Average loan-to-value ratios and caps in several
European countries.
Loan-to-value ratios for residential mortgage loans
New loans for first-time house buyers
country average LTV ratio (2011)5 cap on the LTV ratio6
Netherlands 101% max. 103%
Ireland >100% max. 90%
Estonia > 100%7 max. 85%
Lithuania > 100%8 max. 85%
Finland 87% max. 95%
Cyprus 80% max. 80%
Germany 79% recommended limit
Belgium 63% no restriction
Austria 84% no restriction
France 83% no restriction
Slovakia 70% max. 90%
Italy 60% no restriction
cating the dependence of welfare gains and of macroeconomic
stabilization effects on the level of borrowers’ indebtedness.
The next section introduces the model. The calibration to Euro-
zone data is the focus of section three. Section four is about the
amplification effects of changing LTV ratios, the specification
of the optimal policy rule, and includes the welfare analysis.
The discussion of results follows in section five, while section
six concludes.
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2.2 Model
The model economy is equally populated by two households
differing in their intertemporal discount factor. The assumption
makes them to savers and borrowers denoted by the index s and
b, respectively. The model economy is affected by transitory
technology, monetary policy, and for the research focus most
essential house preference shocks.
2.2.1 Households
Patient household The representative patient household en-
ters period t holding hs,t−1 units of housing and Bs,t−1 nomi-
nal one-period bonds, which yield the gross interest of rt be-
tween the time periods. During period t the household re-
ceives Ws,tns,t total nominal factor payments from supplying
ns,t(i) hours of labor to each intermediate goods producing firm
i ∈ [0, 1].9 Further, the household yields Dt nominal dividends
from each intermediate goods producing firm i ∈ [0, 1].10 The
patient household uses its funds to invest in Bs,t new bonds at
5Banca D’Italia (2013)
6Regulatory limits refer to the press releases of national regulation authori-
ties.
7EMF Hypostat (2013)
8EMF Hypostat (2013)
9The household’s choices of ns,t(i) must satisfy ns,t =
∫ 1
0 ns,t(i) di
10Dividends of the intermediate goods producing firm aggregate to Dt =∫ 1
0 Dt(i) di.
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the nominal cost, to purchase ct units of the output good for
consumption purposes from the final goods sector at a nominal
price Pt, and to buy hs,t housing stock at a nominal price Qt in
accordance to (2.1).11
cs,t+
Bs,t
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t =
rt−1Bs,t−1
Pt
+
Ws,tns,t
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t−1+
Dt
Pt
(2.1)
The household chooses {ct, hs,t, nt, Bs,t}∞t=0 to maximize the stream
of expected utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
ln(cs,t) + jt ln(hs,t) − n
η
s,t
η
 , (2.2)
where 0 < βs < 1 denotes the discount factor and η ≥ 1 gov-
erns the elasticity of labor supply, while 1η−1 is the Frisch elas-
ticity.12 The household derives expected utility from consump-
tion, housing service and leisure according to (2.2). The weight
of housing jt in the utility function represents an intertemporal
demand shock for housing that follows an autoregressive pro-
cess:13
ln( jt) = (1 − ρ j) ln( j) + ρ j ln( jt−1) + ε j,t, (2.3)
11Lower case letters express variables in terms of consumption goods.
12The labor Frisch elasticity describes the change of the wage rate on hours
worked while the marginal utility from income remains constant (Hansen,
1985; Rogerson, 1988).
13The shock affects an increase of the households’ marginal utility of hous-
ing.
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where 0 < ρ j < 1 and the innovation ε j,t is i.i.d. ∼ N (0, σ2j).
The optimality conditions of the problem are characterized by
the budget constraint (2.1), the Euler equation (2.4), the repre-
sentative saver’s labor supply equation (2.5) and the intertem-
poral housing demand equation (2.6). The Euler equation (2.4)
sets the marginal utility of consuming one unit of income today
(in t) equal to the discounted future marginal utility of consum-
ing the gross income acquired by saving income in t + 1.
1
cs,t
= βsrtEt
[
1
cs,t+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
(2.4)
The labor supply equation (2.5) determines how many hours
the saving household is willing to work given their real wage
rate.
n
η−1
s,t cs,t =
Ws,t
Pt
(2.5)
The intertemporal equation for housing (2.6) puts in level the
costs of housing stock in units of consumption today to the
marginal utility of housing services today and the discounted
utility gain in consumption units of selling housing stock to-
morrow.
1
cs,t
Qt
Pt
=
jt
hs,t
+ βsEt
[
1
cs,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
(2.6)
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Impatient household The representative impatient household
enters period t with an existing amount of nominal debt Bb,t−1
and hb,t−1 units of housing. During period t the household re-
ceives Wb,tnb,t total nominal factor payments from supplying
nb,t(i) working hours.14 Given the budget constraint (2.7), next
to labor income the households’ funds encompass real estate
wealth from last period, Qthb,t−1, and the amount Bb,t of nom-
inal debt issued by the borrower at time t. The household uses
its funds to repay outstanding nominal debt Bb,t−1 plus the in-
terest payment rt−1 taking price changes from one period to the
next into account. The household purchases cb,t units of the fi-
nal good for consumption purposes at a nominal price Pt and
acquires real estate stock, hb,t, at a nominal price Qt .
cb,t +
rt−1Bb,t−1
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hb,t =
Qt
Pt
hb,t−1 +
Bb,t
Pt
+
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t (2.7)
Each period all borrowers have limited access to credit markets,
as summarized by the collateral constraint:
rtBb,t
Pt
≤ lEt
[Qt+1
Pt
hb,t
]
, (2.8)
where l represents the cap on the LTV ratio. Accordingly, the
debt service in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of
tomorrow’s value of today’s stock of housing. The exogenous
14Symmetric to the saving household, nb,t(i) must satisfy nb,t =
∫ 1
0 nb,t(i)di.
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set l impedes the free credit flow of funds and thus acts as a fric-
tion. A higher l represents looser collateral requirements, while
a lower l states tight credit conditions. (1 − l) stands for the
borrowers’ equity. In the policy exercise, the macroprudential
rule is introduced on l. The representative household chooses
{ct, hb,t, nb,t, Bb,t}∞t=0 to maximize the stream of expected utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
ln(cb,t) + jt ln(hb,t) − n
η
b,t
η
 , (2.9)
where 0 < βb < 1 is the borrowers’ discount factor that is con-
siderably lower than the savers’ discount factor. This assump-
tion assures the flow of funds from savers to borrowers. The
collateral constraint binds in steady state because the interest
rate is smaller than the inverse of borrowers’ discount factor.15
The intertemporal demand shock jt is assumed to follow the
same autoregressive process as for the patient households (2.3).
The problem’s first order conditions comprise the borrowers’
budget constraint (2.7), the borrower’s Euler equation (2.10),
their housing demand equation (2.12), and labor supply equa-
tion (2.11), as well as the collateral constraint (2.8). Alike
15If the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier µt on the collateral constraint is zero, the
collateral constraint (2.8) is non-binding. In this model, the multiplier is
positive in the steady state and for the given small fluctuations around the
steady state.
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for patient households, the borrowers’ Euler equation (2.10)
equates the marginal utility of consuming today to the discounted
marginal utility from consuming the gross income acquired to-
morrow. For µ , 0, the marginal utility of present consump-
tion is larger than the discounted utility of future consumption.
Therefore, agents borrow up to the limit to increase current con-
sumption.
1
cb,t
= βbrtEt
[
1
cb,t+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
+ µtrt (2.10)
The intratemporal condition for labor supply (2.11) sets the
borrowers’ real wage equal to their marginal rate of substitu-
tion between working and consuming.
n
η−1
b,t cb,t =
Wb,t
Pt
(2.11)
Borrowers’ housing decision (2.12) sets the costs of an addi-
tional unit of housing in terms of consumption equal to the
marginal benefits from housing. The benefits encompass the
marginal utility of housing services, the discounted resale value
of real estate stock in units of consumption in t+1, and the util-
ity gain from using housing as collateral.
1
cb,t
Qt
Pt
=
jt
hb,t
+ βbEt
[
1
cb,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
+ µtlEt
[Qt+1
Pt
]
(2.12)
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2.2.2 Final goods producing firms
The representative final goods producing firm purchases yt(i)
units of each intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] at a price Pt(i) to
produce yt units of the final good. Given these prices each firm
chooses {yt, yt(i)} to maximize its profits while manufacturing
according to a CES-production function with constant returns
to scale technology:
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ǫP−1
ǫP di
] ǫP
ǫP−1
(2.13)
with ǫP > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution between the
different intermediate goods yt(i).
Producing in a perfectly competitive market, profit maximiza-
tion of the firm leads to the demand function for intermediate
goods:
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫP
yt. (2.14)
The zero profit condition in the final goods market determines
the price for the finished good (2.15) as:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ǫPdi
] 1
1−ǫP
, (2.15)
which applies ∀t = 1, 2, 3, ....
24
2.2.3 Intermediate goods producing firms
Each firm hires patient and impatient workers for ns,t(i) and
nb,t(i) working hours to produce yt(i) units of the intermediate
good according to the constant return to scale production func-
tion:
yt(i) ≤ ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α (2.16)
with 1 > α > 0 measuring the relative share of patient house-
holds in terms of labor income and 1 − α of impatient house-
holds, respectively. The Cobb-Douglas function implies com-
plementary labor skills of patient and impatient households.16
The technology parameter zt follows the autoregressive pro-
cess:
ln(zt) = (1 − ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εz,t, (2.17)
where 1 > ρz > 0 and the technology shock εz,t is i.i.d. ∼
N(0, σ2z ). Since intermediate goods substitute imperfectly for
one another as inputs for the finished goods, intermediate goods
producing firms set its product specific price Pt(i) in this mo-
nopolistic competitive market. Whereas each firm faces convex
16If the labor effort of the heterogeneous households were perfect substitutes,
the units worked by one group would influence the total wage income of
the other group. In an extreme case, borrowers would not work at all and
generate their income by debt (Iacoviello and Neri, 2010). The assumption
of complementary is economically justified by the fact that the savers who
manage the firms earn higher wages than borrowers (Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego, 2013).
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price adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982) of the size φP,
measured in units of the final good given by φP2
[ Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
]2
yt
with φP ≥ 0. π is the gross steady state inflation, πt = PtPt−1 .
Real dividends (2.18) of each firm are defined as revenues mi-
nus labor and price adjustment costs.
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
yt(i) −
Ws,tns,t(i) + Wb,tnb,t(i)
Pt
−
φP
2
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i) − 1
]2
yt. (2.18)
Due to the (non-linear) adjustment costs, the firm’s decision
problem becomes dynamic and induces sticky adjustment of
prices. Each firm chooses {ns,t(i), nb,t(i), yt(i), Pt(i)}∞t=0 to maxi-
mize its total market value:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t[Dt(i)/Pt]
subject to the production function (3.9) and considering that
yt(i) equals the final goods producing firms’ demand (2.14).17
λs,t
Pt measures the period t real marginal utility to the patient
households provided by an additional unit of profits in t.
The derived first order conditions encompass the labor demand
17The intermediate goods producing firm takes the final price index Pt and
final output goods yt as given.
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equation for savers (2.19) and borrowers (2.20), the production
function (2.16), and the pricing equation for each intermediate
good (2.21), as well as the clearing condition of the production
sector (2.22).
Ws,t
Pt
ns,t = αξtztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α (2.19)
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t = (1 − α)ξtztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α (2.20)
φP
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
]
Pt
πPt−1(i) = ξtǫP
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP−1
+ (1 − ǫP)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP
+
βsφPEt
{
ct
cs,t+1
[
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i) − 1
] [
Pt+1(i)Pt
πPt(i)2
] (
yt+1
yt
)}
(2.21)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP
= ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α (2.22)
The multiplier on the production function ξt(i) captures the firm’s
real marginal costs.18 In a flexible price specification with
φP = 0, the price of an intermediate good Pt(i) is the markup
ǫP
ǫP−1 over nominal marginal costs ξt(i)Pt. Log-linear approx-
imation of the pricing function (2.21) around a zero-inflation
18The multiplier states by how much costs are reduced if one unit less of yt(i)
is produced.
27
steady-state yields the Phillip’s curve:
πˆt = βsEtπˆt+1 +
(ǫP − 1)
φP
ˆξt,
where hats on a variable denote the variable’s deviation from
steady state.
2.2.4 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is conducted by a modified Taylor rule (TR):19
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1 − ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)]
+ εv,t. (2.23)
The monetary authority gradually adjusts the nominal interest
rate in response to deviations of current gross inflation πt from
its zero-steady state value, while ρr and ωπ are the parameters
of the monetary policy rule. The monetary policy shock εv,t is
i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2v).
2.2.5 Model closing equations
In equilibrium the bond market clears according to Bs,t = Bb,t.
The goods market is cleared when yt = cb,t + cs,t +
(
φP
2
)
19The inflation-targeting rule coincides with the mandatory objective of the
European Central Bank.
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( Pt
πPt−1 − 1
)2
yt, and the housing market clearing condition sat-
isfies 1 = hs,t + hb,t, ∀t. The constant supply of housing en-
tails price formation by household demand.Assuming symmet-
ric behavior within the intermediate sector implies Pt(i) = Pt,
yt(i) = yt, ns,t(i) = ns,t, nb,t(i) = nb,t, and Dt(i) = Dt for t =
0, 1, 2, ... and all i ∈ [0, 1].
The model is solved using real terms. The equilibrium is de-
fined as the path of allocations {cs,t, hs,t, ns,t, bs,t, cb,t, hb,t, nb,t, dt,-
yt, jt, zt, ξt, µt}∞t=0 and prices {rt, qt, πt,ws,t,wb,t}∞t=0 that satisfies
the households’ first order conditions (2.1), (2.4) to (2.8) and
(2.7), (2.8) and (2.10) to (2.12) and the firm’s optimality con-
ditions (2.16), (2.18) to (2.21) and the Taylor rule (2.23), as
well as the shocks’ law of motions (2.3) and (2.17).20 I log-
linearize the model around the steady-state and solve it with
Dynare using the MATLAB routine. The log-linearized equa-
tions are summarized in the appendix 2.A.4 and the applied
Klein’s solution algorithm is explained in appendix section 2.B.
20For the policy scenarios, I add the macroprudential rule to the equilibrium
conditions.
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2.3 Calibration
Unlike Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a) who use US date, I
calibrate the model to match primarily Eurozone data while as-
suming a non-inflationary environment. Table 2.2 summarizes
the calibration values based on a quarterly frequency. Imply-
ing an annual nominal interest rate of four percent, the discount
factor βs is 0.99. Setting the discount factor of impatient house-
holds to βb to 0.975 assures a large enough motive of borrow-
ers to take out a loan, so that the linearization of the binding
collateral constraint around the steady state is accurate. With
a parameter η equal to two, the Frisch labor elasticity is one.
The Eurosystem’s household Finance and Consumption Sur-
vey (ECB, 2013) ascertains 43.7% of households in the Euro
area have some form of debt, while the prevalence of mortgage
debt is higher than of non-mortgage debt.21 In line with these
facts, I choose a value of α = 0.64 for the income share of
non-constrained households, which is also consistent with Ru-
bio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014). The parameter of the price
adjustment costs φP is set to 58, which implies that firms re-
optimize their prices on average every 12 months. The elastic-
ity of substitution ǫP is fixed to 6. This translates to a mark-
up of 20% of prices over real marginal costs (Keen and Wang,
2007). The following calibration values depend on the LTV
21More than half of European indebted households have a mortgage debt,
namely 23.1% of all Euro area households.
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ratio that is either sixty five or ninety in the two benchmark
models. I calibrate the weight on housing in the utility function
to 0.1, which induces a steady state housing wealth to annual
GDP ratio between 225% (LTV=0.65) and 240% (LTV=0.90).
The average ratio from 1994-2009 is around 240% in the Eu-
rozone (Banca D’Italia, 2013). The average mortgage debt to
GDP ratio is 40% in the Eurozone (Musso et al., 2011). Corre-
spondingly, the steady-state mortgage loan to annual GDP ratio
ranges from 54% when the LTV=0.90, and 27% when steady
state LTV is 0.65. For the monetary feedback rule, I assume
that the interest rate smoothing parameter is equal to 0.8 and
a long-run response to inflation ωπ of 2 to regard the Taylor-
principle. The housing demand shock is calibrated so that real
house prices increase on average by one percent in both bench-
mark models creating an impact on output of maximal 0.8 per-
cent. The persistence parameter of this shock is set to 0.95.
The productivity shock with ρz = 0.95 represents an one per-
cent shock to technology, as in Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego
(2014). The standard deviation of a monetary policy shock is
set to 0.004 in line with the literature.
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Table 2.2: Calibration values. Parameters are calibrated to
match Eurozone data.
Parameter Description Value
βs discount factor for savers 0.99
βb discount factor for borrowers 0.975
η parameter governing the disutility of labor 2
j steady state weight of housing 0.1
α labor share of saver 0.64
φP price adjustment costs 58
ǫP price elasticity of demand 6
ρr interest rate smoothing parameter in TR 0.8
ωπ inflation parameter in TR 2
ρ j persistence housing demand shock 0.95
ρz persistence technology shock 0.99
σz standard deviation technology shock 0.01
σ j standard deviation housing demand shock 0.06
σv standard deviation monetary policy shock 0.004
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2.4 Collateral constraints and optimal
countercyclical regulation
2.4.1 Amplification effect of lax credit constraints
The pecuniary externality associated with the collateral con-
straint l plays a central role in the model. Leaving all other pa-
rameters unchanged, I alter the fixed LTV ratio from 65% step-
wise to 90% in different model specifications to stress the am-
plification effect of collateral constraints.22 Table 2.3 lists the
standard deviation of output after a housing demand and tech-
nology shock.23 The output variance generated by a housing
demand shock increases with laxer credit limits for borrowers,
but remains almost unchanged after a technology shock. The
amplification with higher credit limits stresses that only hous-
ing demand shocks induce a collateral effect: the shift in the
households’ taste for housing services causes house prices to
rise. The tighter the collateral constraint the lower is the wealth
effect of the borrower as borrowers profit in two ways by more
housing wealth. First, borrowers have a higher propensity to
spend than savers because of their discount factor. This is ac-
22The externality arises in incomplete credit market where the collateral con-
straint creates the friction in the market. Fire-sales of borrowers to meet
their collateral requirement depress the collateral price, so that economic
conditions worsen (Korinek and Simsek, 2016).
23I simulate 1000 data series based on the perturbation solution of the model
and compute the moments of these simulated series.
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Table 2.3: Simulated output standard deviation for a selec-
tion of models that characterize different LTV ratios
after a housing demand and a technology shock.
Output standard deviation
model housing demand shock technology shock
LTV=0.90 0.0055 0.0200
LTV=0.80 0.0017 0.0195
LTV=0.70 0.0006 0.0194
LTV=0.65 0.0003 0.0194
companied by a higher marginal propensity to consume, which
reinforces the effect on aggregate demand conditional on the
LTV level. Second, borrowers use housing as collateral, which
enables them to increase their borrowing capacity with higher
house prices. In turn they spend more income for housing and
thereby housing collateral value increases boosting borrowing
again. This mechanism is known as the financial multiplier ef-
fect (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
Consistent with the findings of Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego
(2014), Lambertini et al. (2013), and Walentin (2014), hous-
ing demand shocks given collateral constraints are a source for
propagating business cycle fluctuations.24 The fact that a coun-
tercyclical macroprudential rule on the LTV ratio induces the
24Appendix 2.C.1 provides a detailed explanation of the model’s dynamics
after a housing demand and a technology shock.
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borrower to internalize the externality of the constraint moti-
vates the introduction of countercyclical macroprudential rules
on fixed LTV ratios. In this context, the paper defines stabi-
lization effects of macroprudential regulation by lowering vari-
ables’ variance compared to the situation without regulation.
2.4.2 Macroprudential policy
The macroprudential authority sets the countercyclical LTV ra-
tio according to a linear policy rule as in Lambertini et al.
(2013), Angelini et al. (2012), and Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013):
lt = (1 − ρl) l + (1 − ρl) χl ln
(
xt
x
)
+ ρl lt−1 (2.24)
where 0 < ρl < 1 is the autoregressive persistence parameter of
the rule and χl < 0 denotes the response parameter to the cho-
sen indicator variable xt. The ESRB recommends to use either
real estate prices or real estate credit as an indicator (ESRB,
2014). They reason their choice by stating states that strong
price growth and high volumes of real estate credit in the real
estate sector can induce a banking crisis. With that in mind,
deviations of house prices or the credit aggregate, xt = {qt, bt},
from its steady state value indicate an imbalance in the model.
For a countercyclical adjustment of the LTV ratio, χl must be
negative. Accordingly the LTV ratio tightens (relaxes) in re-
sponse to positive (negative) deviation of the indicator variable
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from its steady state value. The following macroprudential pol-
icy analysis is conducted for the model specifications with a
pre-set LTV ratio of 0.65 and 0.90. In both specifications the
rule is introduced making lt endogenous.
2.4.3 Optimal macroprudential rules
The main objective of macroprudential policy is the prevention
of systemic risk and connected with it, excessive borrowing
in order to ensure financial stability. To enforce these objec-
tives, I assume the macroprudential authority parametrizes the
macroprudential rule (2.24) accordingly. As a proxy for finan-
cial stability, the macroprudential authority uses the reduction
of credit variance as key argument in its objective function. To
parameterize the macroprudential policy rule (2.24), to name it
χl and ρl, the macroprudential authority minimizes its objec-
tive function over the two variables.25 The same procedure is
applied by Mendicino and Punzi (2014), Resende et al. (2013)
and Angelini et al. (2012). In contrast to others, I do not con-
sider output stabilization as a second argument in the objective
function which I justify by Tinbergen’s criteria.26 In line with
the Tinbergen principle, this setup with one macroprudential
25Several studies analyzed the impact of a countercyclical rule by using an
arbitrary parametrization of the rule.
26Tinbergen (1952) alludes that every policy objective requires at least one
single instrument.
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instrument allows for only one objective.27
For the parametrization, the countercyclical change of the LTV
ratio is, in particular, supposed to abate the financial multiplier
triggered by a housing demand shock. Therefore, the optimiza-
tion is conducted exclusively under a housing demand shock
for both rules (xt = {bt, qt}). In the two benchmark models, the
macroprudential regulator minimizes the loss function (2.25)
subject to the model equations to find the optimal χl and ρl for
the rule responding to house price or credit growth, separately.
I restrict the χl on a grid going from −2 to 0.5 in steps of 0.01,
which allows a systematic but not to extreme policy reaction.
Besides 0 ≤ ρl < 1 is assumed.
Lmp = min
χl, ρl
Var(b) s. t. the model equations (2.25)
Table 2.4 provides the optimal values of the policy rules in both
model specifications. Independent of the indicator variable,
a sudden policy reaction effectively reduces credit and output
variance compared to a rigid rule; ρl = 0 is optimal.28
27By using only one target variable, I circumvent the issue of arbitrarily as-
signing weights to the arguments in the loss function. As Angelini et al.
(2012) and Quint and Rabanal (2014) state, my analysis confirms that
weights set to the arguments a priori are sensitive to the result.
28Figure 2.6 illustrating the rule on credit growth and figure 2.5 displaying
the rule on house price growth emphasize the optimality of ρl = 0 by plot-
ting the percentage credit change as a function of the intensity parameter
χl. The rules that react instantaneously curtail credit variance the most.
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Table 2.4: Optimal parameters of the macroprudential pol-
icy rule that reacts to either house price or credit
growth after a housing demand shock. The optimal
values for ρl and χl for the two models are results of
the loss function minimization.
model indicator optimal parameter
ρl χl
LTV = 0.90 qˆ 0.0 −0.84
LTV = 0.65 qˆ 0.0 −0.70
LTV = 0.90 ˆb 0.0 −2
LTV = 0.65 ˆb 0.0 −2
Regarding the rule responding to house prices, the optimal re-
action parameter is relatively strong with −0.84 in the model
with a steady-state LTV ratio of 0.9 compared to the model
with tight credit conditions with a value of −0.70. The larger
collateral effect induced by the higher LTV ratio causes this
more intense policy reaction. Turning to the macroprudential
policy rule reacting to credit growth, a value of χl = −2 is op-
timal for the model with tight and lax credit conditions. This
result underlines that using credit as indicator naturally serves
its purpose to stabilize credit volatility.
In a sensitivity analysis, I check the impact of a countercyclical
rule on output variance for both scenarios. To do so, figure 2.1
illustrates the rule reacting to house price growth and figure 2.2
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displays the rule on credit growth as a function of the intensity
parameter χl. The results uncover that the rule responding to
credit growth is less sensitive to the reaction parameter than a
rule on house prices. A rule implemented in the high leverage
scenario results in greater output volatility reduction than in
the scenario when borrowers provide more equity. For the high
leverage scenario, the optimal parameter that mitigates credit
variance lies in the same value region as the parameter that re-
duces output variance. However, this symmetry concerning the
optimal parameter is not evident for both rules in the low lever-
age scenario, where the rule only reduces output variance for
small negative parameter values. If the leverage ratio of bor-
rowers is low, the countercyclical rule reduces less likely, si-
multaneously, the variance of loans and output. Independent of
the indicator variable a sudden policy reaction shows to reduce
output variance most effectively.
2.4.4 Welfare implications
In order to evaluate the desirability of the specified rules from
the above optimization procedure, I compare the welfare im-
plications of macroprudential regulation for the tight and lax
credit scenario. Welfare is defined as the present discounted
value of lifetime utility (2.26) of borrowers and savers i =
{b, s}, respectively, and is recursively calculated according to
(2.27). The separate computation renders possible to identify
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the winners of the introduction of a macroprudential rule. An
accurate approximation to the welfare function requires a second-
order expansion to the model equilibrium conditions following
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b).
Ωi,t ≡ Et
∞∑
m=0
βmi
(
log ci,t+m + j log hi,t+m − (ni,t+m)
η
η
)
(2.26)
Ωi,t = U(ci,t, hi,t, ni,t) + βiΩi,t+1 (2.27)
Conditional welfare depends on the initial state considered of
each model economy, which is the non-stochastic steady state
value of welfare captured in the state vector. As the state vec-
tor is different for the two scenarios, each benchmark scenario
serves as reference. Therefore, I contrast the impact of alter-
native policies that are consistent with the same non-stochastic
steady state to all sources of fluctuations in the model, which
refers to the implied volatility of all shocks. In consequence,
I compare the welfare change between the considered bench-
mark model to the welfare outcome with the countercyclical
rule for the two indicator variables. I quantify the welfare dif-
ferences in terms of consumption equivalences: how much is
the household willing to pay in consumption units for the im-
plementation of the macroprudential rule because it is welfare
improving. A negative value indicates a compensation in per-
cent of the household’s consumption stream that the household
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requires to accept the macroprudential rule.
Table 2.5 summarizes the welfare implications for the two sce-
narios and the corresponding optimal rules. Compared to a
constant LTV ratio, allowing for a countercyclical LTV-rule im-
proves upon total welfare which is the sum of individual wel-
fare gains. Borrowers are the main winners. They obtain a
higher welfare level with macropudential policy regardless of
the indicator variable because the tightening of the collateral
constraint impedes the situation of extreme leverage. Borrow-
ers are unable to smooth their consumption of goods and hous-
ing service without a rule, even though they are rational enough
to expect a boom or a bust phase. As model technique wise
the collateral constraint is always binding, the welfare analy-
sis indicates that the countercyclical rule mitigates the negative
externality of the collateral constraint.
If the countercyclical rule reacts to credit growth in the scenario
with a LTV ratio of 90%, welfare achievements are the largest.
Borrowers receive 0.287% more and savers gain 0.186% more
of lifetime consumption they would have without the regula-
tion. In the high leverage scenario, not only borrowers con-
sumption stream is smoothed, but also savers obtain additional
welfare units. That is very likely due to the stable stock of
housing services from which also savers derive utility. In the
low leverage scenario, the rule on credit growth, however, ac-
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crues welfare costs for savers.29
With a rule on house price growth in the set-up with a LTV ratio
of 90%, borrowers’ consumption smoothing affects a 0.434%
welfare payoff and in the tight credit condition scenario they
earn slightly less with 0.135%. These welfare gains with the
macroprudential rule on house price growth is at the expense
of savers, who lose consumption units. The welfare analysis
showed that the welfare achievements through the introduction
of the regulation depend on the level of borrowers’ indebted-
ness.
2.5 Discussion of results
Compared to the benchmark, the specified optimal rules alter
the transmission of a housing demand shock in the scenarios
with an initial LTV ratio of 90% (figure 2.3) and an initial LTV
ratio of 65% (figure 2.4).30 In both scenarios, the shock induces
that the rule reacting to either house price growth or credit
growth tightens the credit limits different than in the bench-
mark models with a constant credit limit. In the high leverage
29Likewise, Lambertini et al. (2013) find similar welfare gains for both
households when the rule responds to credit growth on a LTV ratio of
85% given a standard Taylor rule.
30As macroprudential regulation authority is not capable to determine the
origin of the shock, the impact of a countercyclical rule under a technology
shock is equally essential and is, hence, discussed in the appendix 2.C.2.
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Table 2.5: Conditional welfare gains with the optimal coun-
tercyclical rules. Gains are stated relative to the
corresponding benchmark model without regulation,
while values are in percent of the household’s life-
time consumption stream. Negative values imply
costs for the household type.
rule on house price growth rule on credit growth
LTV=0.65 LTV=0.90 LTV=0.65 LTV=0.90
χl = −0.70 χl = −0.84 χl = −2 χl = −2
savers’
welfare
−0.065 −0.176 −0.018 0.186
borrowers’
welfare
0.135 0.434 0.082 0.287
total
effect
0.070 0.258 0.064 0.473
scenario, impatient households may, consequently, borrow less,
while the effect is reinforced by a rule on house prices. Com-
paring the scenario with a LTV ratio of 65% with its bench-
mark, the rule on credit growth mitigates borrowing and the
rule on house prices even leads to deleveraging. Consequently,
the effect on output is diverse in the two scenarios. Macropru-
dential regulation smooths output in the high credit scenario,
while output falls in the counter scenario in response to both
rules. That is because in the low leverage scenario, the im-
pact on borrowers’ wealth, generated by higher house prices,
is lower, so the additional amount of credit that the borrower
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receives for its collateral is lower. By restricting borrowing ad-
ditionally, borrowers’ wealth falls and the impact of the posi-
tive housing demand shock reverses in the tight credit scenario.
Prices decrease causing interest rates to fall. Because lower
interest rates boost borrowers’ demand for loans that the coun-
tercyclical rule aims to limit, macroprudential and monetary
policy are in conflict. Subsequently, dampened credit cycles
are at a cost of output destabilization during house price booms
when borrowers are subject to strict LTV ratios. In contrast,
in the lax credit scenario the countercyclical rule shuts off the
amplification effect of the collateral constraint and attenuates
output fluctuations. Moreover, in the scenario with a LTV ratio
of 65%, both rules cause a drop of debt payments by a lower
interest rate, which destabilizes savers’ consumption, and sup-
ports the finding that savers are socially worse off.
Countercyclical regulation mitigates credit cycles in both sce-
narios. However, if credit conditions are initially tight, the ben-
efits of a countercyclial rule to a housing demand shock are
revoked. Thus, a countercyclical rule can be harmful since it
creates unnecessary output variability and deflation. In addi-
tion, in this scenario the consequently lowered interest rates op-
pose tight credit limits, which creates a conflict between poli-
cies. If borrowers have initially a high debt level, I find that
optimal countercyclical regulation reduces simultaneously out-
put and credit volatility. When borrowers provide less equity,
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or put differently, exhibit a relatively high leverage ratio, the
regulatory scope of the macroprudential authority to safeguard
financial stability is larger. These results support findings of
Mendicino (2012) who investigates the effects of a low fixed
LTV ratio of 50% and a countercyclical rule on a LTV ratio of
85%. In response to a credit shock she also finds that coun-
tercyclical caps are successful in dampening credit cycles con-
trary to tight discretionary credit caps.31 Though, this paper
stands out by adding to the literature that in case of low credit
limits the effects of countercyclical regulation are detrimental
because the rule induces an output loss and deflation. The regu-
latory interference with countercyclical regulation shows to be
more influential when households are considerably leveraged.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the relation between countercyclical macro-
prudential rules and the debt level of borrowers. In the model
framework based on Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a), the
presence of a limit on the LTV ratio of borrowers amplifies the
consequences of a housing demand shock for the real economy,
while the collateral effect increases with leverage. As technol-
ogy shocks generate only a weak propagation, the policy anal-
31Additionally, she finds no evidence that countercyclical gaps increase the
response of output to technology shocks.
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ysis focuses on boom and bust cycles in the housing market. In
this set-up, I investigate the welfare implications and stabiliza-
tion benefits of countercyclical LTV-rules for borrowers with a
high and a low initial LTV ratio. The rules are parametrized
to optimally mitigate credit cycles taking monetary policy as
given. Either credit or house price growth indicates counter-
cyclical adjustment of the credit limit.
In response to a housing demand shock, countercyclical rules
effectively dampen credit growth independent of the indicator
variable and borrowers level of indebtedness. If the rule is im-
plemented on a high cap of the LTV ratio, the rule reduces also
output fluctuations contrary to the model with a low cap of the
LTV ratio. The rationale behind the different performance of
the rules in the scenarios is the following: in an economy with
tight credit constraints on borrowers, the time-varying rule ad-
ditionally tightens the credit limit. The over-tight credit cap
prevents a wealth effect for borrowers after the shock, which
accounts for a fall of output and leads to deflation. Due to lower
nominal interest rate, macroprudential and monetary policy en-
ter into conflict. In addition, the welfare computation supports
the introduction of countercyclical rules only in the high lever-
age scenario.
My findings imply the implementation of a LTV rule in markets
with relatively leveraged mortgage borrowers countercyclical
macroprudential regulation achieves credit and output stabiliza-
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tion. The rule on credit growth performs thereby better than a
rule on house price growth due to higher total welfare gains and
smoothed credit cycles. The model results reveal that coun-
tercyclical regulation of hardly indebted households delivers
credit stabilization at a cost of output variability, which is an
important insight for the design of macroprudential real estate
regulation.
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Figure 2.1: Output variance change and the rule reacting to
house price growth. Rule as a function of the pol-
icy reaction parameter (χl) and the percentage out-
put variance change relative to benchmark variance
(Y-axis) that results after a housing demand shock.
ρl = 0 refers to an ad hoc adjustment of the LTV
ratio and ρl = 0.9 to a rigid adjustment of the LTV
ratio to house price growth. The rule on a LTV ratio
of 0.9 and with ρl = 0 is the dashed blue and with
ρl = 0.9 the solid green line. The rule on a LTV
ratio of 0.65 and with ρl = 0 is the dotted red and
with ρl = 0.9 the turquoise dash-dotted line.
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Figure 2.2: Output variance change and the rule reacting to
credit growth. Rule as a function of the policy re-
action parameter (χl) and percentage output vari-
ance change relative to benchmark variance (verti-
cal axis) that results after a housing demand shock.
ρl = 0 refers to an ad hoc adjustment of the LTV
ratio and ρl = 0.9 to a rigid adjustment of the LTV
ratio to credit growth. The rule on a LTV ratio of
0.9 and with ρl = 0 is the dashed blue and with
ρl = 0.9 the solid green line. The rule on a LTV
ratio of 0.65 and with ρl = 0 is the dotted red and
with ρl = 0.9 the turquoise dash-dotted line.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse responses to a housing demand shock
in the model with a LTV ratio of 90%. Vari-
ables’ reaction with constant LTV ratio (solid red
line), with countercyclical LTV-rule on house price
(dashed blue line) and credit growth (dotted black
line).
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to a housing demand shock
in the model with a LTV ratio of 65%. Vari-
ables’ reaction with constant LTV ratio (solid red
line), with countercyclical LTV-rule on house price
(dashed blue line) and credit growth (dotted black
line).
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Figure 2.5: Credit variance change and the rule reacting to
house price growth. Rule as a function of the
policy reaction parameter (χl) and the percentage
credit variance change relative to benchmark vari-
ance (vertical axis) that results after a housing de-
mand shock. ρl = 0 refers to an ad hoc adjustment
of the LTV ratio and ρl = 0.9 to a rigid adjustment
of the LTV ratio to house price growth. The rule
on a LTV ratio of 0.9 and with ρl = 0 is the dashed
blue and with ρl = 0.9 the solid green line. The rule
on a LTV ratio of 0.65 and with ρl = 0 is the dot-
ted red and with ρl = 0.9 the turquoise dash-dotted
line.
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Figure 2.6: Credit variance change and the rule reacting to
credit growth Rule as a function of the policy re-
action parameter (χl) and percentage credit vari-
ance change relative to benchmark variance ( verti-
cal axis) that results after a housing demand shock.
ρl = 0 refers to an ad hoc adjustment of the LTV
ratio and with ρl = 0.9 to a rigid adjustment of the
LTV ratio to credit growth. The rule on a LTV ratio
of 0.9 and with ρl = 0 is the dashed blue and with
ρl = 0.9 the solid green line. The rule on a LTV
ratio of 0.65 and with ρl = 0 is the dotted red and
with ρl = 0.9 the turquoise dash-dotted line.
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Appendix
2.A Model equations
2.A.1 Optimization problems
• Savers’ optimization problem:
max
cs,t ,hs,t ,Ns,t ,Bs,t
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
ln(cs,t) + jt ln(hs,t) − n
η
s,t
η

−βtsλs,t
(
cs,t +
Bs,t
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t −
(rt−1)Bs,t−1
Pt
−
Ws,tns,t
Pt
−
Qt
Pt
hs,t−1 −
Dt
Pt
)}
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First order conditions:
∂L
∂cs,t
= βts
1
cs,t
− βtsλs,t = 0
⇐⇒
1
cs,t
= λs,t
∂L
∂hs,t
= βts jt
1
hs,t
− βtsλs,t
Qt
Pt
+ βt+1s Et
[
λs,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
= 0
⇐⇒ λs,t
Qt
Pt
=
jt
hs,t
+ βsEt
[
λs,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
∂L
∂ns,t
= βts(−η)
n
η−1
s,t
η
+ βtsλs,t
Ws,t
Pt
= 0
⇐⇒
η
η−1
s,t
λs,t
=
Ws,t
Pt
∂L
∂Bs,t
= −βtsλs,t
1
Pt
+ βt+1s (rt)Et
[
λs,t+1
Pt+1
]
= 0
⇐⇒ λs,t = βs(rt)Et
[
λs,t+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
∂L
∂λs,t
= −βts
(
cs,t +
Bs,t
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t − (rt−1)
Bs,t−1
Pt
−
Ws,tns,t
Pt
−
Qt
Pt
hs,t−1 −
Dt
Pt
)
= 0
⇐⇒ cs,t +
Bs,t
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t = (rt−1)
Bs,t−1
Pt
+
Ws,tns,t
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t−1 +
Dt
Pt
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• Borrowers’ optimization problem
max
cb,t ,hb,t ,nb,t ,Bb,t
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
ln(cb,t) + j ln(hb,t) − n
η
b,t
η
−
βtbλb,t
(
cb,t +
(rt−1)Bb,t−1
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hb,t −
Qt
Pt
hb,t−1 −
Bb,t
Pt
−
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t
)
− βtbµt
(
rtBb,t
Pt
− ltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
hb,t
])}
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First order conditions:
∂L
∂cb,t
= βtb
1
cb,t
− βtbλb,t = 0
⇐⇒
1
cb,t
= λb,t
∂L
∂hb,t
= βtb j
1
hb,t
− βtbλb,t
Qt
Pt
+ βt+1b Et
[
λb,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
+
βtbµtltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
]
= 0
⇐⇒ λb,t
Qt
Pt
= j 1hb,t + µtltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
]
+ βbEt
[
λb,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
∂L
∂nb,t
= βtb(−η)
n
η−1
b,t
η
+ βtbλb,t
Wb,t
Pt
= 0
⇐⇒
n
η−1
b,t
λb,t
=
Wb,t
Pt
∂L
∂Bb,t
= −βt+1b Et
[
λb,t+1
(rt)
Pt+1
]
+ βtbλb,t
1
Pt
− βtbµt(rt)
1
Pt
= 0
⇐⇒
1
Pt
λb,t = µt
(rt)
Pt
+ βb(rt)Et
[
λb,t+1
1
Pt+1
]
⇐⇒ λb,t = µt(rt) + βb(rt)Et
[
λb,t+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
∂L
∂µt
= −βtb
(
(rt)
Bb,t
Pt
− ltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
hb,t
])
= 0
⇐⇒ (rt)
Bb,t
Pt
= ltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
hb,t+1
]
∂L
∂λt
= −βtb
(
cb,t + (rt−1)
Bb,t−1
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hb,t −
Qt
Pt
hb,t−1
−
Bb,t
Pt
−
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t
)
= 0
⇐⇒ cb,t + (rt−1)
Bbt−1
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hb,t =
Qt
Pt
hb,t−1 +
Bb,t
Pt
+
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t
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• Final good producers’ optimization problem
max
yt(i)
ΠF = Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
=⇒ max
yt(i)
ΠF = Pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ǫP−1
ǫP di
] ǫP(ǫP−1)
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
First order condition:
∂ΠF
∂yt(i) = Pt
ǫP
ǫP − 1
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ǫP−1
ǫP di
] ǫP
ǫP−1
−1
ǫP − 1
ǫP
yt(i)
ǫP−1
ǫP
−1
− Pt(i) = 0
⇐⇒ Pty
1
ǫP
t yt(i)−
1
ǫP = Pt(i)
⇐⇒ yt(i)
1
ǫP =
Pt
Pt(i)y
1
ǫP
t
⇐⇒ yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫP
yt
The zero-profit condition in the final goods market due
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to perfect competition determines Pt:
yt =

∫ 1
0
{[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫP
yt
} ǫP−1
ǫP
di

ǫP
ǫP−1
⇐⇒ yt = PǫPt
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ǫPdi
] ǫP
ǫP−1
yt
⇐⇒ P−ǫPt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ǫPdi
] ǫP
ǫP−1
⇐⇒ Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ǫPdi
] 1
1−ǫP
• Intermediate goods producing firms’ optimization prob-
lem
max
Pt(i),ns,t(i),nb,t(i)
ΠI = E0
∞∑
t=0
{
βtsλs,t
[
Pt(i)
Pt
yt(i) −
Ws,t
Pt
ns,t(i)
−
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t(i) − φP2
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
)2
yt
+
ξtβsλs,t
(
ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α − yt
)}
=⇒ max
Pt(i),ns,t(i),nb,t(i)
ΠI = E
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t

(
Pt(i)
Pt
)1−ǫP
yt−
Ws,t
Pt
ns,t(i) −
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t(i) − φP2
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
)2
yt
−
βtsλs,tξt
[(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP
yt − ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
]}
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First order conditions:
∂ΠI
∂Pt(i) = β
t
sλs,t
[
(1 − ǫP)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫP 1
Pt
yt − φ
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
)
1
πPt−1(i)yt
]
+ βt+1s λs,t+1Et
[
φ
(
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i) − 1
)
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)2
yt+1
]
+ βtsλs,tξt
ǫP
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP−1 1
Pt
yt
 = 0
⇐⇒ φλs,t
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
]
Pt
πPt−1(i) = λs,t(1 − ǫP)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫP
+
λs,tξtǫP
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP−1
+ βsφEt{
λs,t+1
[
Pt+1(i)
πPt
− 1
] [
Pt+1(i)Pt
πPt(i)2
]
yt+1
yt
}
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∂ΠI
∂ns,t(i) = −β
t
sλs,t
Ws,t
Pt
+ βtsλs,tξtαztns,t(i)α−1nb,t(i)1−α = 0
⇐⇒
Ws,t
Pt
ns,t(i) = αξtztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
∂ΠI
∂nb,t(i) = −β
t
sλs,t
Wb,t
Pt
+ βtsλs,tξtzt(1 − α)ns,t(i)αnb,t(i)−α = 0
⇐⇒
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t(i) = (1 − α)ξtztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
∂πI
∂ξt
= yt(i) − ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α = 0
⇐⇒ yt(i) = ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
∂ΠI
∂ξt
=
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP
yt − ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α = 0
⇐⇒
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP
yt = ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
• Since all firms face the same demand given the aggregate
output level yt and the price index Pt, every firm has the
same marginal costs ξt and consequently sets the same
price, so that Pt(i) = Pt. The pricing equation in terms of
gross inflation πt = PtPt−1 yields:
φP
[
πt
π
− 1
]
πt
π
= (1 − ǫP) + ξtǫP + βsφPEt
{
λs,t+1
λs,t[
πt+1
π
− 1
] [
πt+1
π
] yt+1
yt
}
In a zero-inflation environment, the log-linearization of
the pricing equation around its steady state, which is ξ =
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ǫP−1
ǫP
, derives the New Keynesian Philipp’s curve:
πˆt = βsEtπˆt+1 +
(ǫP − 1)
φP
ˆξt
Inflation is a function of expected inflation and real marginal
cost.
• Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule in setting the gross
interest rate.
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ωr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1 − ωr)
(
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
))
+ vt
• The macroprudential regulation authority sets the LTV
ratio of borrowers according to the macroprudential rule.
lt = (1 − ρl)l + (1 − ρl)χl ln
(
xt
x
)
+ ρllt−1,
• Market clearing conditions
– Goods market
yt = cb,t + cs,t +
(
φP
2
) (
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
)2
yt
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– Labor market
nb,t =
∫ 1
0
nb,t(i)di
ns,t =
∫ 1
0
ns,t(i)di
– Dividend market
Dt =
∫ 1
0
Dt(i)di
– Housing market
1 = hs,t + hb,t
– Bond market
Bs,t = Bb,t
• Law of Motion for the housing demand shock jt, the
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technology shock zt, and the monetary policy shock vt:32
ln( jt) = (1 − ρ j) ln( j) + ρ j ln( jt−1) + ε j,t
ln(zt) = (1 − ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εz,t
ln(vt) = ρv ln(vt−1) + εv,t
2.A.2 Nonlinear system in symmetric equilibrium
The subsequent notation makes use of the bond market clear-
ing condition, Bb,t = Bs,t. In a symmetric equilibrium applies
Pt(i) = Pt, ns,t(i) = ns,t, nb,t(i) = nb,t, Dt(i) = Dt ∀t ∈ [0, 1]. By
redefining πt = PtPt−1 , wt =
Wt
Pt , bs,t =
Bs,t
Pt , qt =
Qt
Pt , dt =
Dt
Pt , the
exposition of the system of the 21 equations for the 21 variables
{ jt, zt, vt, hs,t, ns,t, cs,t, bs,t, hb,t, nb,t, cb,t, πt,ws,t,wb,t, yt, qt, lt, dt, rt,-
ξt, µt} is given by:
ln( jt) = (1 − ρ j) ln( j) + ρ j ln( jt−1) + ε j,t (2.1)
ln(zt) = (1 − ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + ǫz,t (2.2)
ln(vt) = ρv ln(vt−1) + εvt (2.3)
1
cs,t
qt = jt 1hs,t + βsEt
[
1
cs,t+1
qt+1
]
(2.4)
32Since I assume that a monetary policy shock affects the economy right
away, the rigidity parameter ρv is zero and redundant.
64
cs,tn
η−1
s,t = ws,t (2.5)
1
cs,t
= βsrtEt
[
1
cs,t+1
1
πt+1
]
(2.6)
cs,t + bs,t + qths,t = rt−1
bs,t−1
πt
+ ws,tns,t + qths,t−1 + dt (2.7)
1
cb,t
qt = j 1hb,t + µtltEt
[
qt+1πt+1
]
+ βbEt
[
1
cb,t+1
qt+1
]
(2.8)
cb,tn
η−1
b,t = wb,t (2.9)
1
cb,t
= µt(rt) + βb(rt)E
[
1
cb,t+1
1
πt+1
]
(2.10)
cb,t + (rt−1)
bs,t−1
πt
+ qthb,t = qthb,t−1 + bs,t + wb,tnb,t (2.11)
rt
bb,t
Et (πt+1) = ltEt
[
qt+1hb,t
] (2.12)
φP
[
πt
π
− 1
]
πt
π
= (1 − ǫP) + ξtǫP + βsφPEt
{
λs,t+1
λs,t
[
πt+1
π
− 1
]
[
πt+1
π
] yt+1
yt
}
(2.13)
yt(i) = ztnαs,tnb,t(i)1−α (2.14)
ws,tns,t = αξtztn
α
s,tn
1−α
b,t (2.15)
wb,tnb,t = (1 − α)ξtztnαs,tn1−αb,t (2.16)
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ωr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1 − ωr)
(
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
))
+ vt (2.17)
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lt = (1 − ρl)l + (1 − ρl)χl ln
(
xt
x
)
+ ρxlt−1 (2.18)
dt = yt − ws,tns,t − wb,tnb,t −
φ
2
(
πt
π
− 1
)2
yt (2.19)
yt = cs,t + cb,t −
φP
2
(
πt
π
− 1
)2
yt (2.20)
1 = hb,t + hs,t (2.21)
2.A.3 Steady state calculation
In the absence of three shocks ε j,t = εz,t = εv,t = 0 for all t the
model converges to the local steady state, where all variables
are constant. Therefore, in steady state no adjustment costs
arise in the intermediate good production sector. By setting
the monetary policies inflation target to zero, the gross infla-
tion rate in steady state is one. Variables without time index
designate steady state values.
j = j (2.1’)
z = z (2.2’)
v = v (2.3’)
q
cs
= j 1hs + βs
q
cs
(2.4’)
csn
η−1
s = ws (2.5’)
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1
cs
= βsr
1
csπ
(2.6’)
cs +
bs
r
+ qhs =
bs
π
+ wsns + qhs + d (2.7’)
q
cb
=
j
hb
+ µlq + βb
q
cb
(2.8’)
cbn
η−1
b = wb (2.9’)
1
cb
=
µr
π
+ βb
r
cbπ
(2.10’)
cb +
bs
π
+ qhb = qhb +
bb
r
+ wbnb (2.11’)
bs
π
= lqhb (2.12’)
(ǫP − 1) = ξǫP (2.13’)
y = znαs n
1−α
b (2.14’)
wsns = αξy (2.15’)
wbnb = (1 − α)ξy (2.16’)
π = 1 (2.17’)
l = l (2.18’)
d = y − wsns − wbnb (2.19’)
y = cs + cb (2.20’)
1 = hs + hb (2.21’)
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Equation (2.6’) forms to:
r =
π
βs
(2.22)
Rewriting (2.10’) with (2.22) solves to:
µ =
1
cb
(βs − βb) (2.23)
Rewriting (2.12’) yields:
hb =
rbb
πqk (2.24)
Plugging (2.24) into (2.10’) results in:
q
cb
=
j
hb
+
1
cb
(βs − βb) lq + βb q
cb
(2.25)
Plugging (2.23) into (2.8’) adds up to:
q
cb
=
j
hb
+ lq 1
cb
(βs − βb) + βb q
cb
(2.26)
Equation (2.13’) simplifies to:
ξ =
(ǫP − 1)
ǫP
(2.27)
Substituting (2.27) in (2.15’) yields:
ns = αy
(ǫP − 1)
ǫPws
(2.28)
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Substituting (2.27) into (2.16’) results in:
nb = (1 − α)y (ǫP − 1)
ǫPwb
(2.29)
Plugging (2.28) and (2.22) into (2.7’) delivers:
cs +
bsβs
π
=
bs
π
+ αy
(ǫP − 1)
ǫP
+ d (2.30)
Equation (2.29) combined with (2.22) and plugged into (2.11’)
produces:
cb +
bb
π
=
bbβs
π
+ (1 − α) (ǫP − 1)
ǫP
y (2.31)
Solving (2.31) for bb results in:
bb =
cb − (1 − α) (ǫP−1)ǫP y
βs
π −
1
π
(2.32)
Taking (2.24), (2.8’) and (2.32) yields the demand curve:
1
cb
=
jπk
cb−(1−α) (ǫP−1)ǫP y
βs
π −
1
π
+
1
cb
(βs − βb)k + βb 1
cb
(2.33)
Inserting (2.5’) in (2.28) results in:
ns =
αy
(ǫP−1)
ǫP
cs

1
η
(2.34)
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Likewise, inserting (2.9’) in (2.29) results in:
nb =
 (1 − α)y
(ǫP−1)
ǫP
cb

1
η
(2.35)
Equation (2.34) and (2.35) in (2.14’) yield the supply curve:
y = cb + cs = z
α(cs + cb)
(ǫP−1)
ǫP
cs

α
η
 (1 − α)(cs + cb)
(ǫP−1)
ǫP
cb

1−α
η
(2.36)
Given the demand and the supply curve of the model, one can
solve the two equations for the two unknowns cb,t and cs,t and
compute the steady states.
2.A.4 Log-linearized equations
For the linearization of the system, I take the natural logarithm
of all variables to make use of the approximation that ln
(
xt
x
)
≈
xt−x
x
. Let ln
(
xt
x
)
= xˆt be the variable’s xt deviation from its
steady state x. Next, I apply a first order Taylor expansion to
the system around the steady state.
ˆjt = ρ j ˆjt−1 + ε j,t (2.1”)
zˆt = ρzzˆt−1 + εz,t (2.2”)
vˆt = ρvvˆt−1 + εv,t (2.3”)
qˆt − cˆs,t = (1 − βs)
(
ˆjt − ˆhs,t
)
+ βsEt
[
qˆt+1 − cˆs,t+1
] (2.4’)
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cˆs,t + (η − 1)nˆs,t = wˆs,t (2.5”)
Et
[
cˆs,t+1] + Et[πˆt+1
]
− cˆs,t = rˆt (2.6”)
πcscˆs,t + πbs ˆbs,t = πqhs
(
ˆhs,t−1 − ˆhs,t
)
+ rbs
(
rˆt−1 + ˆbs,t−1 − πˆt
)
+
πwsns (wˆs + nˆs) + πd ˆdt
(2.7”)
qhb
(
qˆt − cˆb,t
)
= jcb
(
−ˆhb,t + ˆj
)
+ cbhbµlqπ
(
µˆt + πˆt+1 + ˆlt
)
+
hbq (cbµlπ + βb) qˆt+1 − βbqhbEtcˆb,t+1
(2.8”)
cˆb,t + (η − 1)nˆb,t = wˆb,t (2.9”)
Etcˆb,t+1 + Etπˆt+1 − cˆb,t = (1 − βbβs)µˆt + βsβbrˆt (2.10”)
cbπcˆb,t + (r)bs
(
rˆt + ˆbs,t−1 − πˆt
)
= qπhb
(
ˆhb,t−1 − hb,t
)
+ bs ˆbs,t+
πwbnb
(
wˆb,t + nˆb,t
)
(2.11”)
ˆbs,t − Etπˆt+1 + rˆt = ˆlt + qˆt+1 + ˆhb,t (2.12”)
πˆt =
(ǫP − 1)
φP
ˆξt + βsEtπˆt+1 (2.13”)
yˆt = zˆt + αnˆs,t + (1 − α)nˆb,t (2.14”)
ˆξt = wˆb,t + α(nˆb,t − nˆs,t) − zˆt (2.15”)
ˆξt = wˆs,t + (1 − α)(nˆs,t − nˆb,t) − zˆt (2.16”)
rˆt = ωr rˆt−1 + (1 − ωr) (ωππˆt) + vˆt (2.17”)
ˆlt = (1 − ρl)χlqˆt + ρl ˆlt−1 (2.18”)
d ˆdt = yyˆt − wsnswˆs,t − nswsnˆs,t − wbnbwˆb,t − wbnbnˆb,t (2.19”)
yyˆt = cscˆs,t + cbcˆb,t (2.20”)
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0 = hb ˆhb,t + hs ˆhs,t (2.21”)
2.A.5 Transformed system
The budget constraint of the savers is redundant due to Walras’
law, why I leave it out for the following calculation. To solve
the model I bring the log-linearized equation in the state-space
representation:
AEt(xt+1) = Bxt +Cvt, (2.37)
whereas predetermined and non-predetermined variables are in
xt = [ˆbst−1 ˆhb,t−1 rˆt−1 ˆhs,t−1 nˆb,t nˆs,t wˆb,t wˆs,t ˆdt
µˆt ˆξt ˆlt cˆs,t cˆb,t yˆt qˆt πˆt]′
vt = [zˆt ˆjt υˆt]′ and εt = [εz,t ε j,t εv,t]′
vt represents the structural shocks which follow:
vt = Pvt−1 + εt, (2.38)
whereas
P =

ρz 0 0
0 ρ j 0
0 0 ρv
 (2.39)
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A =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −(1 − βs) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −βs 0 0 βs 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 − jcb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 cbhbµlqπ 0 0 0 −βbqhb 0 qhb(cbµlπ + βb) cbhbµlqπ
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −βsβb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
−bs qπhb rbs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −(1 − ρl)χl 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 hb 0 hs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(2.40)
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B =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −cs −cb y 0 0
0 0 0 (1 − βs) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 (η − 1) 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 cbµqlπ 0 cbhbµlqπ 0 qhb 0 −qhb 0
0 0 0 0 (η − 1) 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 − βbβs) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
−rbs πqhb 0 0 πwbnb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −cbπ 0 0 rbs
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (ǫ−1)φ 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 (1 − α) α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρl 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −wbnb −nsws −wbnb −wsns 0 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 0
0 0 0 0 α −α 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −(1 − α) (1 − α) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ωr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 − ωr )ωπ
0 0 0 −hs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(2.41)
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C =

0 0 0
0 −(1 − βs) 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 jcb 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
−1 0 0
−1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0

(2.42)
2.B Klein’s model solution technique
This section explains the linear solution method by Klein for
solving a system of linear expectational difference equations
(Klein, 2000). The algorithm is the basis for the solution method
built in Dynare (Villemot, 2011). Linear approximation of the
model around its steady state yields the state space representa-
tion for the model:33
AEt(xt+1) = Bxt +Cvt
33In the appendix section 3.B the applied linear perturbation technique is
outlined.
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while xt = [ˆbst−1 ˆhb,t−1 rˆt−1 ˆhs,t nˆb,t nˆs,t wˆb,t wˆs,t ˆdt
µˆt ˆξt ˆlt cˆs,t cˆb,t yˆt qˆt πˆt]′. So xt encompasses the vari-
ables as their deviation from steady state. According to Klein
(2000), the variables are partitioned into ns predetermined and
into nc non-predetermined variables. Klein defines a predeter-
mined variable as a variable that has an exogenously given ini-
tial value and a zero one step prediction error in period zero. In
addition, Klein assumes that the prediction error up from pe-
riod zero follows an exogenous martingale difference process,
ξt = xt+t − Ext+1. Thus, Klein’s definition is a generalization
of Blanchard and Kahn (1980)’s interpretation which assumes
a predetermined variable has a prediction error of zero in all
periods. Given xt = [x1,t x2,t]′, x1,t represents the (ns × 1)
vector of predetermined variables and x2,t is the (nc × 1) vector
of non-predetermined variables. The total number of variables
is n = ns + nc. The structural shocks are vt = [zˆt ˆjt υˆt]′ .
The (n × n) matrices A, B and the (n × nv) matrix C capture
parameters, while nv denotes the number of structural shocks.
The shock processes of the model are summarized in:
vt = Pvt−1 + εt, (2.43)
while the auxiliary random variables of the model are εt =
[εz,t ε j,t εv,t]′ and P has the dimension (3×3) in accordance
to the three shocks.
A great advantage of the solution method by Klein is that the
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matrix A may be singular in contrast to the alternative linear
solution method by Blanchard and Kahn (Dejong and Dave,
2011). Thus, the system may exhibit static equilibrium condi-
tions like identities and a system reduction is redundant. Klein’s
method relies thereby on the complex Schur-decomposition
which does not require A to be invertible. The Schur-decomposi-
tion is a generalization of a QZ-factorization that allows for
complex eigenvalues associated with A and B.34 Applying the
complex Schur-decomposition to the system delivers the uni-
tary complex matrices Q,Z, so that the matrices S and T are
upper triangular with diagonal elements that are assumed to be
ordered in ascending absolute value moving from left to right
(Juillard, 2005).35
QAZ = S (2.44)
QBZ = T (2.45)
34The general eigenvalue problem is defined as A∗v = λB∗v, while v is the
generalized eigenvector and λ comprises of the corresponding eigenvalues.
Let A∗ − λB∗ = P(λ) be the linear matrix pencil. Then λ(A∗, B∗) captures
the set of generalized eigenvalues of P that obey det(A∗ − λiB∗) = 0 with
λi ∈ C. If A∗ and B∗ are Hermitian matrices, it is important to solve for the
generalized eigenvalues using the pencil (A∗, B∗) instead of B−1Av = λv
since the later is generally not Hermitian.
35A Hermitian matrix characterizes that the upper triangular portion of the
matrix is the negative conjugate of the lower triangular portion of this ma-
trix. So the complex square matrices Q and Z are equal to their conjugate
transpose and the product of unitary complex square matrices with its con-
jugate transpose yields the identity matrix, QH Q = ZHZ = I, while H
denotes the Hermitian transpose.
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The generalized eigenvalues of A and B are the ratios of the
{ii}’s element of the matrices S and T , i.e.,
λ(A, B) = {tii/sii} ∀i = 1, 2, ... (2.46)
for sii , 0.36 The arrangement of elements on the diagonal of S
and T bring about that the stable eigenvalues smaller than one
|λi| < 1 come first and the unstable eigenvalues greater than one
and infinite eigenvalues come last (going from left to right).
In general, the number of unstable eigenvalues in a reduced sys-
tem is critical for determining the dynamic behavior of {xt}. For
a reduced system, Blanchard and Kahn (1980) distinguishes
three possibilities:
1. If the number of unstable eigenvalues is equal to the num-
ber of non-predetermined (control) variables, then an ap-
propriate choice for the initial values of the control vari-
ables eliminates the explosive behavior. The system is
saddle-path stable and yields an unique solution.
2. If more eigenvalues with explosive behavior than non-
predetermined variables exist, then the system has no so-
lution and is unstable.
3. If less eigenvalues with explosive behavior than non-pre-
36If A is singular, there is a sii = 0 for some i and λ(A, B) has fewer than n
elements. In line with Klein (2000), I assume that the missing generalized
eigenvalue corresponds to an “infinite” eigenvalue for that particular i. The
case |λi| = 1 is excluded.
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determined variables exist, then for any choice for the
controls the system converges to steady state, so there
are infinite solutions for this stable system.
The model given in chapter 2 satisfies the Blanchard and Kahn
conditions that state that the model has as many eigenvalues
larger than one in modulus as it has forward looking variables.
More specifically, the saddle-path stable system exhibits five
explosive eigenvalues equal to the number of non-predetermined
endogenous variables nc.
Next, I seek the solution of the model which is a feedback
rule relating the current endogenous variables to the state vari-
ables of the model. Following Klein (2000), the solution ap-
proach entails decoupling the system into an explosive and a
non-explosive part in a first step. A second step involves solv-
ing the individual components, separately. First, I partition Z:
Z =
 Z11 Z12Z21 Z22
 (2.47)
The matrix Z11 corresponds to the non-explosive eigenvalues
with the dimension (ns×ns) that conforms to the number of pre-
determined variables in x1,t.37 The matrices Z12 and Z21 have
the dimension (ns × nc) and (nc × ns), respectively. The explo-
37If there are more stable eigenvalues than predetermined variables, one has
more degrees of freedom when pinning down the solution (Klein, 2000).
Moreover, it is possible to fix the initial value of forward looking variables
to make them predetermined in the sense of Klein.
79
sive eigenvalues are stored in the (nc × nc) matrix Z22. The aim
of the next step is to find a upper triangular system of expec-
tational difference equations in the auxiliary variable zt defined
as:
zt = ZH xt ⇐⇒ zt =
 Z
H
11 Z
H
21
ZH12 Z
H
22

 x1,t
x2,t
 (2.48)
Let ZH denote the Hermitian transpose of Z. Thus, I obtain
z1,t = ZH11x1,t + Z
H
21x2,t (2.49)
which contains the stable transformed variables and
z2,t = ZH12x1,t + Z
H
22x2,t (2.50)
which collects the unstable transformed variables. Since Z is
unitary, the relations ZHZ = I and ZH = Z−1 are feasible. The
transformation of the original equation result in:
AZEt(zt+1) = BZzt +Cvt. (2.51)
Premultiplying the equation (2.51) by Q, I use the relation of
the Schur-decomposition (2.44) to replace A = Q′S ZH and B =
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Q′S ZH . Next, partitioning the matrices S and T yields:
 S 11 S 120(nc×ns) S 22
 Et
 z1,t+1z2,t+1
 =
 T11 T120(nc×ns) T22

 z1,tz2,t
 +
 Q1Q2
Cvt.
(2.52)
Here the matrices S 11 and T11 have the dimension (ns ×ns) and
are invertible by assumption (modulus greater than one). S 12
and T12 are of size (ns × nc). This upper relation corresponds
to the stable part of the system. Thus, the number of predeter-
mined variables with endogenously given initial values is equal
to the number of stable eigenvalues. The lower part is unsta-
ble because the generalized eigenvalues of λ(A, B) given by the
diagonal elements of T22S −122 lie all outside the unit cycle. The
matrix T22 is invertible because the determinant of a triangular
matrix is a product of its diagonal entries and the invertibility of
a square matrix is equivalent to its determinant being non-zero.
As a second step, I solve for the individual parts of the system.
Reformulating the lower, unstable part and solving by forward
iteration derives:
S 22Et(z2,t+1) = T22z2,t + Q2Cvt
z2,t = T−122 S 22Et(z2,t+1) − T−122 Q2Cvt.
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This implies the expression for Et(z2,t+1):
Et(z2,t+1) = T−122 S 22Et(z2,t+2) − T−122 Q2Cvt+1.
Inserting in each other delivers:
z2,t = T−122 S 22Et(T−122 S 22Et(z2,t+2) − T−122 Q2Cvt+1) − T−122 Q2Cvt.
The first part of the equation converges to zero:
lim j→∞
(
T−122 S 22)
) j
Etzt+ j = 0. By making use of the shock
process relation (2.43), the second part evolves according to:
lim
j→∞
z2t = −
∞∑
j=0
(T22)−( j+1)S j22Q2CEtvt+ j
⇔ z2,t = −
∞∑
j=0
(T22)−( j+1)S j22Q2CP jvt.
For the second part to be stable, the following computation
must rely on the assumption that the shocks follow a station-
ary vector autoregressive VAR(1) process. Recalling that
vec
(
(S 22T−122 ) jQ2CP j
)
= ((P j)′⊗ (S 22T−122 ) j)vec(Q2C) and that
for the diagonal matrix P′ = P applies, the equation (2.53) ex-
presses the non-explosive behavior of z2,t which only depends
on vt:
z2,t = −T−122 Rvt (2.53)
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with
vec(R) = vec
∞∑
j=0
(S 22T−122 ) jQ2CP j
=
∞∑
j=0
vec
[
(S 22T−122 ) jQ2CP j
]
=
∞∑
j=0
[P j ⊗ (S 22T−122 ) j]−1vec(Q2C).
The last step of computing vec(R) entails applying the geomet-
ric series, which is applicable because 1tii/sii of the unstable gen-
eralized eigenvalues captured in the matrix S 22T−122 is smaller
than one and hence stable.
vec(R) = [I(n·nv)×(n·nv) − P ⊗ (S 22T−111 )]−1vec(Q2C)
Next, I recall the unstable part of the system (2.50) and plug in
(2.53) to solve the expression for a stable solution:
x2,t = −(ZH22)−1(T−122 Rvt) − (ZH22)−1ZH12x1,t. (2.54)
The last equation ensures that the system is saddle-path stable
and that a unique solution (unique policy function) to the model
exists. Since Z is unitary, the following relation holds:
 Z
H
11 Z
H
21
ZH12 Z
H
22

 Z11 Z12Z21 Z22
 =
 I(ns×ns) 00 I(nc×nc)
 . (2.55)
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From ZH12Z11 + Z
H
22Z21 = 0 follows that
(ZH22)−1ZH12Z11Z−111 = −(ZH22)−1ZH22Z21Z−111 (2.56)
⇔ (ZH22)−1ZH12 = −Z21(Z11)−1. (2.57)
Taking ZH12Z12+Z
H
22Z22 = I and multiplying it by (ZH22)−1 results
in:
(ZH22)−1ZH12Z12 + (ZH22)−1ZH22Z22 = (ZH22)−1. (2.58)
Using the result of equation (2.56) transforms equation (2.58)
to:
− Z21Z−111 Z12 + Z22 = (ZH22)−1. (2.59)
With the relations of equations (2.58) and (2.59), I reformulate
the solution for the unstable part (2.54):
x2,t = Z21Z−111 x1,t − MT
−1
22 Rvt (2.60)
with M = Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12.
In the next step, I seek the solution for the stable part. There-
fore, I plug equation (2.60) into the equation for the trans-
formed stable variables (2.49):
z1,t = (ZH11 + ZH21Z21Z−111 )x1,t − ZH21MT−122 Rvt. (2.61)
From ZH11Z11 + Z
H
21Z21 = I, I derive the relation:
ZH11 + Z
H
21Z22Z
−1
11 = Z
−1
11 . (2.62)
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I reduce Z21M = Z21(Z22 − ZH21Z−111 Z12) to
−ZH11Z12−(I−ZH11Z11)Z−111 Z12 = −Z−111 Z12 using ZH11+ZH21Z21 = I
and ZH11Z12 = −Z
H
21Z22, whereby the equation (2.61) simplifies
to:
z1,t = Z−111 x1,t + Z
−1
11 Z12T
−1
22 Rvt. (2.63)
I take the first row of (2.52) and insert the results for z1,t and
z2,t that are the equations (2.63) and (2.53), respectively:
S 11(Z−111 x1,t+1 + Z−111 Z12T−122 Rvt+1) + S 12(−T−122 Rvt+1) =
T11(Z−111 x1,t + Z−111 Z12T−122 Rvt) + T12(−T−122 Rvt) + Q1Cvt.
(2.64)
Finally, I define an equation that depends only on predeter-
mined variables:
x1,t+1 = Nx1,t + Lvt (2.65)
with N = Z11S −111 T11Z
−1
11 and L = Z11S
−1
11 (T11Z−111 Z12T−122 R +
S 12T−122 RP + Q1C − T12T−122 R) − Z12T−122 RP. The term in front
of the shocks vt follows the mentioned serially uncorrelated
stochastic process of the form vt = Pvt−1. The model’s so-
lution is the policy equation and the transition equation given
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by:38
st+1 = Γ0st + Γ1εt+1 (2.66)
ft = Γ2st (2.67)
where st = [ˆbst−1 ˆhbt−1 rˆt−1 ˆhs,t nˆb,t nˆs,t wˆb,t wˆs,t
ˆdt µˆt ˆξt ˆlt zˆt ˆjt vˆt]′. The vector st = [s1,t s2,t]′ col-
lects the s1,t endogenous predetermined variables and s2,t are
exogenous predetermined variables. The vector ft captures the
controls ft = [cˆs,t cˆb,t yˆt
qˆt πˆt]′ and εt = [εz,t ε j,t εv,t]′, where
Γ0 =
 N L0(3×12) P

Γ1 =
 0(12×3)I(3×3)

Γ2 =
(
Z21Z−111 − (Z12 − Z21Z−111 )T−122 R
)
.
38The equations are sometimes also called state and observation equation,
respectively.
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2.C On the amplification effect of collateral
constraints
2.C.1 Amplification effect of lax credit constraints in
detail
Responses to a housing preference shock A positive hous-
ing demand shock shifts the households’ taste for housing ser-
vices up, whereby in all model specifications under consider-
ation the weight of housing in the utility function rises. Fig-
ure 2.7 plots the variables’ reactions of the models with mod-
ified LTV ratio from 60% to 90%. In all model versions, the
shock boosts savers’ and borrowers’ demand for housing. Con-
sequently, due to the higher utility returns from housing, house
prices rise almost equivalent. Since the total stock of housing
is fixed, the effect on housing demand of borrowers overlaps
the demand of savers. As borrowers profit twice from housing
wealth, their incentive is greater. First, borrowers have a higher
marginal propensity to spend and consume than savers because
of their discount factor. Therefore, the higher the LTV ratio,
the greater is borrowers’ fraction of consumption on aggregate
demand. Second, borrowers use housing as collateral. Higher
housing wealth enables them to increase their borrowing capac-
ity proportional to their maximum LTV ratio. They invest ad-
ditional funds from borrowing on housing, which boosts again
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house prices. As a second round effect the increased housing
collateral value promotes borrowing again, creating a financial
multiplier effect that is most powerful for the LTV ratio of 90%
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Moreover, higher consumption
prices reduce the real value of outstanding debt, affecting bor-
rowers’ net worth positively (Fisherian-debt deflation). This
results in a positive net effect on aggregate demand that deter-
mines output (Iacoviello and Neri, 2010). The net effect of the
shock on labor supply is positive, which is mainly driven by
savers’ decision to work more. Borrowers work less since they
gain from the collateral effect in contrast to savers. The as-
sumed complementarity between both types of workers causes
the positive net effect on wages. The Taylor rule responds to
the shock induced inflation by raising the nominal interest rate.
Thus, debt service costs increase, but only marginally affect the
borrowing decision of impatient households. Overall, the im-
pact on output is amplified with laxer credit limits.
Responses to a technology shock The figure 2.8 plots the
variables’ reaction to a transitory technology shock. By raising
the technology parameter up, the positive technology shock in-
creases output. Augmented factor payments to both labor types
enhance aggregate consumption independent of the LTV ratio
in the model economy. Savers work more, while borrowers
substitute labor for leisure due to their additional income stream
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses of key variables to a hous-
ing demand shock as in percentage deviation from
steady state for different constant LTV ratios. The
dashed line represents a LTV ratio of 90%, solid
line 80%, dashed-dotted line 70% and the dotted
line 60%, respectively.
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from a laxer borrowing limit. With higher income, borrowers
demand more housing. As consumption prices decrease, the
Taylor rule lowers the nominal interest rate reducing borrow-
ing cost. Because house prices rise after a technology shock,
borrowers benefit twice from real estate holdings and borrow
more, proportionally to their maximum leverage ratio. How-
ever, the level of the LTV ratio has only a minor impact on the
aggregate output level as well as inflation because the effects
on house prices and deflation interfere with each other and can-
cel each other out. As a result the collateral effect tends to be
roughly zero.
Demand shocks moving house prices and inflation in the same
direction, create a wealth effect for borrowers whereby output
is amplified. However, the impulse response analysis after a
technology shock provides no evidence, contingent on the bor-
rowers’ leverage ratio, for an amplification, what is in line with
the results of Walentin (2014) and Lambertini et al. (2013). The
reason seems to lie in the non-credit constrained production
sector (Liu et al., 2013). The evolution of house prices de-
termines mortgage market properties but not directly produc-
tion in the given model. Hence, the evaluation stresses two
insights: On the one hand, housing demand shocks shifting the
collateral price and inflation in the same direction are a source
for business cycle fluctuations. On the other hand, borrower’s
level of leverage is positively related to macroeconomic volatil-
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses of key variables to a transi-
tory technology shock as in percentage deviation
from steady state for different constant LTV ratios.
The dashed line represents a LTV ratio of 90%,
solid line 80%, dashed-dotted line 70% and the dot-
ted line 60%, respectively.
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ity. These results motivate the introduction of countercyclical
macroprudential rules on a fixed LTV ratio in order to reduce
the amplification effect after house price shocks.
2.C.2 Technology shocks and macroprudential
regulation
The specified optimal rules in section 2.4 primarily modify the
transmission of a housing demand shock as outlined, but the
understanding of the transmission of a technology shock is also
essential as the macroprudential authority might not be capa-
ble to identify the direct source of macroeconomic fluctuation.
Figure 2.9 and figure 2.10 illustrate the variables’ responses in
the scenario with highly leveraged and with low leveraged bor-
rowers, respectively. After a positive impulse to technology in
both policy scenarios the hike of loans without regulation is
attenuated with the countercyclical rule on credit growth and
is even negative with a rule on house price growth. In both
scenarios a rule on credit growth smooths borrowers’ housing
purchases and equivalently provides savers steady housing ser-
vices because the housing stock is normalized to one. Whereas
the effect is more pronounced in the high leverage scenario.39
In response to the technology shock, launching the regulation
39The induced stabilization in the housing market might be an explanation
for savers’ welfare gain with a rule on credit growth.
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has no impact on the remaining variables regarding the alge-
braic sign. In the low leverage scenario the reaction of infla-
tion, output, savers consumption, and the interest rate are al-
most identical to the benchmark model with a constant LTV ra-
tio. This fact underlines the ineffectiveness of macroprudential
regulation. In the lax credit limit scenario deflation is slightly
more pronounced as well as the interest rate drop than in the
corresponding benchmark model, so that Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2014) argue that macroprudential policy enters into
conflict with monetary policy. That is because macropruden-
tial policy aims to limit the provision of loans during this tech-
nological boom time, but monetary policy fuels borrowing by
lowering the interest rates.40 The net effect on output with reg-
ulation remains, however, weak in the high leverage scenario
and is not detectable in the low leverage scenario. Therefore, I
argue that the output costs created by macroprudential regula-
tion during a technological boom are negligible, in particular,
when compared to the trade-off of policies that arises in the
tight credit scenario as a result of a housing demand shock (see
section 2.4).
40Indeed, the policies’ conflict of goals is also evident in the low leverage
scenario, but in the scenario macroprudential policy shows to be in any
way inefficient.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse responses to a technology shock in the
model with a LTV ratio of 90%. Variables’ reac-
tion with constant LTV ratio (solid red line), with
a countercyclical LTV rule on house price (dashed
blue line) and credit growth (dotted black line).
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Figure 2.10: Impulse responses to a technology shock in the
model with a LTV ratio of 65%. Variables’ reac-
tion with constant LTV ratio (solid red line), with
a countercyclical LTV rule on house price (dashed
blue line) and credit growth (dotted black line).
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3 Financial intermediation,
the mortgage market and
macroprudential regulation
3.1 Introduction
During the financial crisis bank capital (BC) regulation and
tight credit limits forced borrowers and banks to deleverage. By
deleveraging, banks reduce the supply of credit to the economy.
This disruption of financial markets amplifies the decline in
economic activity (Gruss and Sgherri, 2009; Iacoviello, 2015).
The aim of countercyclical macroprudential regulation is a sus-
tainable provision of credit to the economy to ensure financial
stability and a fast recovery. Several papers demonstrate that
countercyclical risk-weighted BC regulation and lending stan-
dards dampen the impact of financial shocks on the macroe-
conomy, but seem suboptimal in response to other sources of
business cycle fluctuations (Unsal, 2013; Angelini et al., 2014;
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Angeloni and Faia, 2013). In contrast to these models with
financial intermediation, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014)
and Lambertini et al. (2013) analyze the impact of countercycli-
cal loan-to-value (LTV) ratios on borrowers in models with het-
erogeneous agents without banking. This paper stands out by
contrasting the effectiveness of two countercyclical instruments
− a rule on the LTV ratio of borrowers and a rule on the lever-
age ratio of banks, i.e., the BC ratio − in one DSGE model
with banking. Moreover, the paper considers the interplay of
these macroprudential rules, thereby filling a gap in the litera-
ture. While the results predict that both macroprudential pol-
icy rules moderate credit volatility and improve welfare, nei-
ther rule attenuates the drop of output when the transmission
proceeds through the mortgage market. Unlike countercyclical
adjusted BC ratios, countercyclical LTV-regulation on borrow-
ers effectively restores lending irrespective of the source of the
adverse shock. In addition, this rule has the benefit of damp-
ening the drop of the credit-to-output gap, thus strengthening
the banks’ resilience against a crisis. The best policy mix is
achieved when both rules are active. These insights are essen-
tial to derive macroprudential policy implications.
The Basel III Accord obliges banks to maintain a minimum
leverage ratio of three percent, defined as Tier 1 capital-to-
total-exposure ratio, from 2018 onwards. This complement to
the risk-weighted higher capital ratios prevents extreme bank
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leverage.1 The recent macroprudential regulation changes also
include upper limits for LTV ratios of mortgage borrowers to
limit indebtedness. With this regulation borrowers may only
borrow up to a fraction of their housing collateral value. In
times of financial stress leverage caps on banks and borrowers
bear the risk of banks cutting loans more than they would with-
out the regulatory limit whereby the peril of a credit crunch
increases. Thus, these frictions can amplify the effects of an
adverse shock on aggregate production. The mechanism is
known as the financial multiplier effect (Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997).2 To address the procyclicality of financial frictions, the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) − the supervisory in-
stitution for financial stability in the EU − recommends coun-
tercyclical regulation (ESRB, 2014). Countercyclical non-risk
weighted BC regulation represents an innovative extension of
present macroprudential policy tools.
The aim of this paper is to assess the capability of dynamic
policies for the provision of mortgage loans to households and
for banking sector resilience in order to reduce the severity of
a financial crisis. More precisely, I compare the impact of i)
countercyclical BC ratios, and ii) the countercyclical LTV ratio,
1Since the beginning of 2015 banks are obliged to disclose their leverage
ratio.
2The regulation puts pressure on highly leveraged banks with less risky
assets as these also have a potential risk to default. Thus, the measure is
a supplement to the risk-based capital ratios, which among others bear the
risk of measurement errors and risk model manipulation.
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as well as iii) their interplay relative to the situation with con-
stant leverage ratios. In contrast to Angelini et al. (2012), who
analyze how these rules reduce the volatility of key variables,
conducting a welfare analysis as I do allows the identification
of the beneficiaries of the regulation. Moreover, I depart from
Angelini et al. (2012)’s focal point on the optimal policy mix
between macroprudential and monetary policy by relying on
independent policy institutions. The assumed independence of
both policies is justified by Tinbergen’s criteria.3 Apart from
that, I measure not only the performance of macroprudential
regulation with regard to the credit aggregates as earlier stud-
ies did, but also with regard to the credit-to-output gap. The
credit-to-output ratio prevails as an indicator of the build-up of
financial vulnerabilities and serves as an early warning indica-
tor of a banking crises (Drehmann, 2013).
The paper focuses exclusively on the private mortgage market
for three reasons. First, there is a common consensus that the fi-
nancial crisis originated in the mortgage market of households.
More specifically, financial innovations of mortgage contracts
lead to a build-up of systemic risk. Second, the decline of mort-
gage loans contributed considerably to the decline of output in
the EU at the peak of the crisis (Ciccarelli et al., 2010). Third,
Justiniano et al. (2015) stress that decreasing house prices that
reduce households’ collateral are a major driver of the reces-
3The Tinbergen criteria states that every policy objective requires at least
one instrument.
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sion.4 In line with this finding, banks identify the lower credit-
worthiness of borrowers due to the higher risk perception sur-
rounding the economic situation as a reason for tighter credit
conditions rather than issues related to costs of funds and banks’
balance sheet constraints (ECB, 2010, p.7.). The fact that eco-
nomic expectations play a role in the appraisal of borrowers’
collateral value and credit standards highlights the importance
of regulation that counterbalances negative prospects as a rem-
edy to avoid a credit crunch.
To address these issues, I extend the model of Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2014) using the banking sector from Gerali et al. (2010).
Banks offer mortgage loans to consumers whose consumption
decision affects aggregate production.5 The representative bank’s
pricing power for loan and deposit rates drives the credit con-
ditions in the economy. Retained earnings from the bank’s
intermediation activity build up the BC position. The regula-
tory leverage ratio induces the bank to limit the supply of loans
when the BC ratio approaches the regulatory target level in a
bust. Saving households provide the banks with financial re-
sources that the banks pass on to borrowers who are constrained
4In the bank lending survey the ECB reinforces that the worsening of hous-
ing market prospects contributed to the declining loan demand (ECB,
2009a).
5The model set-up is similar to Justiniano et al. (2015) who also abstract
from debt-constrained firms. They ignore alternative channels through
which the credit cycle affects the macroeconomy in order to be able to
analyze the important household debt channel in isolation.
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by a maximum LTV ratio. Thus, the balance sheet position of
banks and borrowers limits the availability of mortgage credit
in the economy. A financial shock occurs when the quality of
BC deteriorates and lending and saving interest rates decline.
Consequently, the increased debt payments of borrowers cause
a negative cash-flow effect on consumption and housing de-
mand. The lower borrowing demand puts additional downward
pressure on the capital position of banks. The dynamics of the
model reflect the financial multiplier effect. Hence, the banks’
and borrowers’ leverage constraint exhibit a pecuniary exter-
nality: both agents fail to internalize that their borrowing deci-
sion forces them to deleverage during financial distress, as in
Bianchi (2011). This deleveraging process reduces consump-
tion, BC, and credit availability.6
The calculation of welfare maximizing policy rules documents
that mild countercyclical rules are socially optimal, especially
during financial disturbances: the welfare gain of borrowers
through consumption smoothing with either rule compensates
the welfare loss of savers. The optimal parameterization of the
rules is robust to the regime of single or combined exertion,
6A pecuniary externality for borrowers arises because they not internalize
the spill-over effects on the real economy caused by their accumulation
of debt during booms (Jeanne and Korinek, 2010). Banks face a similar
credit externality. During busts they sell short on assets to meet bank cap-
ital regulation. In turn the deposit interest rate decreases more than in an
economy without the regulatory leverage ratio, which deepens the reces-
sion. It would be socially optimal for the bank to not exercise such high
leverage in good times.
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which underlines their complementarity.
Simulation results show that by introducing an optimal counter-
cyclical LTV and BC-rule in the model, borrowers and banks
avert the repercussions from a financial and even a negative
technology shock. With an LTV-rule, borrowers suffering from
a downgraded credit worthiness during the downturn receive
alleviated access to mortgage credit due to relaxed credit stan-
dards. The countercyclical BC ratio allows the bank to provide
the economy with loans in times when constant banking regula-
tion would force them to shorten their balance sheet. The joint
implementation of optimal rules successfully mitigates credit
cycles and the volatility of BC. The single rule on the LTV
ratio performs significantly better in providing credit than the
single countercyclical BC-rule. By preventing a further tight-
ening of credit standards, the LTV-rule also dampens the drop
of the credit-to-output ratio, thereby reducing the probability
of a banking crisis. I find no evidence that either rule stabi-
lizes output due to the non-existent direct transmission from
the mortgage market to the production sector. During financial
stress a mild countercyclical reaction is socially optimal. Thus,
the welfare gain of borrowers through the internalization of the
externality compensates the welfare loss of savers. Savers lose
in terms of welfare because the regulation only promotes con-
strained households. These gains do not accrue during technol-
ogy driven business cycle fluctuations. In this situation strong
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countercyclical reaction delivers negligible welfare gains.
The analysis shows that in particular countercyclical LTV reg-
ulation is a powerful instrument to provide financial sector re-
silience as it preserves the credit-to-output-ratio during finan-
cial turmoil. These findings suggest that LTV-regulation for
private mortgage loans represents a valuable complement to the
stricter leverage regulation of banks with Basel III. Therefore,
the implications are important for the design of a macropruden-
tial policy framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, I discuss the related literature. section 2 introduces the
model and the two macroprudential policy instruments. Section
3 describes the calibration and the parametrization of shocks.
In section 4, I conduct the welfare analysis to identify the opti-
mal countercyclical rules that are used for a volatility analysis.
Finally, I compare the model dynamics for each time-varying
rule with the non-macroprudential policy outcome and discuss
the results in section 5.
3.2 Related literature
The vast literature on macroprudential regulation in general
equilibrium models investigates the interaction between macro-
prudential and monetary policy. A common finding is that in re-
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sponse to financial shocks, countercyclical regulation achieves
financial and macroeconomic stability irrespective of the regime,
but mixed results for supply shocks. In a model with a BC
requirement rule, Angelini et al. (2014) document that non-
coordination between policies achieves only modest stabiliza-
tion benefits in booms generated by technology increases com-
pared to sizable stabilization gains in response to financial shocks.
In a framework with heterogeneous agents and a housing mar-
ket, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) find that macropru-
dential and monetary policy enter into conflict in response to
a technology shock. The conflict arises because monetary pol-
icy lowers the key interest rate which in turn stimulates loan
demand and macroprudential policy tightens credit limits. An-
geloni and Faia (2013) find that mild countercyclical BC reg-
ulation and an interest rate rule reacting to financial variables
helps to limit the risk taking of banks and improves welfare in
risky times. Their results are based on a model in which banks
are prone to runs.
Apart from above findings, there are also contradicting con-
tribution that detect no shock-specific desirability of counter-
cyclical regulation. Mendicino (2012) investigates the impli-
cations of countercyclical LTV ratios. Her results imply that
the regulation successfully dampens credit cycles without in-
creasing the response of output and other macroeconomic vari-
ables to real shocks. The recent paper by Lambertini and Uysal
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(2015) raises doubt about the general usefulness of counter-
cyclical risk-weighted BC regulation for macroeconomic and
financial stability. Their findings indicate that after a nega-
tive capital quality shock, countercyclical BC ratios do not alter
banks’ incentives to reduce lending during a crisis, so that the
impact on loans and output is the same as under time-invariant
ratios.7 As a positive side effect they show that the regulation
forces banks to issue more stock, so that the volatility of bank
variables, such as net income and net worth, and the BC ratio
strengthen the banks’ resilience.
Another common outcome is the trade-off of beneficiaries from
macroprudential regulation. Lambertini et al. (2013) examine
welfare implications for savers and borrowers of an extended
interest rate rule and an LTV-rule that reacts to a range of vari-
ables. According to their results, the use of a countercyclical
LTV policy in addition to an interest-rate response to credit
growth is welfare improving because of the large gains that ac-
crue to the borrowers. In the model of Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2014), savers directly lend to borrowers who are sub-
ject to an LTV-rule reacting to credit growth. By conducting a
welfare analysis of a countercyclical rule on the LTV ratio, Ru-
bio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) uncover a trade-off between
savers and borrowers. They find that Kaldor-Hicks transfers
from borrowers to savers provide total welfare gains.
7They also find that steady state output falls under Basel III.
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Similar to my analysis Tavman (2015) assumes independent
policy institutions. Adopting the model of Gertler and Karadi
(2013), he compares the effects of a rule on reserve require-
ment ratios, risk-weighted BC regulation, and a regulation pre-
mium. His findings imply that a countercyclical capital require-
ment ratio is the most effective macroprudential tool for miti-
gating the repercussions of the financial multiplier mechanism
built into banks’ endogenous capital constraints. In his set-up,
which allows direct lending to the production sector, this reg-
ulation delivers the highest welfare gains and macroeconomic
stabilization.
3.3 Model
The model extends the set-up of Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego
(2014) with the banking sector of Gerali et al. (2010). The
banking sector features endogenous BC accumulation of re-
tained earnings, which is necessary for the analysis of a coun-
tercyclical BC measure.
3.3.1 Households
Saving households Following Iacoviello (2005), in the model
patient and impatient agents differ in their discount rate. This
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assumption ensures a flow of funds via the financial intermedi-
ary from savers to borrowers. βs stands for the discount factor
of savers. The representative patient household derives util-
ity from consumption cs,t, housing services hs,t, and leisure
(1 − ns,t), and thus maximizes the following function:
max
cs,t ,hs,t ,ns,t ,Dst
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
ln(cs,t) + jh ln(hs,t) − n
η
s,t
η
 ,
where jh denotes the weight of housing in the utility function.
The inverse of the Frisch elasticity is given by η − 1, while
η ≥ 1. The budget constraint of savers in real terms reads as:
cs,t+
Dst
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t =
Dst−1R
s
t−1
Pt
+
Ws,tns,t
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t−1+
Xt
Pt
+(1−τ)G
b
t−1
Pt
,
(3.1)
where Pt and Qt are consumption and house prices, respec-
tively. Savers’ expenses include consumption Pt cs,t, expendi-
ture for housing stock Qths,t, and savers’ investment in deposits
Dst at the banks, while they have the choice between [0, 1] dif-
ferent deposit products with a maturity of one period. Savers
receive funds from nominal wage income Ws,tns,t, where Ws,t
is the nominal wage rate, the stock of housing wealth of last
period Qths,t−1, profits from the intermediate goods producing
firm Xt, as well as dividends from the banks, (1− τ) Gbt−1.8 Ad-
ditionally, the financial intermediary pays savers the nominal
8The profits of the i intermediate firms aggregate to: Xt(i) =
∫ 1
0 Xt(i)di.
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gross deposit interest rate Rst−1 for deposits invested last period,
t − 1.9
Banks obtain market power in the deposit and loan market
through the introduction of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggre-
gates. Thus, savers allocate their overall amount of Dst assets
to slightly differentiated deposit contracts Dst ( j) while the re-
turn of contract j is Rst ( j) (s denotes the specific variable for
savers). Accordingly, the deposit products are aggregated by
the constant elasticity of substitution technology:
Dst ≥
(∫ 1
0
(Dst ( j))
ǫs,t−1
ǫs,t d j
) ǫs,t
ǫs,t−1
, (3.2)
where ǫs,t < −1 governs the elasticity of substitution between
the different contracts that is time varying. The deposit demand
elasticity facilitates the steady state interest spread between the
policy rate and the deposit rate. Savers choose Dst ( j) to maxi-
mize their financial income given by:
max
∫ 1
0
Rst ( j)Dst ( j)d j
subject to (3.2). The resulting demand equation for product j
is Dst ( j) = Dst
(Rst ( j)
λsd
)−ǫs,t
. The multiplier on (3.2), λsd represents
the shadow price of the households’ choice for Dst ( j). It can
9The first order conditions from the optimization procedure yield the savers’
housing demand equation, savers’ labor supply equation, and savers’ Euler
equation, as well as the budget constraint summarized in the appendix.
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be replaced by the interest rate index over all j deposit interest
rates, Rst , so that the demand for the saving product j simplifies
to:
Dst ( j) =
(
Rst ( j)
Rst
)−ǫs,t
Dst (3.3)
Combining (3.2) and (3.3) yields the deposit rate index, Rst ,
which is a CES functional of the individual contract prices;
Rst =
[∫ 1
0 (Rst ( j))1−ǫs,t d j
] 1
1−ǫs,t
. So Rst is simply the return the
saver receives for its deposits.
Borrowing households The representative impatient house-
hold differs from savers along two dimensions. First, they do
not earn dividends from either the intermediate goods produc-
ing firm or the financial intermediary. Second, their lower dis-
count factor βb < βs makes them into borrowers who are sub-
ject to a binding maximum LTV ratio (b denotes the specific
variable for borrowers). By pledging their housing wealth hb,t
as collateral, they borrow until the amount of debt burden is
equal to the fraction of expected tomorrow’s housing wealth.10
The fraction of loan repayment including debt service Rbt Bbt to
tomorrow’s housing wealth Qt+1hb,t may not exceed the regu-
10Analogously, savers would face a collateral constraint if they were willing
to borrow. Since this is not the case, the collateral constraint is omitted.
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latory leverage ratio l:
l ≥
Rbt Bbt
Pt
Et(Qt+1)
Pt hb,t
. (3.4)
Thus, the level of l represents the credit limit that is constant
in the benchmark model but changes according to the counter-
cyclical macroprudential rule in the policy scenarios, making
it time-dependent lt.11 Rising house prices trigger a feed-back
loop between higher collateral value and the borrowing capac-
ity known as the financial multiplier (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
Savers and borrowers, alike maximize their stream of utility
through consumption Ptcb,t, housing wealth hb,t, leisure time
1 − nb,t, and one-period loans Bbt from the banks:
max
cb,t ,hb,t ,nb,t ,Bst
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
ln(cb,t) + jh ln(hb,t) − n
η
s,t
η
 .
The impatient households’ decision has to match the collateral
constraint (3.4) and the budget constraint:12
cb,t +
Rbt−1B
b
t−1
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hb,t =
Qt
Pt
hb,t−1 +
Bbt
Pt
+
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t. (3.5)
Accordingly, the borrower disburses for consumption Pt cb,t,
111 − l is the borrower’s equity. If the representative borrower defaults, this
would be the collateral repossession of banks.
12As long as the multiplier on collateral constraint satisfies µ > 0, the lever-
age constraint binds.
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housing Qthb,t, and gross reimbursement for borrowing Rbt−1Bbt−1
with Rbt−1 being the gross loan interest rate. Borrowers’ funds
comprise housing wealth from t−1, Qthb,t−1, new loans Bbt , and
wage income Wb,tnb,t with Wb,t denoting the nominal wage rate
for borrowers.13
Borrowers face slightly differentiated loan contracts Bbt ( j) for
the price of Rbt ( j). They seek a total amount of real loans Bbt
while their individual loan basket is composite of their loan
contract with the time varying elasticity of substitution, ǫb,t,
with ǫb,t > 1:
Bbt ≤
(∫ 1
0
(Bbt ( j))
ǫb,t−1
ǫb,t d j
) ǫb,t
ǫb,t−1
. (3.6)
Thus, impatient households invest in the different loan products
Bbt ( j) such that they minimize their financial debt repayments
subject to the loan composition technology (3.6):
min
∫ 1
0
Rbt ( j)Bbt ( j)d j.
The demand for loan product j, (3.7) depends negatively on the
j’s loan interest rates that is put in relation to the aggregate in-
13The first order conditions of the borrowers’ optimization problem yield
borrowers demand for housing, their labor supply, borrowers’ Euler equa-
tion, as well as the collateral and budget constraint listed in the appendix.
111
dex of loan interest rate Rbt and borrowers’ overall debt amount.
Bbt ( j) =
(
Rbt ( j)
Rbt
)−ǫb,t
Bbt (3.7)
The combination of (3.6) and (3.7) proves that Rbt is the ag-
gregate index of loan interest rates paid by the representative
borrower: Rbt =
[∫ 1
0 (Rbt ( j))1−ǫb,t d j
] 1
1−ǫb,t
.
3.3.2 Firms
Final goods producing firms The final good producer pur-
chases yt(i) units of each intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] for the
price Pt(i) to compound a homogeneous consumption good.
Patient and impatient households consume that final good yt
for the price Pt. The perfectly competitive final goods producer
maximizes its profit function:
max
yt ,yt(i)
ΠF = Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
subject to the final good production technology:
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ǫP−1
ǫP di
] ǫP
ǫP−1
,
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where ǫP > 1. The resulting demand for goods (3.8) shows that
the demand for i diminishes with its price.
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
yt (3.8)
The price index Pt thereby satisfies: Pt =
[∫ 1
0 Pt(i)1−ǫPdi
] 1
1−ǫP
.
Intermediate goods producing firms Intermediate goods pro-
ducing firms are monopolistically competitive. By employing
both household labor types, they produce differentiated inter-
mediate goods yt(i) according to the production function:
yt(i) ≤ ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α (3.9)
with 1 > α > 0. The Cobb-Douglas production function with
α measuring the labor income share of patient households and
1 − α of impatient households assumes that patient and impa-
tient households are not perfect substitutes.14 The technology
zt follows a log AR (1) process:
ln(zt) = (1 − ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εz,t, (3.10)
14This assumptions is economically justified by the fact that patient house-
holds adopt more demanding management tasks and consequently earn
higher income than borrowers. The approach is based on Iacoviello and
Neri (2010).
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where ρz is the autoregressive coefficient, z is the steady state
value, and εz,t is a technology shock that follows a normal i.i.d.
process with zero mean and standard deviation σεz .15 The firms
face quadratic adjustment costs à la Rotemberg if they change
the price from one period to the next:
φP
2
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
)2
yt,
while φP is the cost parameter and π denotes steady state infla-
tion. The firms’ maximization of its total market value yields
the log-linearized Phillip’s curve:16
πˆt =
(ǫP − 1)
φP
ˆξt + βsEtπˆt+1, (3.11)
where πt = PtPt−1 is the gross inflation rate, ξt refers to the firms’
real marginal costs, and hats on the variables denote the values’
deviation from the steady state (xˆt = xt−xxt ).
3.3.3 Banks
The microfounded banking sector captures the financial inter-
mediation function and profit orientation of banks. At the top
of the bank holding, the headquarter manages the flow of funds
15The notation also applies to the remaining shocks.
16The first order conditions of the firms’ optimization problem are listed in
the appendix.
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from the saving to the borrowing retail branch and the repre-
sentative bank’s capital position (net worth of the bank). BC
denoted by Kbt accumulates out of earnings Gbt from purchasing
the j financial products of the retail branches. While the frac-
tion τ of last period achieved and aggregated bank profits Gbt−1
is retained to build up the depreciating BC stock, the fraction
1−τ is disbursed to the patient household as dividends. The de-
preciation rate δb captures the expenses for managing BC that
comprises of labor costs and expenses for the technical bank-
ing infrastructure. Moreover, the depreciation rate captures the
idea that a part of the banks’ net worth disappears exogenously,
e.g., due to borrowers’ default (Angelini et al., 2014), or labor
costs. The BC law of motion is:
Kbt
Pt
=
1
skb,t
(1 − δb) K
b
t−1
Pt
+ τ
Gbt−1
Pt
 , (3.12)
where skb,t is modeled to represent the BC depreciation shock.
The shock follows a log AR (1) process:
ln skb,t = (1 − ρskb) ln skb + ρskb ln skb,t−1 + εskb,t , (3.13)
where εskb,t is the innovation that is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2skb). The
shock is correlated to the margins of the bank’s retail rates.
The correlation to the shock on the markup of loan rates is
Cor(εskb , εmkb) = 0.7. Alike, the correlation between the BC
and the markdown interest rate shock is given by Cor(εskb , εmks) =
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0.7. This modeling approach of a financial shock generates the
severe financial conditions observable during the financial cri-
sis in 2008/09. Moreover, the headquarter ensures the banks
fulfils the balance-sheet identity:
Bt
Pt
=
Dt
Pt
+
Kbt
Pt
(3.14)
in all t. Moreover, the headquarter controls that the non-risk
weighted BC ratio K
b
t
Bt complies with the regulatory capital re-
quirement ratio υ. This restriction depicts the newly introduced
leverage ratio for banks of Basel III. Higher bank leverage is
accompanied by a lower ratio. Deviations of K
b
t
Bt from υ imply
quadratic adjustment costs given by:17
ϑ(Kbt , Bt) =
φWS
2

Kbt
Pt
Bt
Pt
− υ

2
Kbt
Pt
,
where φWS is the cost parameter. The macroprudential BC-rule
endogenizes the ratio to υt, so that it adjusts countercyclically.
In the beginning of t the headquarter receives the stock of de-
posits Dt for the costs Rt from the deposit branch and allo-
cates the stock of loans Bt to the loan branch for which the
headquarter charges the intrabank rate RWSt . The intrabank de-
posit rate Rt is equal to the key policy rate in order to close
17The banks bears costs for deviations from the regulatory ratio that they
transmit on to the prices of financial products. Thus, illegal behavior of the
bank is avenged in contrast to the regulatory leverage ratio of borrowers.
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the model.18 Acting in a perfectly competitive market, the rep-
resentative headquarter maximizes the discounted sum of real
cash flows by choosing loans Bt and deposits Dt for t and t + 1,
subject to the banks’ balance sheet constraint (3.14) and the
capital accumulation relation (3.12):
max
Dt ,Bt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t
[(
RWSt
Bt
Pt
+
Dt+1
Pt
− Rt
)
Dt
Pt
−
φWS
2

Kbt
Pt
Bt
Pt
− υ

2
Kbt
Pt
−
Bt+1
Pt
+
K
b
t+1
Pt
−
Kbt
Pt

 .
λs,t is the Lagrange multiplier from the savers’ optimization
problem and translates bank profits in terms of units of con-
sumption.
RWSt = Rt − φWS
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
) (
Kbt
Bt
)2
(3.15)
The first order condition (3.15) states that deviations of the
capital ratio through, e.g., expansion of borrowing, results in
a premium on the policy rate, RWSt > Rt. In contrast, over-
compliance of the ratio facilitates loan supply by lowering the
interbank lending rate below the policy rate. Thus, banks is-
sue a quantity of loans that equalizes the benefits and costs of
changing υ. The headquarter’s incentive is to keep the BC ratio
18Otherwise, if unlimited financing of banks by the central bank’s lending
facility is assumed, arbitrage opportunities will arise.
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as close as possible to the regulatory limit. By doing so, the
bank grants as many loans as possible. Because bankers do not
consider the fact that by issuing more equity, they would re-
duce the regulation costs in the case of a negative shock to the
economy, banks face a pecuniary externality.19
Loan products In the retail department for the bank’s loan
and deposit products, monopolistic competition persists, so that
each developer of a loan or deposit product possesses some
price setting power. The loan unit of the bank receives loans
Bt from the headquarter at the interbank loan rate RWSt . The
department splits them at no cost into different loan products
j ∈ [0, 1] that are under the hand of each manager. The man-
agers in the loan unit offer the product Bt( j) to impatient house-
holds for the corresponding loan rate of Rbt ( j).20 If the price of
the credit product Rbt ( j) changes, the manager faces quadratic
adjustment costs φb, whereby loan rates are sticky. The rep-
resentative loan product developer sets Rbt ( j) to maximize its
19Most studies that evaluate countercyclical policy rules focus on risk-
weighted BC ratios, which Basel III promotes, e.g., Angelini et al. (2014),
Christensen et al. (2011), and Angeloni and Faia (2013).
20The unit’s choice must satisfy: Bt =
∫ 1
0 Bt( j)d j.
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profits:
max
Rbt ( j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t
Rbt ( j) B
b
t ( j)
Pt
− RWSt
Bt( j)
Pt
−
φb
2
 R
b
t ( j)
Rbt−1( j)
− 1

2
Rbt
Bbt
Pt
]
subject to the demand for the loan products (3.7) and Bbt ( j) =
Bt( j). The first order condition (3.16) in a symmetric equilib-
rium implies that changes to the loan rate Rbt in the past and
future yield a surcharge that is transferred to the banks’ clients
by higher rates.
RWSt ǫb,t
Rbt
= −(1 + ǫb,t) + φb
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
−
βs
 c
s
t
cst+1
φb
R
b
t+1
Rbt
− 1

R
b
t+1
Rbt

2 Bbt+1Pt
Bbt Pt+1

(3.16)
When no adjustment costs exist for either the capital-to-asset
ratio, Rt = RWSt , or for loan rates, the loan rate is a markup
on the policy rate, Rbt =
ǫb,t
ǫb,t−1 Rt. The markup is defined by
mkb,t = ǫb,tǫb,t−1 and is assumed to follow a stochastic log AR(1)
process:
ln(mkb,t) = (1−ρmkb) ln(mkb)+ρmkb ln(mkb,t−1)+εmkb,t . (3.17)
The markup shock εmkb,t thereby is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2mkb).
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Saving products The developers in the deposit unit of the
bank offer different deposit products Dst ( j) for the deposit rate
Rst ( j) to the patient households. The unit aggregates all deposit
products j, as Dt( j), at no cost and passes the funds as a ho-
mogenous deposit Dt to the head of the bank holding, thereby
meeting Dt =
∫ 1
0 Dt( j)d j. Each product developer receives a
reward Rt from the wholesale unit for his passed on product
Dt( j) and faces quadratic adjustment costs φS for changing the
deposit rate for saver Rst ( j). Each deposit product developer
maximizes his profits by choosing Rst ( j):
max
Rst ( j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t
Rt Dt( j)Pt − Rst ( j)
Dst ( j)
Pt
−
φs
2
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)2
Rst
Dst
Pt
]
subject to savers’ demand for deposit products (3.3) and the
condition that Dt( j) = Dst ( j). After imposing symmetry, the
optimization problem yields:
Rtǫs,t
Rst
= (ǫs,t − 1) − φs
(
Rst
Rst−1
− 1
)
Rst
Rst−1
+
βs
 ct,sct+1,sφs
(Rst+1
Rst
− 1
) (Rst+1
Rst
)2 Dst+1
Dst
Pt
Pt+1
 .
(3.18)
The saving rate Rst depends on the policy rate and on the steady
state degree of competition in banks’ fund raising (the inverse
of ǫs,t) and, inversely, on how important the φs adjustment costs
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are. Under flexible rates and without adjustment costs, the
deposit rate index is a markdown over the policy rate, Rst =
ǫs,t
ǫs,t−1 Rt. The markdown of the deposit rate is mks,t =
ǫs,t
ǫs,t−1 . In
addition, the markdown of the deposit rate is assumed to evolve
according to a log AR(1) process:
ln(mks,t) = (1−ρmks) ln(mks)+ρmks ln(mks,t−1)+εmks,t . (3.19)
The markdown shock εmks,t is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2mks).
Bank profits Overall bank profits are the sum of net earnings
from the two retail units minus adjustment costs:
Gbt = Rbt Bbt − Rst Dst −
φWS
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
)2
Kbt −
φs
2
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)2
Rst D
s
t −
φb
2
 R
b
t ( j)
Rbt−1( j)
− 1
Rbt Bbt .
(3.20)
3.3.4 Monetary and macroprudential policy
The central bank sets the interest rate according to the Taylor
rule that reacts gradually to output and inflation deviations from
the steady state. Steady state inflation is zero, π = 1. ωπ and
ωy measure the interest rate response to inflation and output,
respectively. ρr is the degree of interest rate smoothing and the
121
monetary policy shock εv,t is i.i.d.N(0, σ2εv,t ).
Rt = R1−ρr R
ρr
t−1
((
πt
π
)ωπ (yt
y
)ωy)1−ρr
εv,t (3.21)
In line with the recommendations of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision for the countercyclical risk-based BC ra-
tio, the rule on the BC ratio (3.22) reacts to changes in the
credit-to-output ratio, et =
Bt
Pt
yt , from its steady state, e =
B
y .
The indicator captures the interaction of loan supply and loan
demand as the factor is influenced by the co-movement of credit
and output. Since positive deviations represent a boom phase
and negative deviation a bust phase, the reaction parameter χυ
is positive for the countercyclical adjustment of the BC ratio,
χυ > 0. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)
proposes a prompt release of changes in response to financial
stress in the economy, which is why I assume no rigid adjust-
ment of the rule.
υt = υ
(
et
e
)χυ (3.22)
The countercyclical leverage ratio (3.23) changes the credit limit
of borrowers in response to deviations of the real credit aggre-
gate, bt = BtPt , from its steady state, b =
B
P . Several studies
identify the credit aggregate as an efficient indicator of credit
market imbalance, e.g., Lambertini et al. (2013).21 Thus, the
21Several studies recommend a prompt adjustment of the ratio to the eco-
nomic imbalance e.g. Körner (2016a).
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countercyclical rule with χl < 0 implies a tight credit limit in
times of credit growth and relaxed credit conditions with de-
clining lending.
lt = l
(
bt
b
)χl
(3.23)
3.3.5 Model closing equations
In a symmetric equilibrium, the goods market is cleared ac-
cording to:
yt = cb,t + cs,t −
φP
2
(
πt
π
− 1
)2
yt −
φWS
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
)2
Kbt
−
φs
2
(
Rst
Rst−1
− 1
)2
Rst D
s
t −
φb
2
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1

2
Rbt B
b
t + δ
b K
B
t−1
Pt
.
(3.24)
The housing market (3.25) clears when housing demand is equal
to the fixed supply of one.
1 = hb,t + hs,t (3.25)
Moreover, labor markets clear. The following analysis of the
non-linear system is conducted using real variables denoted by
small letters.22
22All first order conditions, model closing equations and laws of motion are
summarized in the appendix 3.A.
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3.4 Calibration
The calibrated model primarily matches Eurozone data. Cali-
bration values are summarized in table 3.1. Where it applies,
parameters are presented as quarterly numbers. The borrow-
ers’ discount factor of 0.975 assures loan demand and a binding
borrowing constraint for small deviations from the steady state.
The savers’ discount factor with βs = 0.996 implies a saving
rate Rst of 1.2 percent per annum (p.a.), while with a steady
state interest rate elasticity for deposits of ǫs = −150, the pol-
icy rate is four percent p.a.. To realize a loan rate of around
six percent p.a., the steady state interest rate elasticity of loan
demand ǫb must be 200. The steady state bank leverage ratio
is four percent, which is a little higher than the Basel III reg-
ulation for banks’ leverage ratio. By assuming a buffer on the
regulatory ratio, the approach follows Gerali et al. (2010).23 To
model an imperfect pass-through to loan interest rates, the loan
rate adjustment cost parameter φb is set to 100. I pick a deposit
rate adjustment cost parameter φs of 35 in line with Gerali et al.
(2010).24 Given the retail interest rates, the calibration of the
steady state leverage ratio implies a BC depreciation rate δB of
one. Full depreciation of BC from one period to the next allows
23When examining the risk-weights BC ratio, Gerali et al. (2010) assume a
ratio of nine percent instead of the regulatory eight percent risk-weighted
BC.
24Gerali et al. (2010) base their adjustment costs on net rates, which explains
why the adjustment costs used here are proportionally higher.
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to capture the extreme BC erosion during the last financial cri-
sis in the model.25 Based on Gerali et al. (2010), the banks’
leverage deviation costs are adjusted for gross rates and is set
to 100. The fraction τ of total bank profits constructs the bank’s
capital position, which I set to 77 percent as in Roger and Vlcˇek
(2011). Vice versa the fraction (1 − τ), so 23 percent of profits
are disbursed as dividends to savers. As the ECB reports an
average housing wealth to gross domestic product ratio of 313
percent (ECB, 2009b, p.20) and Musso et al. (2011) records
a ratio of 240 percent for around the same time period from
2000 to 2006, I target a implied steady state housing wealth
to annual gross domestic product ratio of 290 percent by set-
ting the weight of housing in the households’ utility function to
jh = 0.06. Similar to Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a), the
parameter associated with the Frisch elasticity of labor is set
to 2. The national average LTV ratios of borrowers within the
EU vary from above 100 to 60 percent (Banca D’Italia, 2013).
By setting the LTV ratio to 90 percent, the mortgage debt to
annual gross domestic product ratio in steady state is 23 per-
cent consistent with the estimate of 22.6 percent for outstand-
ing housing loans to GDP in 2007 (ECB, 2009b, p.21). The
price elasticity of demand ǫP of six affects a 20 percent markup
on prices in steady state. The price adjustment cost parame-
ter φP is calibrated to 25 which implies that firms change their
25This assumption regarding BC depreciation reinforces the financial multi-
plier by forcing banks to raise new equity in downturns.
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prices every 8 months in line with empirical studies. Following
the estimate of Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a) for α, the
parameter governing the labor income share for savers is set to
0.64.
The Taylor rule responds to inflation deviation with an intensity
of ωπ = 2 and to output deviations with ωy = 0.01 (Gerali et al.,
2010). The interest rate smoothing parameter is 0.8 as in Rubio
and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a).
The standard deviation of the technology shock is set to 0.02
in order to affect a 1.5 percent change of output. The persis-
tence of the technology shock is 0.9 in line with the estimate
of Gerali et al. (2010). The financial shock is a multi-shock
that pushes up the costs of loans or, to put it differently, reduces
the credit availability to the real sector, as applied in Angelini
et al. (2012). Through the implied correlation of 0.7, the BC
depreciation shock entails a shock on the markup and mark-
down of the retail rates. I justify this approach by the fact that
the macroprudential authority is confronted with a set of shocks
that are hard to disentangle. The BC depreciation shock with a
standard deviation of 0.01 is more pronounced than the shock
to the bank interest rates with a standard deviation of 0.006. In
line with the estimates of Gerali et al. (2010), the persistence is
ρskb = 0.81 for the BC depreciation shock, ρmks = 0.86 for the
markdown, and ρmkb = 0.78 for the markup shock, respectively.
The shock on BC produces an eight percent reduction of BC,
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followed by a 12 percent decline in borrowing. The shock pro-
vokes a drop in output of two percent.26 The financial shock
mimics quite well the severe developments after the outbreak
of the crisis in 2008/09.
3.5 The implications of countercyclical
regulation
3.5.1 Welfare implications of optimal policy rules
I use the log-model to quantitatively evaluate the optimal spec-
ifications of countercyclical rules on the BC and the LTV ra-
tio measuring the rules’ welfare performance. By calculat-
ing conditional welfare for the lifetime consumption stream of
borrowers and savers separately for the occurrence of differ-
ent shocks, I shed light on the benefits for the specific type of
agent for distinct points of the business cycle. Using the condi-
tional expected discounted lifetime utility of the representative
agents, the measure of welfare takes into account the transi-
tional effects from the non-stochastic steady state to the im-
plied stochastic mean of the variables that is attained by each
policy rule. I calculate lifetime utility recursively according
26For comparison, the BC quality shock in Gertler and Karadi (2013) pro-
duces a drop in output of five percent and a drop in loans of 15 percent
while BC decreases by 50 percent.
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to Ωi,t = U(ci,t, hi,t, ni,t) + βiΩi,t+1 for i = [s, b] for the two
household types. Alike Mendicino and Pescatori (2008), the
total social welfare is simply the weighted sum of the individ-
ual welfare gains for the different types of households weighted
by their discount factor: Ωall,t = (1 − βs)Ωs,t + (1 − βb)Ωb,t.27
A second-order approximate solution of the model around the
non-stochastic steady state is necessary so that the welfare mea-
sure captures the effects of time-varying stochastic distortions
on the variables’ first and second moments (Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2004b).28
To assess the implications of each policy rule and their combi-
nation, I numerically derive the welfare change with the regu-
lation. Following this approach, the model scenario, in which l
and υ are endogenous and respond to the corresponding indica-
tor variable, is compared to the model outcome with constant l
and υ. Hence, I conduct a stochastic simulation to receive the
welfare level with each single rule and their combination given
by Ωmp,i,t, while mp = {lt, υt, both}. Moreover, I compute the
welfare level for the benchmark situation with constant LTV
27The weights βs and βb ensure that given a constant consumption stream
borrowers and savers generate the same individual level of utility, so that
both agents contribute equally to total welfare.
28Appendix section 3.B.2 describes the second order perturbation method
and section 3.C provides a detailed description on computing welfare, re-
spectively.
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and BC ratio, which is given by Ωcr,i,t:
Ωcr,i,t = E0
∞∑
t=0
βti
ln ( ccr,i,t) + j ln hcr,i,t − n
η
cr,i,t
η
 (3.26)
The relative welfare gain from benchmark welfare to the wel-
fare level with rule calculated according to (3.27) makes is pos-
sible to represent the welfare gain in percent of the agent’s life
time consumption without regulation which Λi captures.
Ωmp,i,t = E0
∞∑
t=0
βti
ln ((1 + Λi) ccr,i,t) + j ln hcr,i,t − n
η
cr,i,t
η

(3.27)
with i = {s, b, all}. Thus, the value Λi indicates how much a
household would be willing to pay in consumption units for the
regulation to be implemented because it is welfare improving.
I conduct a grid search to identify the rules’ reaction parameter
that maximizes Λall. To avoid unrealistic high reaction values,
I limit the search for the optimal χv to the range from 0.1 to
10, with increments of 0.1. The reaction parameter of the LTV-
rule χl is allowed to lie between -2 to 0, with increments of 0.1.
The model is simulated for each parameter value 100000 times
which should suffice law of large numbers that the simulation
converges to the expected value.
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Table 3.1: Calibration values. Parameters are calibrated to
match Eurozone data.
Parameter Description Value
βs savers’ discount factor 0.996
βb borrower’ discount factor 0.975
η parameter associated with labor elasticity 2
jh weight of housing in utility function 0.06
l steady state loan-to-value ratio 0.9
α labor share of savers 0.64
φP price adjustment costs 25
ǫP price elasticity of demand 6
ρr interest rate smoothing parameter in TR 0.8
ωy output parameter in TR 0.2
ωπ inflation parameter in TR 2
1 − τ bank dividend payout ratio 0.23
υ capital requirement ratio 0.04
ǫs steady state deposit rate elasticity -150
ǫb steady state loan rate elasticity 200
φws banks’ leverage deviation costs 100
φs saving rate adjustment costs 35
φb loan rate adjustment costs 100
δb bank capital management costs 1
ρz persistence technology shock 0.9
ρskb persistence capital depreciation shock 0.81
ρmks persistence deposit markdown shock 0.86
ρmkb persistence loan markup shock 0.78
σz std technology shock 0.02
σskb std capital shock 0.01
σmkb std loan rate markup shock 0.006
σmks std deposit rate markdown shock 0.006
r2bk,mks corr bank capital and markdown shock 0.7
r2bk,mkb corr bank capital and markup shock 0.7
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Table 3.2: Welfare maximized countercyclical rules for individual implementation of each policy
rule. The optimal parameter values for χl and χυ maximize total welfare relative to the bench-
mark without regulation. Gains are computed in percent of consumption equivalence units for
savers and borrowers, separately, as well as for both agents.
BC-Rule optimal
χυ
total welfare
in %
savers’
welfare in %
borrowers’
welfare in %
financial shock 0.1 0.104 −0.002 0.106
technology shock 7.2 0.00303 −0.00004 0.00307
both shocks 0.2 0.103 −0.001 0.104
LTV-Rule optimal
χl
total welfare
in %
savers’
welfare in %
borrowers’
welfare in %
financial shock −0.1 0.109 -0.002 0.111
technology shock −0.9 0.00072 0.00003 0.00075
both shocks −0.2 0.103 −0.002 0.106
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The results for the single rules in table 3.3 and for the joint
regime in table 3.3 provide three main insights. First, macro-
prudential rules generate a sizable total welfare gain in response
to financial shocks in comparison to only marginal but positive
gains in response to technology shocks. The welfare improve-
ment is relatively greater for a countercyclical LTV-rule with
0.109 percent than for a countercyclical BC-rule, for which the
households would pay 0.104 percent of their aggregate con-
sumption stream. That is because the LTV-rule influences di-
rectly the lending decision of borrowers and thus stimulates
credit demand in a bust. Several studies in the literature, e.g.,
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014); Kannan et al. (2012) pro-
vide similar evidence for the shock-specific social optimality
of macroprudential regulation, while adding to the literature, I
find countercyclical regulation not to be socially harmful in re-
sponse to a technology shock. When the household faces the
uncertainty of both shocks, the total welfare gain with either
rule is 0.103 percent of the households’ consumption. Con-
sidering the situation when both rules are implemented, the
achieved welfare gains are higher than in the single policy rule
regimes. Since the welfare analysis uncovers no reduction of
the aggregate welfare level for the combined regime, the two
rules appear to complement each other or at least do not inter-
fere with each other in a way that diminishes welfare.
Second, the findings show that the welfare loss of savers with
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the regulation is compensated by a greater welfare gain for bor-
rowers. Without regulation, neither banks nor borrowers antic-
ipate that in response to a negative shock deleveraging is opti-
mal. Since both rules are directly linked to the agents’ leverage
ratio, either regulation causes borrowers and banks to internal-
ize their pecuniary externality of overborrowing generating a
total welfare gain. Borrowers being the winner from macro-
prudential regulation coincides with the findings of Lambertini
et al. (2013) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a). With-
out regulation, unconstrained savers are also able to accumulate
precautionary savings to smooth consumption which explains
why they bear marginal welfare losses. The results reveal that
regulation leads to a constrained-efficient allocation by reduc-
ing the probability of excessive borrowing.
Third, the optimal degree of countercyclicality of the rule de-
pends on the origin of the shock. In response to a financial
shock, each rule reacts mildly− with an absolute value close to
zero − to changing economic conditions, but in response to a
technology shock the optimal macroprudential rule character-
izes a high reaction intensity. The result remains valid for the
regime with two active policy rules. The dependence of the re-
action parameter on the source of the shock poses a challenge
for the optimal calibration of macroprudential policy rules.
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Table 3.3: Welfare maximized countercyclical rules for joint implementation. The optimal parameter
values for χl and χυ maximize total welfare relative to the benchmark without regulation.
Gains are computed in percent of consumption equivalence units for savers and borrowers,
separately, as well as for both agents.
BC-rule and
LTV-rule
optimal total welfare
in %
savers’
welfare in %
borrowers’
welfare in %
χl χυ
financial shock −0.3 0.2 0.110 −0.001 0.111
technology shock −0.4 4.5 0.0037 −0.00001 0.0037
both shocks −0.2 0.1 0.105 −0.001 0.106
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3.5.2 Volatility analysis
The welfare-maximizing reaction parameter values in response
to both shocks (last line of each table) identify the optimal
policy rule in the following. Table 3.4 shows the volatility
impact of financial and technology shocks on key economic
model variables for the benchmark scenario with constant ra-
tios and the three policy regimes. I find that both rules bal-
ance the standard deviation of loans in isolation compared to
the situation with a constant bank leverage ratio, though only
the variance reduction with the LTV-rule is significant.29 In
particular, when both rules are implemented, macroprudential
policy attenuates the impact on the credit aggregate. Regarding
the variance of BC, the BC-rule performs better than the LTV-
rule. Indeed, with the BC-rule the bank uses internal capital
for extending loans, which leads to a faster return to the initial
level of BC by generating bank profits. The BC ratio is best
stabilized by the combination of both rules. The rules do not
have a significant effect on inflation, although a few studies as
Kolasa (2016) emphasize that macroprudential policy enhances
the inflation-output stabilization trade-off. In this model with
a distinct mortgage market, macroprudential regulation hardly
affects macroeconomic stabilization, unlike the findings of An-
29I conduct an F-Test comparing the empirical variances calculated by a
1000 period simulation of each regime.
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gelini et al. (2014).30 I only find a significant reduction in out-
put volatility in the scenario where both macroprudential rules
are implemented. The result does not contradict the identified
welfare enhancements of borrowers with either rule since the
fact that each rule makes borrowers internalize the effects of
overborrowing smooths borrowers’ stream of utility over time.
Besides consumption, borrowers derive utility from housing
services that they mainly effort through lending. To sum up,
in comparison to the BC-rule the LTV-rule − alone and in com-
bination with the BC-rule − shows to be an effective tool to
mitigate credit cycles. In addition the LTV-rule contributes sig-
nificantly to the health of the financial system by reducing the
variance of the credit-to-output ratio.
30Angelini et al. (2014) document that macroprudential regulation damages
aggregate activity when the economy experiences a technology shock and
non-cooperation between macroprudential and monetary policy prevails.
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Table 3.4: Standard deviation of key variables with optimal macroprudential rules after financial
and technology shocks. Asteriks (*) indicate values that are significantly different from the
variance in the constant ratio model on a 1 percent level.
Standard deviation
loans bank
capital
capital-
to-credit
ratio
output credit-to-
output
ratio
inflation
constant BC
and LTV ratio
0.322313 0.473812 0.763547 0.045397 0.319929 0.017585
LTV-rule
(χl = −0.2)
0.249279* 0.510366 0.740980 0.045088 0.250730* 0.018581
BC-rule
(χv = 0.2)
0.311523 0.467938 0.745974 0.045401 0.305242 0.017813
LTV+BC-rule
(χl = −0.2,
χv = 0.1)
0.204603* 0.533356 0.724667 0.044990* 0.208015* 0.019026
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3.6 Model dynamics and results
This section contrasts the business-cycle implications of a rule
on the LTV ratio and the rule on the BC ratio with the bench-
mark situation with fixed leverage ratios. The parameter in the
LTV-rule is optimal at χl = −0.2, but I use a slightly higher
intensity χυ = 5 than optimal for the parameter in the BC-rule
in order to illustrate the rule’s impact. My approach is rea-
sonable since the volatility analysis indicates that the BC-rule
with the optimal mild parametrization affects the key variables
only marginal. Figure 3.1 illustrates the impulse responses of
the time-invariant regulation economy (blue, solid line) to the
economy with countercyclical capital requirements (black, dot-
ted line) and an active countercyclical LTV ratio (red, dashed
line).
After a one standard deviation shock on BC accompanied by
a shock to the markup and markdown on retail rates, borrow-
ing falls and BC depreciates. The benchmark model predicts
that the BC ratio initially increases due to a faster drop in loans
than BC. The subsequent drop of the ratio implies higher intra-
bank costs of lending and thus forces the representative bank
to deleverage. The countercyclical BC-rule marginally miti-
gates that effect by allowing BC to be used for extending loans,
so that borrowing drops less. The implementation of a coun-
tercyclical LTV-rule also stabilizes the banks’ leverage ratio.
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The regulation allows borrowers to a higher leverage position,
thereby assuring loan demand. Thus, the LTV-rule prevents
bank profits that build up bank capital from falling and miti-
gates the steep decline of loans better than a BC-rule. More-
over, the rule on the LTV ratio dampens the loss of BC, which,
however, slightly prolongs the return of net worth to the ini-
tial level relative to the benchmark. The LTV-rule stabilizes
the plunge of the credit-to-output ratio in contrast to the BC-
rule. The spread between the loan retail rate and the policy rate
rises without countercyclical regulation as well as when a LTV-
rule is implemented. Nonetheless, the BC-rule attenuates the
impact on the interest spread as the rule reduces the loan inter-
est rate making banks’ internal financing of loans through the
bank’s equity cheaper. Monetary policy reacts to deflation by
lowering the key interest rate, which underlies the increase in
the spread. Sticky loan interest rates prevent the lower policy
rate being passed on to the retail rates.
In the set-up households’ decisions transmit the unanticipated
change in credit conditions with the shock to the macroecon-
omy. In particular, borrowers, but also savers, experience wealth
destruction with the shock because of higher loan prices and
reduced deposit income. In the benchmark scenario borrowers
sell housing stock to savers. Savers smooth their consumption
according to their Euler equation by depositing their financial
means at the banks. After the shock and induced by the ex-
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pansionary monetary policy, they substitute their deposits with
the bank for investments in housing which pose another sav-
ing opportunity in order to smooth utility. Consequently, house
prices are hump-shaped (decrease and then increase) because
of savers’ short-term hike of demand for housing and the ex-
ogenous stock of housing. With the countercyclical rule on
the LTV ratio and thus greater propensity to borrow, impatient
households’ demand for housing recovers and leads to a further
undesirable rise in house prices.31 The households reduce la-
bor hours whereby the economy’s production falls, while there
is no distinct difference between the alternative regimes.
Overall, the fall of the credit aggregate is less pronounced with
regulation, in particular with the rule on the LTV ratio. When
lending influences only households’ consumption demand over
the mortgage market, macroprudential regulation fails to miti-
gate the recession in response to a financial shock.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the impulse responses under the alterna-
tive policy regimes when the economy is subject to a negative
one standard deviation technology shock. Analyzing the econ-
omy in response to this shock allows to check the performance
of countercyclical regulation during “normal“ business cycle
fluctuations. Output and prices of consumer goods decline.
The decreased house prices reduce borrowers’ collateral posi-
31The assumed exogenous fixed supply side of the housing market causes
the hump-shaped evolution of house prices. An extension of the model by
a more sophisticated supply of housing would moderate this reaction.
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tion. Consequently, borrowers are forced to deleverage and sell
housing. The poor economic situation induces households to
work more. Restrictive monetary policy due to inflation leads
to a lower spread between the loan and policy rate. Since this
pass-through is sticky, the higher credit costs are not immedi-
ately passed on to the loan interest rate by the banks.32 The
effect on the interest rate spread is considerably lower than un-
der a financial shock. Borrowing decreases in the benchmark
scenario and only marginally less under a BC-rule. The LTV-
rule attenuates the drop of lending and stabilizes BC while the
BC-rule amplifies the depreciation of BC below the benchmark
reaction in order to finance loans. Again, the BC ratio increases
initially and then falls below the steady state because BC depre-
ciates more slowly than loans. The LTV-rule preserves the BC
ratio better than the BC-rule since borrowing and BC drop less
with the former rule.
In the model macroprudential regulation only affects financial
and housing market variables after an exogenous change in
technology and has no effect on output. This finding, which
contradicts earlier studies, rests on the model framework by
virtue of the omitted direct transmission channel to the pro-
duction sector. The improved financial situation through the
relaxed collateral constraint with the LTV-rule stabilizes the
credit-to-output ratio in response to both shocks. Thus, the
32The development of the interest spread is in line with Gerali et al. (2010)
who find that bank inter-meditation mitigates the impact of the shock.
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LTV-rule reduces the probability of a sustained banking crisis.
3.7 Conclusion
In a model with a mortgage market, I examine the welfare ef-
fects and stabilization properties of three macroprudential pol-
icy regimes: a countercylical policy rule on the LTV ratio of
borrowers, a countercyclical rule on the BC ratio of banks, and
their combined implementation. My analysis is motivated by
the recent introduction of a leverage ratio for banks in Basel
III and the important role of the mortgage market in recent
crises. In the model economy with a banking sector á la Ger-
ali et al. (2010), borrowers are subject to a collateral constraint
and banks, respectively, are constrained by regulation in issu-
ing credit. A financial shock deteriorates the balance sheet po-
sitions of the agents, thereby triggering the financial multiplier
effect. Taking monetary policy as given, I compare the impact
of the introduction of the macroprudential tools to the bench-
mark with constant leverage ratios.
After conducting a welfare analysis for savers and borrowers
separately, results show that borrowers attain a welfare gain ir-
respective of the rule employed. When the rule reacts mildly
countercyclically to the changing economic conditions, the wel-
fare increase of borrowers compensates the loss of savers and
leads to a pareto improvement. The rationale behind it is that
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macroprudential regulation induces borrowers to internalize his
externality of overborrowing in downturns. In response to a fi-
nancial shock, both rules, separately and in combination, gener-
ate considerably higher welfare gains, but play only a marginal
role for uncertainties stemming from technology.
Simulating a financial market collapse shows that the introduc-
tion of a LTV-rule effectively stabilizes the credit aggregate,
while the effect of a countercyclical BC-rule on credit is rela-
tively small. The mechanism behind it is as follows: the LTV-
rule successfully restores borrowers demand for loans and thus
dampens the fall of BC after the negative shock. By attenuating
credit-to-output fluctuations, the regulation also strengthens the
resilience of the banking sector and provides financial stability
through a secured lending by banks during downturns. The
combined introduction of both rules achieves the best policy
outcome. Besides financial stability, I find, however, no evi-
dence for macroeconomic stabilization with either rule when
the linkage between the financial and the real sector is exclu-
sively the private mortgage market.
By assessing the macroeconomic performance of countercycli-
cal macroprudential regulation, my findings predict that the
LTV-rule performs better than a countercyclical BC-rule as the
LTV-rule ensures consistent loan provision during downturns.
This insight reveals that countercyclical regulation of credit
limits is a useful complement to BC regulation. Moreover, my
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results show that macroprudential policy alone does not help to
moderate the real consequences of a crises. Thus, the study en-
riches the current policy debate about optimal macroprudential
regulation.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses to a financial shock in a econ-
omy with constant leverage ratios for banks and
borrowers (blue, solid line), with a countercycli-
cal LTV-rule and a constant ratio for the bank (red,
dashed line), and a countercyclical BC-rule given a
constant LTV ratio (black, dotted line).
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to a technology shock in an
economy with constant leverage ratios for banks
and borrowers (blue, solid line), with a counter-
cyclical LTV-rule and a constant ratio for the bank
(red, dashed line), and a countercyclical BC-rule
given a constant LTV ratio (black, dotted line).
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Appendix
3.A Model equations with banking sector
3.A.1 Optimization problems
• Savers’ optimization problem:
max
cs,t ,hs,t ,ns,t ,Dst
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
ln(cs,t) + jh ln(hs,t) − n
η
s,t
η
 − βtsλs,t
(
cs,t +
Dst
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t −
Dst−1R
s
t−1
Pt
−
Ws,tns,t
Pt
−
Qt
Pt
hs,t−1+
Xt
Pt
+
(1 − ω)
Pt
GBt−1
)}
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First order conditions:
∂L
∂cs,t
= βts
1
cs,t
− βtsλs,t = 0
⇐⇒
1
cs,t
= λs,t
∂L
∂hs,t
= βts jh
1
hs,t
− βtsλs,t
Qt
Pt
+ βt+1s Et
[
λs,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
= 0
⇐⇒ λs,t
Qt
Pt
=
jh
hs,t
+ βtsEt
[
λs,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
∂L
∂ns,t
= βts(−η)
η
η−1
s,t
η
+ βtsλs,t
Ws,t
Pt
= 0
⇐⇒
η
η−1
s,t
λs,t
=
Ws,t
Pt
∂L
∂Dt
= −βtsλs,t
1
Pt
+ βt+1s Et
[
λs,t+1Rst
Pt+1
]
= 0
⇐⇒ λs,t = βsEt
[
λs,t+1Rst
Pt
Pt+1
]
∂L
∂λs,t
= −βst
(
cs,t +
Dst
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t −
Dst−1R
s
t−1
Pt
−
Ws,tns,t
Pt
−
Qt
Pt
hs,t−1−
Xt
Pt
−
(1 − ω)
Pt
GBt
)
= 0
⇐⇒ cs,t +
Dst
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t =
Dst−1R
s
t−1
Pt
+
Ws,tns,t
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hs,t−1+
Xt
Pt
+
(1 − ω)
Pt
GBt−1
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• Borrowers’ optimization problem
max
cb,t ,hb,t ,nb,t ,Bbt
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
ln(cb,t) + jh ln(hb,t) − n
η
b,t
η

−βtbλb,t
cb,t + R
b
t−1B
b
t−1
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hb,t −
Qt
Pt
hb,t−1 −
Bbt
Pt
−
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t
−
βtbµt
(
Rbt Bbt
Pt
− ltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
hb,t
])}
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First order conditions:
∂L
∂cb,t
= βtb
1
cb,t
− βtbλb,t = 0
⇐⇒
1
cb,t
= λb,t
∂L
∂hb,t
= βtb jh
1
hb,t
− βtbλb,t
Qt
Pt
+ βt+1b Et
[
λb,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
+
βtbµtltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
]
= 0
⇐⇒ λb,t
Qt
Pt
= jh 1hb,t + µtltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
]
+ βbEt
[
λb,t+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
]
∂L
∂nb,t
= βtb(−η)
n
η−1
b,t
η
+ βtbλb,t
Wb,t
Pt
= 0
⇐⇒
n
η−1
b,t
λb,t
=
Wb,t
Pt
∂L
∂Bb,t
= −βt+1b Et
[
λb,t+1
(Rbt )
Pt+1
]
+ βtbλb,t
1
Pt
− βtbµtEt
[ (Rbt )
Pt
]
= 0
⇐⇒
1
Pt
λb,t = µtRbt
1
Pt
+ βbEt
[
λb,t+1
Rbt
Pt+1
]
⇐⇒ λb,t = µtRbt + βbEt
[
λb,t+1
Rbt Pt
Pt+1
]
∂L
∂λb,t
= βtb
cb,t + R
b
t−1B
b
t−1
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hb,t −
Qt
Pt
hb,t−1 −
Bbt
Pt
−
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t
)
= 0
⇐⇒ cb,t +
Rbt−1B
b
t−1
Pt
+
Qt
Pt
hb,t =
Qt
Pt
hb,t−1 +
Bbt
Pt
+
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t
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∂L
∂µt
= −βtb
(
Rbt Bbt
Pt
− ltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
hb,t
])
= 0
⇐⇒
Rbt Bbt
Pt
= ltEt
[Qt+1
Pt
hb,t
]
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• Final good producers’ optimization problem
max
yt(i)
ΠF = Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
⇐⇒ max
yt(i)
ΠF = Pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ǫP−1
ǫP di
] ǫP
ǫP−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
First order conditions:
∂ΠF
∂yt(i) = Pt
ǫP
ǫP − 1
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ǫP−1
ǫP di
] 1
ǫP−1 ǫP − 1
ǫP
yt(i)
ǫP−1
ǫP
−1
−
Pt(i) = 0
⇐⇒ Pty
1
ǫP
t yt(i)−
1
ǫP = Pt(i)
⇐⇒ yt(i)
1
ǫP =
Pt
Pt(i)y
1
ǫP
t
⇐⇒ yt(i) =
[
Pt
Pt(i)
]ǫp
yt
⇐⇒ yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫp
yt
In order to derive the price index, I include the demand
for one intermediate good in the final good producers’
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production function.
yt =

∫ 1
0
{[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫP
yt
} ǫP−1
ǫP
di

ǫP
ǫP−1
⇐⇒ yt = PǫPt
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ǫPdi
] ǫP
ǫP−1
yt
⇐⇒ P−ǫPt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ǫPdi
] ǫP
ǫP−1
⇐⇒ Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ǫPdi
] 1
1−ǫP
• Intermediate goods producers’ optimization problem
max
Pt(i),ns,t ,nb,t
ΠI = E
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t

(
Pt(i)
Pt
)1−ǫP
yt −
Ws,t
Pt
ns,t(i)
−
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t(i) −
φp
2
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
)2
yt
 − βtsλs,t
ξt
[(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP
yt − ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
]}
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First order conditions:
∂ΠI
∂Pt(i) = β
t
sλs,t
[
(1 − ǫP)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫP 1
Pt
yt − φp
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
)
1
πPt−1(i)yt
]
+ βt+1s λs,t+1Et
[
φp
(
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i) − 1
)
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)2
yt+1
]
+
βtsλs,tξt
ǫP
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP−1 1
Pt
yt
 = 0
⇐⇒ φλs,t
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
]
Pt
πPt−1(i) = λs,t(1 − ǫP)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ǫP
+
λs,tξtǫP
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ǫP−1
+ βsφpEt+{
λs,t+1
[
Pt+1(i)
πPt
− 1
] [
Pt+1(i)Pt
πPt(i)2
]
yt+1
yt
}
∂ΠI
∂ns,t
= −βtsλs,t
Ws,t
Pt
+ βtsλs,tξtαztns,t(i)α−1nb,t(i)1−α = 0
⇐⇒
Ws,t
Pt
ns,t = αξtztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
∂ΠI
∂nb,t
= βtsλs,t
Wb,t
Pt
+ βtsλs,tξtzt(1 − α)ns,t(i)αnb,t(i)−α = 0
⇐⇒
Wb,t
Pt
nb,t = (1 − α)ξtztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
∂ΠI
∂ξt
= yt(i) −t ns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
⇐⇒ yt(i) = ztns,t(i)αnb,t(i)1−α
• Banking sector − The headquarters’ optimization33
33βsλs is the pricing kernel of patient households who are the owners of all
banks.
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Bank capital is accumulated out of a fraction of retained
earnings from t − 1, τGbt−1.
Kbt
Pt
=
1
skb,t
(1 − δb) K
b
t−1
Pt
+ τ
Gbt−1
Pt

The headquarter maximizes its cash flow by taking the
intrabank credit rate RWSt and the intrabank savings rate
that is equal to the key interest rate RWS ,st = Rt as given.
Moreover, this department of the representative bank en-
sures the bank’s adherence with the balance sheet iden-
tity Bt = Dt + Kbt .
max
Dt ,Bt
ΠB = E0
∞∑
t=0
β
t
sλs,t

RWSt
Bt
Pt
− Rt
Dt
Pt
−
φWS
2

Kbt
Pt
Bt
Pt
− υ

2
Kbt
Pt
+
Dt+1
Pt
−
Bt+1
Pt
+
Kt+1
Pt
−
Kbt
Pt
]
− ξWSt
(
Bt
Pt
−
Dt
Pt
−
Kbt
Pt
)]}
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First order conditions
∂ΠB
∂Dt
= −βtsλs,t
Rt
Pt
+ βtsλs,tξ
WS
t
1
Pt
+ βt−1s
λs,t−1
Pt−1
= 0
⇐⇒ −Rt + ξWSt + β
t−1
s
λs,t−1
λs,t
Pt
Pt−1
= 0
⇐⇒ Rt − βt−1s
λs,t−1
λs,t
Pt
Pt−1
= ξWSt
∂ΠB
∂Bt
= βtsλs,t
[
RWSt
Pt
+ φWS
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
)
Kbt
Pt
Kbt
B2t
]
− βts
ξWSt
Pt
λs,t−
βt−1s λs,t−1
1
Pt−1
= 0
⇐⇒ RWSt + φWS
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
) (
Kbt
Bt
)2
− ξWSt − β
t−1
s
λs,t−1
λs,t
Pt
Pt−1
= 0
Inserting both first order conditions in each other links
the spread of the intrabank loan rate and the intrabank
savings rate and the leverage ratio of banks.
0 = RWSt + φWS
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
) (
Kbt
Bt
)2
− Rt+
βt−1s
λs,t−1
λs,t
Pt
Pt−1
− βt−1s
λs,t−1
λs,t
Pt
Pt−1
⇐⇒ RWSt − Rt + φWS
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
) (
Kbt
Bt
)2
= 0
⇐⇒ RWSt = Rt − φWS
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
) (
Kbt
Bt
)2
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Spread of intrabank rates:
sWSt = R
WS ,b
t − Rt = −φ
WS
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
) (
Kbt
Bt
)2
• Loan product brokers’ optimization problem subject to
Bbt ( j) = Bt( j) is:
max
Rbt ( j)
ΠL = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtsλs,t
Rbt ( j)
(
Rbt ( j)
Rbt
)−ǫb,t Bbt
Pt
−
RWSt
(
Rbt ( j)
Rbt
)−ǫb,t Bbt
Pt
−
φb
2
 R
b
t ( j)
Rbt−1( j)
− 1

2
Rbt
Bbt
Pt


First order condition:
∂ΠL
∂Rbt ( j)
= βtsλs,t
−Rbt ( j)ǫb,t
(
Rbt ( j)
Rbt
)−ǫb,t−1 Bbt
Pt
1
Rbt
+
(
Rbt ( j)
Rbt
)−ǫb,t Bbt
Pt
+
RWSt ǫb,t
(
Rbt ( j)
Rbt
)−ǫb,t−1 Bbt
Rbt Pt
− φb
 R
b
t ( j)
Rbt−1( j)
− 1
 R
b
t Bbt
Rbt−1( j)Pt
+
βt+1s λs,t+1
φb
R
b
t+1( j)
Rbt ( j)
− 1

 R
b
t+1
Rbt ( j)

2
Bt+1Pt
Pt+1
 = 0
⇐⇒ RWSt ǫb,t
Bbt ( j)
Rbt ( j)
= ǫb,tBbt ( j) − Bbt ( j) + φb
 R
b
t ( j)
Rbt−1( j)
− 1
 R
b
t Bbt ( j)
Rbt−1( j)
−
βs
λs,t+1λs,t φb
R
b
t+1( j)
Rbt ( j)
− 1

 R
b
t+1
Rbt ( j)

2 Bbt+1Pt
Pt+1

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In a symmetric equilibrium, Rbt ( j) = Rbt applies.
RWSt ǫb,t
Rbt
= −(1 + ǫb,t) + φb
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
−
βs
λs,t+1λs,t φb
R
b
t+1
Rbt
− 1

R
b
t+1
Rbt

2 Bbt+1Pt
Bbt Pt+1

⇐⇒
RWSt ǫb,t
Rbt
= ǫb,t − 1 + φb
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
−
βs
λs,t+1λs,t φb
R
b
t+1
Rbt
− 1

R
b
t+1
Rbt

2 Bbt+1Pt
Bbt Pt+1

⇐⇒
RWSt ǫb,t
Rbt
= ǫb,t − 1 + φb
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
−
βs
 cs,tcs,t+1φb
R
b
t+1
Rbt
− 1

R
b
t+1
Rbt

2 Bbt+1
Bbt πt+1

When interest rates are flexible and adjust instantaneously,
the relation simplifies to:
Rbt =
ǫb,t
ǫb,t − 1
RWSt
S bt ≡ Rbt − Rt =
ǫb,t
ǫb,t − 1
S WSt − Rt
By assuming that the markdown ǫb,tǫb,t−1 = mkb,t follows an
AR(1) shock process, the first order condition changes
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to:
mkb,t
mkb,t − 1
RWSt
Rbt
=
mkb,t
mkb,t − 1
− 1 + φb
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
−
βs
 cs,tcs,t+1φb
R
b
t+1
Rbt
− 1

R
b
t+1
Rbt

2 Bbt+1Pt
Bbt Pt+1

• Saving product brokers’ optimization problem subject to
Dst ( j) = Dt( j) is:
max
rst ( j)
ΠS = E0
∞∑
t=0
{
βtsλs,t
[
Rt
(
Rst ( j)
Rst
)−ǫs,t Dst
Pt
− Rst ( j)
(
Rst ( j)
Rst
)−ǫs,t
Dst
Pt
−
φs
2
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)2
Rst
Dst
Pt


First order condition:
∂ΠS
∂Rst ( j)
= βtsλs,t
−ǫs,tRt
(
Rst ( j)
Rst
)−ǫs,t−1 Dst
PtRst
+ ǫs,tRst ( j)
(
Rst ( j)
Rst
)−ǫs,t−1
Dst
PtRst
−
(
Rst ( j)
Rst
)−ǫs,t Dst
Pt
− φs
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)
Rst Dst
Rst−1( j)Pt
}
+
βt+1s λs,t+1
φs
(Rst+1( j)
Rt( j) − 1
) Rst+1Dst+1Rst+1( j)
Rs,2t ( j)Pt+1
 = 0
160
In a symmetric equilibrium Rst ( j) = Rst applies.
ǫs,t
RtDst
Rst Pt
= (ǫs,t − 1)
Dst
Pt
− φs
(
Rst
Rst−1
− 1
)
Rst Dst
Rst−1Pt
+ βs
{
λs,t+1
λs,t
φs
(Rst+1( j)
Rst
− 1
) (Rst+1
Rst
)2 Dst+1
Pt+1

⇐⇒ ǫs,t
Rt
Rst ( j)
= (ǫs,t − 1) − φs
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)
Rst
Rst−1
+ βs
{
λs,t+1
λs,t
φs
(Rst−1( j)
Rst ( j)
− 1
) (Rst+1
Rst
)2 Dst+1
Dst
1
πt+1

⇐⇒ ǫs,t
Rt
Rst ( j)
= (ǫs,t − 1) − φs
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)
Rst
Rst−1
+ βs
{
cs,t
cs,t+1
φs
(Rst+1( j)
Rst ( j)
− 1
) (Rst+1
Rst
)2 Dst+1
Dst
1
πt+1

The relation simplifies when interest rates are flexible
and adjust instantaneously, so that the last two terms equal
to zero.
ǫs,t
Rt
Rst
= ǫs,t − 1
Rst =
ǫs,t
ǫs,t − 1
Rt
By assuming that the markdown ǫs,tǫs,t−1 = mks,t follows an
AR(1) shock process, the first order condition changes
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to:
mks,t
mks,t − 1
Rt
Rst ( j)
=
mks,t
mks,t − 1
− 1 − φs
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)
Rst
Rst−1
+
βs
 cs,tcs,t+1φs
(Rst+1( j)
Rst ( j)
− 1
) (Rst+1
Rst
)2 Dst+1
Dst
1
πt+1

• Profits of banks
Gbt = Rbt Bbt − Rdt Dst −
φWS
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
)2
Kbt −
φs
2
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)2
Rst D
s
t−
φb
2
 R
b
t ( j)
Rbt−1( j)
− 1

2
Rbt B
b
t
• Borrowers’ demand for loans
min
Bbt ( j)
LBD =
∫ 1
0
Rbt ( j)Bbt ( j)d j − λbd

(∫ 1
0
(Bbt ( j))
ǫb,t−1
ǫb,t d j
) ǫb,t
ǫb,t−1
− Bbt

First order condition:
∂LBD
∂Bbt ( j)
= Rbt ( j) − λbd
 ǫb,tǫb,t − 1
(∫ 1
0
(Bbt ( j))
ǫb,t−1
ǫb,t d j
) ǫb,t
ǫb,t−1
−1
ǫb,t − 1
ǫb,t
(Bbt ( j))
ǫb,t−1
ǫb,t
−1
)
= 0
⇐⇒ Rbt ( j) = λbd(Bbt )
1
ǫb,t (Bbt ( j))
−1
ǫb,t
⇐⇒ Bbt ( j) = Bbt
(
Rbt ( j)
λbd
)−ǫb,t
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λbd is the shadow price for loan products. Since the
shadow price is independent of the household i, it can
be replaced by the overall price index for loan products
Rbt that is the same for all households. Aggregating the
condition over all households i delivers the aggregated
nominal demand of patient households for loans:
⇐⇒ Rbt ( j) = Rbt (Bbt )
1
ǫb,t (Bbt ( j))
−1
ǫb,t
⇐⇒ Bbt ( j) =
(
Rbt ( j)
Rbt
)−ǫb,t
Bbt
The aggregated loan interest rate is:
Bbt ( j) =

∫ 1
0

[
Rbt ( j)
Rbt
]−ǫb,t
Bbt

ǫb,t−1
ǫb,t
d j

ǫb,t
ǫb,t−1
Rbt =
[∫ 1
0
(Rbt ( j))1−ǫb,t d j
] 1
1−ǫb,t
• Savers’ demand for deposits:
max
Dst ( j)
ΠS D =
∫ 1
0
Rst ( j)Dst ( j)d j − λsd

(∫ 1
0
(Dst ( j, i))
ǫs,t
ǫs,t−1 d j
) ǫs,t
ǫs,t−1
−
Dst (i)
)
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First order condition:
∂ΠS D
∂Dst ( j)
= Rst ( j) − λsd
 ǫs,tǫs,t − 1
(∫ 1
0
(Dst ( j))
ǫs,t
ǫs,t−1 d j
) ǫs,t
ǫs,t−1−1
ǫs,t − 1
ǫs,t
(Dst ( j))
ǫs,t−1
ǫs,t
−1
)
⇐⇒ Rbt ( j) = λsd(Dst )
1
ǫs,t (Dst ( j))
−1
ǫs,t
⇐⇒ Dst ( j) = Dst
(
Rst ( j)
λsd
)−ǫs,t
λsd is the shadow price for deposit products. Since the
shadow price is independent of the household i, it can be
replaced by the overall price index for deposit products
Rst .
Aggregating the condition over all households i delivers
the aggregated nominal demand of patient households for
deposits:
⇐⇒ Rst ( j) = Rst (Dst )
1
ǫs,t (Dst ( j))
−1
ǫs,t
⇐⇒ Dst ( j) =
(
Rst ( j)
Rst
)−ǫs,t
Dst
The aggregated interest rates on deposits to households
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is:
Dst ( j) =

∫ 1
0
[[
Rst ( j)
Rst
]−ǫs,t
Dst
] ǫs,t−1
ǫs,t
d j

ǫs,t
ǫs,t−1
Rst =
[∫ 1
0
(Rst ( j))1−ǫs,t d j
] 1
1−ǫs,t
• Monetary policy rule
Rt = R1−ρr R
ρr
t−1
((
πt
π
)ωπ (yt
y
)ωy)1−ρr
+ εv,t
• The macroprudential policy rules comprise
– the countercyclical rule on the BC ratio
υt = υ
(
et
e
)χυ
where χυ > 0.
– and the countercyclical rule on the LTV ratio
lt = l
(
bt
b
)χl
where χl < 0.
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• , Laws of motion for the transitory shocks:
ln(zt) = (1 − ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εz,t
ln(skb,t) = (1 − ρskb) ln(skb) + ρskb ln(skb,t−1) + εskb,t
ln(mkb,t) = (1 − ρmkb) ln(mkb) + ρmkb ln(mkb,t−1) + εmkb,t
ln(mks,t) = (1 − ρmks) ln(mks) + ρmks ln(mks,t−1) + εmks,t
• Model closing equations and market clearing conditions
– Goods market clearing conditions:
yt = cb,t + cs,t −
φP
2
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
)
yt −
φWS
2
(
Kbt
Bt
− υ
)2 Kbt
Pt
−
φs
2
(
Rst ( j)
Rst−1( j)
− 1
)2
Rst
Dst
Pt
−
φb
2
 R
b
t ( j)
Rbt−1( j)
− 1
Rbt B
b
t
Pt
+
δb
KBt−1
Pt
– Labor market clearing condition
nb,t =
∫ 1
0
nb,t(i)di
ns,t =
∫ 1
0
ns,t(i)di
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– Dividend clearing condition
Xt =
∫ 1
0
Xt(i)di
– Housing market clearing condition
1 = hs,t + hb,t
– Intrabank market clearing condition
Bt =
∫ 1
0
Bt( j)d j
Dt =
∫ 1
0
Dt( j)d j
3.A.2 Nonlinear system in symmetric equilibrium
To close the model, I consider a symmetric equilibrium, where
all intermediate firms and banks make identical decision since
they face the same optimization problem. This assumption im-
plies: Pt = Pt(i), nb,t = nb,t(i), ns,t = ns,t(i), yt = yt(i), Xt(i) =
Xt, Bbt = Bbt ( j), Dst = Dst ( j),Rbt = Rbt ( j),Rst = Rst ( j),Gbt ( j) =
Gbt ,∀i ∈ [0, 1] and ∀ j ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, I change the vari-
ables according to: πt = PtPt−1 , ws,t =
Ws,t
Pt , wb,t =
Wb,t
Pt , b
b
t =
Bbt
Pt ,
dst =
Dst
Pt , qt =
Qt
Pt , xt =
Xt
Pt ,
Kbt
Pt = k
b
t , gbt =
GBt
Pt to represent the
nonlinear system in real terms:
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ln(zt) = (1 − ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εz,t (3.1)
ln(skb,t) = (1 − ρskb) ln(skb) + ρskb ln(skb,t−1) + εskb,t (3.2)
ln(mkb,t) = (1 − ρmkb) ln(mkb) + ρmkb ln(mkb,t−1) + εmkb,t (3.3)
ln(mks,t) = (1 − ρmks) ln(mks) + ρmks ln(mks,t−1) + εmks,t (3.4)
1
cs,t
qt = jh 1hs,t + βsEt
[
1
cs,t+1
qt+1
]
(3.5)
cs,tn
η−1
s,t = ws,t (3.6)
1
cs,t
= βsRst Et
[
1
cs,t+1
1
πt+1
]
(3.7)
cs,t +dst +qths,t =
dst−1
πt
Rst−1 +ws,tns,t +qths,t−1 + xt + (1− τ)
gBt−1
πt(3.8)
1
cb,t
qt = jh 1hb,t + µtltEt
[
qt+1πt+1
]
+ βbEt
[
1
cb,t+1
qt+1
]
(3.9)
cb,tn
η−1
b,t = wb,t (3.10)
1
cb,t
= µtRbt + βbEt
[
Rbt
cb,t+1
1
πt+1
]
(3.11)
cb,t +
bbt−1
πt
Rbt−1 + qthb,t = qthb,t−1 + b
b
t + wb,tnb,t (3.12)
Rbt bbt = ltEt
[
qt+1hb,tπt+1
] (3.13)
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φP
[
πt
π
− 1
]
πt
π
= (1 − ǫP) + ξtǫP
+βsφPEt
{
λs,t+1
λs,t
[
πt+1
π
− 1
] [
πt+1
π
] yt+1
yt
} (3.14)
yt = ztnαs,tn
1−α
b,t (3.15)
ws,tns,t = αξtztn
α
s,tn
1−α
b,t (3.16)
wb,tnb,t = (1 − α)ξtztnαs,tn1−αb,t (3.17)
Rt = R1−ρr R
ρr
t−1
((
πt
π
)ωπ (yt
y
)ωy)1−ρr
εv,t (3.18)
υt = υ

bt
yt
b
y

χυ
(3.19)
lt = l
(
qt
q
)χl
(3.20)
xt = yt − ws,tns,t − wb,tnb,t −
φ
2
(
πt
π
− 1
)2
yt (3.21)
kbt πt =
1
skb
(
(1 − δb)kbt−1 + τgbt−1
)
(3.22)
RWS ,bt = Rt − φ
WS
(kbt
bt
− υ
) (kbt
bt
)2
(3.23)
mkb,t
mkb,t − 1
RWSt
Rbt
=
mkb,t
mkb,t − 1
− 1 + φb
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
−
βts
 cs,tcs,t+1φb
R
b
t+1
Rbt
− 1

R
b
t+1
Rbt

2 Bbt+1Pt
Bbt Pt+1

(3.24)
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mks,t
mks,t − 1
Rt
Rst
=
mks,t
mks,t − 1
− 1 − φs
(
Rst
Rst−1
− 1
)
Rst
Rst−1
+
βs
 cs,tcs,t+1φs
(Rst+1
Rst
− 1
) (Rst+1
Rst
)2 Dst+1
Dst
1
πt+1

(3.25)
gbt = R
b
t bbt − Rst dst −
φWS
2
(kbt
bt
− υ
)2
kbt −
φs
2
(
Rst
Rst−1
− 1
)2
Rst dst−
φb
2
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1

2
Rbt bbt
(3.26)
bbt = dst + kt (3.27)
yt = cb,t + cs,t +
φP
2
(
πt
π
− 1
)
yt +
φWS
2
(kbt
bt
− υ
)2
kbt +
φs
2
(
Rst
Rst−1
− 1
)2
Rst dst +
φb
2
 R
b
t
Rbt−1
− 1
Rbt bbt + δb k
b
t−1
πt
(3.28)
1 = hb,t + hs,t (3.29)
3.A.3 Steady state calculation
In the absence of three shocks εz,t = εv,t = εskb,t = εmks,t =
εmks,t = 0 for all t, the model converges to the local steady state,
where all variables are constant. Therefore, in steady state no
adjustment costs arise in the banking sector as well as in the
intermediate goods production sector. By setting the monetary
policy’s inflation target to zero, the gross inflation rate in the
steady state is one. Variables without a time index designate
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steady state values.
z = z (3.1’)
skb = skb (3.2’)
mkb = mkb (3.3’)
mks = mks (3.4’)
1
cs
q = jh 1hs + βs
[
1
cs
q
]
(3.5’)
csn
η−1
s = ws (3.6’)
1
cs
= βsRs
[
1
cs
1
π
]
(3.7’)
cs + ds + qhs =
ds
π
Rs + wsns + qhs + x + (1 − τ)g
b
π
(3.8’)
1
cb
q = jh 1hb + µl
[
qπ
]
+ βb
[
1
cb
q
]
(3.9’)
cbn
η−1
b = wb (3.10’)
1
cb
= µRb + βb
[
Rb
cb
1
π
]
(3.11’)
cb +
bb
π
Rb + qhb = qhb + bb + wbnb (3.12’)
Rbbb = l [qhbπ] (3.13’)
ξǫP = (1 − ǫP) (3.14’)
y = znαs n
1−α
b (3.15’)
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wsns = αξzn
α
s n
1−α
b (3.16’)
wbnb = (1 − α)ξznαs n1−αb (3.17’)
R = R (3.18’)
υ = υ (3.19’)
l = l (3.20’)
x = y − wsns − wbnb (3.21’)
kbπ = (1 − δb)kb + τgb (3.22’)
From the steady state relation kbbb = υ follows:
RWS ,b = R (3.23’)
With ǫbǫb−1 = mkb equation (3.24) reduces in steady state to:
Rb =
ǫb
ǫb − 1
RWS (3.24’)
With ǫsǫs−1 = mks equation (3.25) reduces in steady state to:
Rs =
ǫs
ǫs − 1
R (3.25’)
gb = Rbbb − Rsds (3.26’)
bb = ds + kb (3.27’)
y = cb + cs + δb
kb
π
(3.28’)
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1 = hb + hs (3.29’)
From the savers’ Euler equation (3.7’) follows:
Rs =
π
βs
(3.30)
With equation (3.25’) one derives:
R =
ǫs,t − 1
ǫs,t
(
π
βs
)
(3.31)
Rewriting the borrowers’ Euler equation (3.11’) derives:
µ =
1
cb
(
π
Rb
− βb
)
(3.32)
Plugging (3.32) in the housing demand equation of borrowers
(3.9’) results in:
1
cb
q =
jh
hb
+
1
cb
(
π
Rb
− βb
)
lqπ + βb
1
cb
q (3.33)
From the collateral constraint (3.13’) one derives:
hb = Rb
bb
π
1
lq (3.34)
Substituting this in equation (3.33) yields:
1
cb
q =
jh
Rb b
b
π
1
lq
+
1
cb
(
π
Rb
− βb
)
lqπ + βb
1
cb
q (3.35)
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Equation (3.35) simplifies to:
1
cb
=
jhlπ
Rbbb
+
l
cb
(
π
Rb
− βb
)
π + βb
1
cb
(3.36)
From equation (3.12’), (3.14’) and (3.17’) it follows that:
bb =
cb −
ǫP−1
ǫP
(1 − α)y
1 − Rbπ
(3.37)
Plugging (3.37) in (3.36) results in:
1
cb
=
jhlπ
Rb
cb−
ǫP−1
ǫP
(1−α)(cb+cs+δbkb)
1− Rbπ
+
l
cb
(
π
Rb
− βb
)
π+βb
1
cb
(3.38)
Considering the production side of the model economy, equa-
tion (3.14’) reduces to:
ξ =
ǫP − 1
ǫP
(3.39)
Substituting equation (3.39) in savers’ labor demand equation
(3.16’) derives:
wsns = α
ǫP − 1
ǫP
znαs n
1−α
b (3.40)
Likewise, substituting (3.39) in borrowers’ labor demand equa-
tion (3.17’) derives:
wbnb = (1 − α)ǫP − 1
ǫP
znαs n
1−α
b (3.41)
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Combining the savers’ labor supply equation (3.6’) with equa-
tion (3.40) and the production function (3.15’) results in:
ns =
α
1−ǫP
ǫP
y
cs

1
η
(3.42)
The borrowers’ labor supply equation (3.10’) combined with
equation (3.41) yields:
nb =
 (1 − α)
ǫP−1
ǫP
y
cb

1
η
(3.43)
Plugging (3.42) and (3.43) in the production function and con-
sidering equation (3.28’) results in:
cb+cs+δ
bkb = z
α
ǫP−1
ǫP
(cb + cs + δbkb)
cs

α
η
 (1 − α)
ǫP−1
ǫP
(cb + cs + δbkb)
cb

1−α
η
(3.44)
From equation (3.22’) follows:
δbkb = τgb (3.45)
Inserting the saving rate (3.24’) and the lending rate (3.25’) in
equation (3.22’) and further partitioning delivers:
δbkb = τ(Rbbb − Rsds) (3.46)
δbkb = τR( ǫb
ǫb − 1
bb − ǫs
ǫs − 1
ds) (3.47)
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δb = τR
(
ǫb
ǫb − 1
bb
kb
−
ǫs
ǫs − 1
ds
kb
)
(3.48)
Making use of the relation that kbbb = υ leads to:
δb = τ
R
v
(
ǫb(ǫs − 1) + (ǫsv − ǫs)(ǫb − 1)
(ǫb − 1)(ǫs − 1)
)
(3.49)
δb = τ
R
v
(
ǫbǫs − ǫb + ǫsv(ǫb − 1) − ǫsǫb + ǫs
(ǫb − 1)(ǫs − 1)
)
(3.50)
δb = τ
R
v
(
ǫs − ǫb + v(ǫs(ǫb − 1))
(ǫb − 1)(ǫs − 1)
)
(3.51)
Inserting the equations (3.26’), (3.21’), (3.51) and (3.45) in
(3.8’) solves for
ds =
( (1−α)
(ǫP−1) (cs + cb + δbkb) − cb + 1ǫP (cs + cb + δbkb) + δ
bkb
τ
)
(
1 − Rsπ
)
(3.52)
Using (3.52), (3.27’) and (3.37) solves for:
kb =
( (1−α)
(ǫP−1) (cs + cb + δbkb) − cb + 1ǫP (cs + cb + δbkb) + δ
bkb
τ
)
(
1 − Rsπ
) +
cb −
ǫP−1
ǫP
(1 − α)(cs + cb + δbkb)(
1 − Rbπ
)
(3.53)
Given (3.53) and (3.44) and (3.38) one can solve the system for
the three unknowns cs, cb, kb.
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3.A.4 Log-linearized equations
For the linearization of the system, I take the natural logarithm
of all variables to make use of the approximation that ln
(
xt
x
)
≈
xt−x
x
. Let ln
(
xt
x
)
= xˆt be the variable’s xt deviation from its
steady state x. Next, I apply a first order Taylor expansion to
the system around the steady state.
zˆt = ρzzˆt−1 + εz,t (3.1”)
sˆkb,t = ρskb sˆkb,t−1 + εskb,t (3.2”)
ˆmkb,t = ρmkb ˆmkb,t−1 + εmkb,t (3.3”)
ˆmks,t = ρmks ˆmks,t−1 + εmks,t (3.4”)
q
cs
(qˆt − cˆs,t) = − j
h
hs
ˆhs,t + βs
q
cs
Et(qˆt+1 − cˆs,t+1) (3.5”)
cˆs,t + (η − 1)nˆs,t = wˆs,t (3.6”)
cˆs,t = βs
Rs
π
( ˆRst − Etcˆs,t+1 − Etπˆt+1) (3.7”)
cˆs,t + ˆds,t + qhs(ˆhs,t − Et ˆhs,t+1) = 1
π
Rsds( ˆds,t−1 + ˆRst−1 − ˆpit)+
wsns(wˆs,t + nˆs,t) + xxˆt + (1 − τ)g
b
π
(gˆBt−1 − πˆt)
(3.8”)
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q
cb
(qˆt − cˆb,t) = − j
h
hs
ˆhb,t + µlqπ(µˆt + ˆlt + Etqˆt+1 + Etπˆt+1) + βb q
cb
Et
(
qˆt+1 − cˆb,t
)
(3.9”)
cˆb,t + (η − 1)nˆb,t = wˆb,t (3.10”)
−cbcˆb,t = µRb(µˆt− ˆRbt )+βb
Rb
cbπ
( ˆRbt −Etcˆb,t+1−Etπˆt+1) (3.11”)
cbcˆb,t +
bbRb
π
(ˆbb,t−1 + ˆRb,t−1 − πˆt) + qhb(ˆhb,t − ˆhb,t−1) = bb ˆbb,t+
wbnb(wˆb,t − nˆb,t)
(3.12”)
ˆRbt + ˆbbt = ˆlt + Etqˆt+1 + ˆhb,t + πˆt+1 (3.13”)
πˆt =
(
ǫP − 1)
φP
)
ˆξt + βsEtπˆt+1 (3.14”)
yˆt = zˆt + αnˆs,t + (1 − α)nˆb,t (3.15”)
ˆξt = wˆb,t + α(nˆb,t − nˆs,t) − zˆt (3.16”)
ˆξt = wˆs,t + (1 − α)(nˆs,t − nˆb,t) − zˆt (3.17”)
ˆRt = ρr ˆRt−1 + (1 − ρr)
(
ωππˆt + ωyyˆ
)
+ εt (3.18”)
υˆt = χυ
(
ˆb
y t
)
(3.19”)
ˆlt = χl ˆbt (3.20”)
xxˆt = yyˆt − wsnswˆs,t − nswsnˆs,t − wbnbwˆb,t − wbnbnˆb,t (3.21”)
178
kbπ( ˆpit+ ˆkbt ) = −kbπsˆkb,t+
1
skb
(
(1 − δb)kb ˆkbt−1 + τgˆbt−1
)
(3.22”)
RWS ˆRWS = R ˆRt + φWS (ˆbt − ˆkbt ) (3.23”)
(ǫb − 1 + (1 + βs)φb) ˆRbt = φb ˆRbt−1+βsφbEt ˆRbt+1+(ǫb−1) ˆRWSt −ǫˆb,t
(3.24”)
(ǫs − 1 + (1 + βs)φs) ˆRst = φs ˆRst−1+βsφsEt ˆRst+1+ (ǫs−1) ˆRt− ǫˆs,t
(3.25”)
gbgˆbt = R
bbb( ˆRbt + ˆbbt ) − Rsds( ˆRst ˆdst ) (3.26”)
bˆbt = d ˆdt + kb ˆkbt (3.27”)
yyˆt = cscˆs,t + cbcˆb,t (3.28”)
0 = hb ˆhb,t + hs ˆhs,t (3.29”)
3.A.5 Some remarks
By borrowing the banking sector from Gerali et al. (2010), this
model is closely related to their set-up, but the model dynamics
differ along two dimensions.
First, after a positive technology shock in the model of Gerali
et al., bank profits fall which they reason by the reduced bank
interest rate spread. The lower earnings thereby outweigh the
increase in intermediated funds. However, in the model at hand
the banks’ net worth increases when the economy is subject to
a positive technology shock. One main model difference is the
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mentioned structure of the production sector. The broader pro-
duction sector in the model of Gerali et al. (2010) features next
to wage rigidities firms that are reliant on loans from banks to
buy physical capital for production. Thus, higher credit avail-
ability through the shock directly increases investments in the
capital stock, whereby aggregated output increases. As a sec-
ond round effect the physical capital used as collateral appre-
ciates which rises the firms’ borrowing capacity. The mecha-
nism triggers the financial accelerator. Since in my model only
households borrow, the aggregated loan demand is less pro-
nounced in my set-up. Therefore, given Gerali’s model con-
struction the need for financial intermediation is reinforced.
Another reason for the countercyclical properties of bank prof-
its in Gerali’s model lies in the formulation of the banks’ divi-
dend policy. They assume all bank profits are retained to build
up the bank capital stock. Opposing to Gerali et al. (2010), I
assume that the representative bank retains only part of bank
profits which in turn shows that the banks’ market power is
lower in my model. Consequently, banks have less influence
on the interest rate spread and the intermediation margin which
might cause the asymmetric reaction of bank profits to a tech-
nology shock across the models.
Second, after an exogenous destruction of bank capital inflation
rises in Gerali’s model. They justify this effect on prices by
higher wage cost. Reacting to inflation,the central bank rises
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the nominal interest rate, which aggravates loan costs. How-
ever, the model in this paper documents benign deflation and
nominal interest rate cuts when bank capital depreciates. Also
Gertler and Karadi (2013) report deflation to a shock in the
banking sector. Besides, deflationary tendencies have been ob-
servable in the aftermath of the crises that accompanied expan-
sionary monetary policies.
Despite the fact that financial market conditions have no di-
rect effect on production in my model, the credit conditions
affect output indirectly via the households’ labor supply and
consumption demand. Since the largest share of household li-
abilities is mortgage debt, my modeling approach is justified.
Justiniano et al. (2015) who also abstract from an external fi-
nanced production sector follows the same reasoning.
3.B Perturbation techniques
3.B.1 First order approximation
The objective of the linearization is to convert the non-linear
model equations into a linear system, which can be solved us-
ing a linear solution technique.34 Following the exposition of
Juillard (2005) and Faia (2008), in this section I explain how to
yield a linear approximation of the policy function, for which
34The notation to above relates as follows xt = yˆ.
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a linear approximation of the model is needed. Moreover, by
pointing to the distinction of a first order and a second order
approximation, I make clear that for a reliable welfare calcula-
tion the variance of future shocks only matters if the model’s
decision rule and the transition function are second order poly-
nomials (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004b). The second order
approximation is focus of the subsequent subsection.
The expectational difference equations of the model form a
non-linear system. The general representation of a DSGE model
is as follows:
Et { f (yt+1, yt, yt−1, vt; θ)} = 0
yt includes all endogenous variables that comprise predeter-
mined and non-predetermined variables.35 To be consistent
with the method used in Dynare, I abstract from deterministic
exogenous variables and a further variable partition. vt = σ · ε
are the exogenous stochastic shocks where σ scales the amount
of uncertainty in the economy. ε is an auxiliary random variable
with E(εt) = 0 and E(εε′) = ∑ε. θ is the vector of parameters.
Let yt = g(yt−1, vt, σ) be the policy function that solves the sys-
tem.36 Plugging in these guesses for yt = g(yt−1, vt, σ) and for
35By assuming stationary variables, the unconditional expectation of the
level of yt is time independent (variables show no long-term growth).
36In other words, g is a time recursive (approximated) representation of the
model that can generate time series that will approximately satisfy the ra-
tional expectation hypothesis contained in the original model.
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yt+1 = g(yt, vt+1, σ) = g(g(yt−1, vt, σ), vt+1, σ) into the function
f results in:
F(yt−1, vt, vt+1, σ) =
f (g(g(yt−1, vt, σ), vt+1, σ), g(yt−1, vt, σ), vt−1, vt)
(3.54)
If the guesses are correct, then Et {F(yt−1, vt, vt+1, σ)} = 0 is the
solution function and the model is solved (Faia, 2008). Hence,
the aim is finding the model’s solution function for any given
order of approximation that is valid around the neighborhood
of the particular steady state of the system. There are several
deterministic steady states that satisfy f (y, y, y, 0), whereby y
denotes the steady state of yt. But only one steady state is used
for the approximation. Because F(y, v) must be equal to zero
for any possible values of y and v, if g is correct, it must be the
case that the derivatives of any order of F must be also equal to
zero (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004b).
Fykσ j(y, σ) = 0 ∀y, σ, j, k, (3.55)
Fykσ j(y, σ) denotes the derivative of F with respect to y taken k
times and with respect to σ taken j times.
Next, I take the first order Taylor approximation F1 of the sys-
tem (3.54) around the non-stochastic steady state y = g(y, 0, 0)
where yt = y, vt = 0 and σ = 0.
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Et
(
F1(yt−1, vt, vt+1, σ)
)
= Et
(
f (y, y, y, 0) + fy+gy(gyyˆ + gvv + gσσ) + gv v′︸︷︷︸
Ev′=0
+gσσ
+
fy
(
gyyˆ + gvv + gσσ
)
+ fy−yˆ + fvv
)
= 0
with yˆt = yt−y expressing deviations of the variable from steady
state. The timing notation is as follows: v = vt, v′ = vt+1 and
the derivative notation is defined by fy+ = ∂ f∂yt+1 , fy =
∂ f
∂yt , fy− =
∂ f
∂yt−1 , fv =
∂ f
∂vt
, gy− = ∂g∂yt−1 , gv =
∂g
∂vt
, gσ = ∂g∂σ .
Taking expectations yields:
Et
(
F1(yt−1, vt, vt+1, σ)
)
=
(
fy+gygy + fygy + fy−
)
yˆ+
(
fy+gygv + fygv + fv
)
v+
 fy+gy gσ︸︷︷︸
=0
+ fy gσ︸︷︷︸
=0
σ = 0.
The last term is zero since the certainty equivalence holds, gσ =
0. The certainty equivalence states that the policy function is
independent of the variance-covariance matrix ∑ε. In general,
when approximating the policy function up to first order, sec-
ond order terms are omitted. As also higher polynomials of
the welfare function are discarded, a accurate welfare analysis
is not possible (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004b). If the fo-
cus of research is the effect of uncertainties on the economy,
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e.g., to evaluate precautionary savings, first order perturbation
techniques are not appropriate.
To derive the approximation of the policy function, I conclude
from the term in front of vt that gv satisfies −
(
fy+gy + fy
)−1 fv.
gy can be recovered from
(
fy+gygy + fygy + fy−
)
yˆ. Taking ex-
pectations, the structural state space representation is:
 0 fy+I 0

 Igy
 gyyˆ
︸     ︷︷     ︸
xt+1
=
 − fy− − fy0 I

 Igy
 yˆ
︸  ︷︷  ︸
xt
, (3.56)
whereas xt+1 =
 yt − yyt+1 − y
 and xt =
 yt−1 − yyt − y
 denoting the
variables deviation from its steady state value. Rewriting equa-
tion (3.56) results in linear stochastic difference equations writ-
ten in the state-space representation:
AEt(xt+1) = Bxt +Cvt
The solution I seek is the first order approximated decision
function (3.57), which can be derived by applying the solution
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technique by Klein (2000) in appendix section 2.B.37
yt = g(yt−1, vt, σ)
yt = y + gyyˆ + gvv (3.57)
The solution represents the time series behavior of yt as a func-
tion of the structural shocks vt. The expectation of yt is E(yt) =
y and the variance ∑y = gy ∑y g′y + σ2gu ∑ε g′u. Thus, up to
first order the unconditional mean of endogenous variables is
the same as their non-stochastic steady state value. First order
perturbation methods have the advantage that they do not suffer
from the ”curse” of dimensionality. As the linear perturbation
method is not computationally demanding, the method can be
applied in models with a large number of state variables with-
out the need for much computational power.
3.B.2 Second order approximation
This section focuses on a second order approximation to the
model equations based on Juillard (2005). Second order pertur-
bation methods account for uncertainties, which affect welfare.
Therefore, a welfare analysis requires a second order approx-
imation. The second order Taylor approximation F2 of (3.54)
37The Klein solution algorithm explains how one can exclude explosive tra-
jectories of the system by selecting a stable trajectory (Dejong and Dave,
2011). In particular, it states how to select the stable trajectory given by
gy = −Z−122 Z21 (see appendix section 2.B).
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is:
Et
(
F2(yt−1, vt, vt+1σ)
)
= Et
(
F1(yt−1, vt, vt+1, σ)+
0.5
Fy−y−(yˆ ⊗ yˆ) + Fvv(v ⊗ v) + Fv′v′(v′ ⊗ v′︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2 ~
∑
ε
) + Fσσσ2
+
Fy−v(yˆ ⊗ v) + Fy−v′(yˆ ⊗ v′︸︷︷︸
E=0
) + Fy−σyˆσ + Fvv′(v ⊗ v) + Fvσvσ+
fv′σ v′︸︷︷︸
E=0
σ
 .
In order to explain the notation used, I assume yt to be y = g(s)
and f (y) = f (g(s)). Then the second order derivative is: ∂2 f∂s∂s =
f
∂y
∂2g
∂s∂s +
∂2 f
∂y∂y
(
∂g
∂s ⊗
∂g
∂s
)
. ⊗ refers to the Kronecker product.
As before, all derivatives of F are equal to zero. I recover
gyv from: Fy−v = fy+(gyy(gy ⊗ gv) + gygyv) + fygyv + B = 0.
The term B contains all terms that are not second derivatives
of g. A standard linear problem results: gyv = −( fy + gy +
fy)−1(B + fygyy(gy ⊗ gv)) (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004b).
From Fy−y− = fy+(gyy(gy ⊗ gy)+ gygyy)+ fygyy + B = 0 it stems
that ( fy+gy+ fy)gyy+ fy+gyy(gy⊗gy) = −B. This Sylvester type
equation can be solved with a appropriate algorithm to recover
gyy.
Next, finding a solution for gvv from Fvv = fy+(gyy(gv ⊗ gv) +
gygvv) + fygvv + B = 0 the following standard linear problem
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evolves: gvv = −( fy+gy + fy)−1(B + fy+gyy(gv ⊗ gv)), where B
contains higher order derivatives of g(·).
Since gσ = 0 and Fyσ = fygygyσ + fygyσ = 0 and Fvσ =
0 are likewise zero, one can conclude that also gyσ = gvσ =
0. I derive gσσ by rearranging Fσσ + Fv′v′
∑
ε = fy+(gσσ +
fygσσ + gygσσ) + ( fy+y+(gv ⊗ gv) + fy+gvv)∑ε = 0, so that:
gσσ = −( fy+(I + gy) + fy)−1( fy+y+(gv ⊗ gv) + fy+gvv)∑ε.
The second order decision function then simplifies to:
yt = y+0.5gσσσ2+gyyˆ+gvv+0.5(gyy(yˆ⊗yˆ)+gvv(v⊗v))+gyv(yˆ⊗v).
(3.58)
The second order approximation departs from the certainty equiv-
alence theorem because with gσσ the variance of future shocks
matters. The result (3.58) shows that the coefficients on the lin-
ear and quadratic terms of the state vector are independent of
the size of the variance of the underlying shocks but not the
constant term, which is significantly altered by the prevailing
uncertainty in the model.
Thus, the expectation of y is E(yt) = y + (I − gy)−1(0.5(gσσ +
gyy
∑
y +gvvσε)), when σ = 1 is assumed. The variance is
given by ∑y = gy ∑y g′y + σ2gu ∑u g′u. As the first moments
of the system depend on the variance of the shocks given by
0.5gσσσ2, the uncertainty in the model affects that the mean of
the endogenous variables is different from the non-stochastic
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steady state. Consequently, the second order approximation to
the policy function of a stochastic model differs from its non-
stochastic counterpart. Moreover, by applying a second order
approximation the non-stochastic and the deterministic steady
state differ. The non-stochastic steady state is the point, where
the agents decide to stay in the absence of shocks but taking
into account the likelihood of future shocks.
3.C Welfare computation
The following section explains the computation of the welfare
measure used in this thesis. The welfare measure is defined as
the present discounted value of lifetime utility Ωt. By adding
the welfare measure to the endogenous non-predetermined vari-
ables, it is possible to calculate the second order approximation
to the policy function and simultaneously obtain the second or-
der welfare approximation Ωt = gΩt (yt, σ), whereby gΩt is just
one element of the policy function. So welfare is just one non-
linear function of the state vector yt, which includes the initial
states of the economy and σ. The coefficients of the linear and
quadratic terms approximated welfare function are independent
of the exogenous shocks, but as explained above not the con-
stant terms. Hence, the welfare means with and without pol-
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icy diverge (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004a).38 To calculate
welfare, one can either use the conditional expectation of life-
time utility or the unconditional expectation. In contrast to un-
conditional welfare, the conditional welfare measure captures
the effects of the transition from the non-stochastic steady state
without the policy to the steady state induced by the policy of
consideration. Thus, one can ensure that the economy begins
from the same initial point under all possible policies.
I note that the use of conditional welfare does not imply that
results are necessarily tied to some particular initial state (Faia,
2008). Depending on the particular research question one may
consider a number of relevant initial values for the state vec-
tor and average over those to obtain an average value of con-
ditional welfare (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2009). Since my
research focus is to include the transition path from a non-
macroprudential policy situation to a macroprudential policy
situation, I tie my results on simply one original state vector.
Comparing alternative macroprudential policies that are imple-
mented in economies with the same non-stochastic steady state,
I compute the welfare benefits in percentage of the household’s
consumption stream that the household receives associated with
the particular policy introduction. Ωcr,i,t captures the lifetime
38If welfare were directly approximated to first order, all policies that imply
the same non-stochastic steady state will give rise to the same level of
welfare. That is because the unconditional expectation and the steady state
value of a variable are equal using first order approximation techniques.
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utility level of the household i, while i stands either for the lend-
ing s or borrowing b household. In fact, calculating lifetime
utility recursively, the welfare level with regulation is Ωmp,i,t.
Ωcr,i,t ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βti
ln(ccr,i,t) + j ln(hcr,i,t) − n
η
cr,i,t
η

Ωmp,i,t ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βti
ln(ccr,i,t) + j ln(hcr,i,t) − n
η
cr,i,t
η

Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), the welfare change
Λi (3.59) is computed by equating the lifetime utility level with-
out regulation Ωcr,i,t and the lifetime utility level achieved with
macroprudential regulation Ωmp,i,t. Thus, Λi denotes the wel-
fare gain of adopting macroprudential regulation in consump-
tion units for household i in reference to the benchmark situa-
tion without macroprudential regulation. The welfare measure
allows to rank the policies according to their desirability for the
specific agents.
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Ωmp,i,t = E0
∞∑
t=0
βti
ln((1 + Λi)ccr,i,t) + j ln(hcr,i,t) − n
η
cr,i,t
η

(3.59)
Solving for Λi induces:
Ωmp,i,t = E0
∞∑
t=0
βti ln(1 + Λi) + Ωcr,i,t
Ωmp,i,t =
1
1 − βi
ln(1 + Λi) + Ωcr,i,t
Λi = exp((1 − βi)(Ωmp,i,t −Ωcr,i,t)) − 1
By performing a second order expansion at the non-stochastic
steady state of the policy and non-policy regime, one receives
gΩmp,t (y, 0) and gΩcp,t (y, 0). Since the initial non-stochastic steady
state is the same in both regimes, there is only a change in the
system’s derivatives with regard to σ. So the resulting second-
order-accurate measure of welfare is the percentage gain of
consumption for agent i given by:
Λi ≈ exp
(
(1 − βi)
[
gΩmp,i,tσσ (y, 0) − gΩcr,i,tσσ (y, 0)
]
σ
2
× 100
)
− 1.

4 Assessing macroprudential
regulation: the role of the
zero lower bound
4.1 Introduction
Nominal interest rates near the zero lower bound (ZLB) and
slow growth characterize many economies since the economic
and financial crisis almost a decade ago. These low rates, how-
ever, instead of fostering lending and spending, may and do
lead households to deleverage due to low inflation expecta-
tions (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2011; Eggertsson and Krug-
man, 2012). In this paper, we contribute to the literature by
looking at the interaction between the ZLB and rule-based, and
therefore flexible macroprudential regulation (FMR) that pre-
cisely addresses the leverage of household. Macroprudential
regulation gained quite some attention both in policymaking
and academia; cf. Farhi and Werning (2016), Dogra (2014),
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and Darbar and Wu (2016).
More specifically, we look at both a fixed and a flexible loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio that constrains borrowers. FMR is thus
implemented by allowing the maximum LTV ratio to respond to
macroeconomic conditions. Monetary policy may or may not
be constrained by the ZLB. The unconstrained scenario simply
allows for a negative interest rate if an adverse demand shock is
sufficiently strong, whereas the constrained scenario does not;
see also Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015).
In section 2, the theoretical model is briefly described, section
3 explains our implementation, section 4 presents and discusses
the results. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Households and production
We use a slightly modified version of Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2015a)’s standard two-representative agent model with
group specific discount rates βi, i ∈ {s, b} that determine savers
and borrowers. Both groups are of equal size. The assump-
tion βb < βs implies that the more patient savers are lending to
borrowers.
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Both household types solve the same intertemporal maximiza-
tion problem which is given by
max
ci,t ,hi,t ,ni,t ,bi,t
E
∞∑
t=0
βtiκt
log ci,t + j log hi,t − n
η
i,t
η

ci,t, hi,t, ni,t and j denote consumption, housing services, work-
ing hours and the weight of housing, respectively. η − 1 ≥ 0
is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. κt denotes
an intertemporal aggregate demand shock. Following Guerrieri
and Iacoviello (2016), it is specified as
ln(κt) = ρκ ln(κt−1) + εκ,t (4.1)
where 0 < ρκ < 1 and εκ,t ∼ N(0, σ2εκ). A decrease of κt implies
a negative aggregate demand shock since both savers and bor-
rowers are more willing to postpone consumption. Savers face
the budget constraint
cs,t + bs,t + qths,t = bs,t−1
rt−1
πt
+ ws,tns,t + qths,t−1 + xt, (4.2)
where bs,t, qt, rt−1,ws,t and πt denote lending, the price of hous-
ing, both in units of consumption, the gross nominal interest
rate in t − 1, the real wage rate earned by savers and overall
inflation rate, respectively. xt are dividend payments from the
production sector that are assumed to go to the savers. The
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budget constraint of borrowers is
cb,t +
rt−1
πt
bb,t−1 + qthb,t = qthb,t−1 + bb,t + wb,tnb,t (4.3)
The amount of borrowing is limited by a maximum LTV ratio
l ≥ Et
[
rtbb,t
πtqt+1hb,t
]
. (4.4)
A flexible limit is detailed below.
The production sector is basic. Final output yt is assembled
from a continuum of intermediate goods yt(z) according to
yt =
∫ 1
0
(
yt(z) ε−1ε dz
) ε
ε−1
, (4.5)
whereas the yt(z)’s are produced in a continuum of firms z ∈
[0, 1] that are owned by lenders by means of the CRS technol-
ogy
yt(z) = ns,t(z)αnb,t(z)1−α, (4.6)
Each firm employs the two types of labor paying wb,t to bor-
rowers and ws,t to savers. (Rationales for this distinction are
given e.g. in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).) Prices Pt(z) are set
in the usual way observing Rotemberg price adjustment costs
φP and demand yt(z) =
[Pt(z)
Pt
]−ε
yt. Price adjustment costs are
introduced in order to allow for different developments of real
and nominal interest rates.
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Assuming symmetry across firms, profit maximization yields
the log-linearized Phillip’s curve:
πˆt =
(ε − 1)
φP
ˆξt + βsκtEtπˆt+1 (4.7)
where πt = PtPt−1 and ξt depict gross inflation and marginal cost,
respectively. Hats denote deviations from steady state.
4.2.2 Monetary and macroprudential policy
The central bank sets the interest rate according to the modified
Taylor rule
rt = max
1, r1−ρr r ρrt−1
((
πt
π
)ωπ (yt
y
)ωy)1−ρr
εv,t
 (4.8)
when it is constrained by the ZLB. If the ZLB is not binding,
interest rates unconditionally follow the second expression in
the maximum function. ǫv,t captures the monetary policy shock.
Following e.g. Lambertini et al. (2013), FMR is introduced as
lt = l ρlt−1
(
l
(
bt
b
)χl)(1−ρl)
(4.9)
where l denotes the steady state value of the LTV ratio. 0 <
ρl < 1 and χl denote the persistence and the reaction parame-
ter of the rule, respectively. A countercyclical macroprudential
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regulation is implied by χl < 0. This can be motivated by the
fact that individual borrowers do not take into account the nega-
tive externality their indebtedness exerts on the macroeconomy
in a downturn (Korinek and Simsek, 2016).
In order to close the model, the following market clearing con-
ditions are introduced. Supply of housing is fixed at unity,
i.e. hs,t + hb,t = 1, goods market clearing is given by yt =
cb,t + cs,t +
(
φP
2
) ( Pt
πPt−1 − 1
)2
yt, bond market clearing requires
bs,t = bb,t, labor market clearing is given by
∫ 1
0 ni,t(z)dz = ni,t,
i ∈ {s, b}.
4.3 Method and calibration
The model outlined above is simulated in the usual way when
the ZLB does not bind or is assumed not to bind. If the ZLB is
binding, the policy rule becomes non-linear in the sense of re-
action function (4.8). We handle this by using the Occbin tool-
box developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015).1 In order
to calibrate the model, we use parameter values that are com-
monly used in the relevant literature with the aim of matching
data from the Eurozone; see table 4.1.
1The occasionally binding solution technique is outlined in the appendix
section 4.A.
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Table 4.1: Calibration parameters
Parameter Description Value
βs discount factor saver 0.99
βb discount factor borrower 0.975
η parameter associated with labor elasticity 2
j weight of housing in utility function 0.1
l steady state LTV ratio 0.7
α labor share of saver 0.64
φP price adjustment costs 58
ε price elasticity of demand 6
ρr interest rate smoothing parameter in TR 0.8
ωy output parameter in TR 0.1
ωπ inflation parameter in TR 2
ρl smoothing parameter in LTV-rule 0.2
χl reaction parameter in LTV rule -2
ρκ persistence preference shock 0.9
σκ standard deviation preference shock 0.02
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4.4 Results and discussion
The exogenous shock we are focusing on is a 2 percent reduc-
tion of κt in t = 1. This makes both savers and borrowers will-
ing to postpone consumption and therefore lowers aggregate
demand. The shock is strong enough in order to make the ZLB
binding. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the impulse responses after
this shock with and without a binding ZLB, respectively. The
solid lines depict the situation when FMR according to (4.9) is
in place, where as the dotted lines apply for a fixed value of l.
In all scenarios, house prices increase. This is due to the fact
that housing serves as a saving vehicle. Since everybody wants
to shift consumption to the future, this vehicle becomes more
expensive.
Clearly, the adverse shock triggers an expansionary monetary
policy aimed at dampening the effects on output and inflation.
If the ZLB binds, however, the real interest nevertheless in-
creases, bringing down indebtedness. This deleveraging leads
to a countercyclical increase of the LTV ratio in the presence
of FMR. Note that FMR considerably dampens the volatility of
output, inflation and, most significantly, debt. Hence, on top of
stabilizing financial markets (indebtedness), FMR is a partial
substitute for monetary policy in stabilizing the economy after
an adverse demand shock.
If the ZLB is assumed not to bind, the real interest rate goes
201
down as a result of the expansionary monetary policy stance.
Unlike in the case of a binding ZLB, this leads to an increase in
debt, which in turn implies a procyclical downward correction
of the LTV ratio in the case of a FMR. Note that this still very
successfully dampens indebtedness, whereas there is no addi-
tional effect of FMR on the stability of output and inflation if
the ZLB does not bind.
On a different note, the results also show the benefits of an un-
constrained monetary policy in terms of macroeconomic stabi-
lization. This is a reminder that monetary policy should keep
clear of the ZLB in the first place.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper extends the existing literature by documenting that
flexible macroprudential regulation helps to attenuate the ef-
fects of an adverse aggregate demand shock in the presence of
a ZLB. The inability of a constrained monetary policy to bring
down real interest rates can thus be partially compensated by
flexible macroprudential regulation.
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Figure 4.1: Impulse responses after a negative demand shock
with ZLB
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses after a negative demand shock
without ZLB
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Appendix
4.A Nonlinear model solution technique
Solving dynamic models with standard linear perturbation meth-
ods fails to depict inequality constraints that often arise in eco-
nomics. Next to several other nonlinear solution methods for
medium-size models (e.g., the Smolyak algorithm by Malin
et al. (2011), the penalty function approach by Judd (1998)),
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) introduce an algorithm to cap-
ture occasionally binding constraints in a DSGE model using
piecewise linear techniques. The approach assumes that the
same model economy comprises of two linear regimes: in one
regime dubbed as reference model (R1) the occasionally bind-
ing constraint is slack. In the alternative regime (A1) the same
constraint is binding. The piecewise linear solution method in-
volves linking the first-order approximation of the model to the
same point under each regime. For the existence of a rational
expectations solution, the Blanchard and Kahn conditions must
hold under the R1 regime. The solution algorithm presumes
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that a shock hits the model economy in R1 such that the con-
straint binds. Consequently, the model economy switches to
A1. The impact of the shock proceeds regarding the A1 model
equations with the binding constraint and abates over a finite
time horizon, so that the model returns back to R1. The un-
derlining important assumption is that agents expect no future
shocks to occur. Formally, the generic representation of a lin-
earized DSGE model with the occasionally binding constraint
being slack is given by:2
AEt xt+1 + Bxt +Cxt−1 + Evt = 0, (4.10)
where the n× n matrices A, B,C and the n×m matrix E collect
the structural parameters of the linearized system. The vector xt
captures the variables deviation from steady state and vt com-
prises of the shock processes. The system linearized around
the same non-stochastic steady state with the binding constraint
can be expressed as:
A∗Et xt+1 + B∗xt +C∗xt−1 + D∗ + E∗vt = 0, (4.11)
where the matrices A∗, B∗,C∗ and E∗ collect again the structural
parameters. The additional vector D∗ of size n encompasses
constants. D∗ includes the terms that arise because the lin-
earization is carried out around the same non-stochastic steady
2This representation abstracts from the usual first-order system notation, so
that lagged and current state variables are written separately.
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state as in R1, even though now the constraint binds. The vec-
tor xt collecting the variables’ deviation remains equal across
the systems.
Following Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), the policy function
for the model with an occasionally binding constraint is defined
as a function g(xt−1, vt) = xt such that the conditions under sys-
tem (R1) or the system (A1) hold, depending on the evaluation
of the occasionally binding constraint. Given the initial steady
state vector x0 and the realization of the shocks v1, the equation
g can be expressed by the set of matrices Rt, the set of matrices
Pt, and a matrix Q1 for the particular point in time such that:
x1 = P1x0 + R1 + Q1v1. (4.12)
Even though PtRt are functions of xt−1 and the initial shock ǫ1
only, the matrices are time-varying summarized by:
xt = Pt xt−1 + Rt∀t ∈ {2,∞}. (4.13)
Also Qt is time-varying, but it fades out in the long-run with
the decreasing impact of the initial shock. The above equations
(4.12) and (4.13) show that even though R1 and A1 are lin-
ear, the solution of the piecewise algorithm is nonlinear. Thus,
the applied solution method provides a local approximation as
a function of the two models with and without a binding con-
straint. Next, by a guess-and-verify approach the routine is re-
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peated along the following steps until the right guess is verified.
Recall that in t = 0 when the shock occurs the model R1 is rel-
evant. The algorithm initially assumes the number of periods
in which each regime applies and updates the number if the
verification of the guess fails.
1. Given the realized shock v1, let T be the point in time
when the model returns to R1 for all consequent periods
t ≥ T . The linear approximation to the decision rule xt
is then: xt = Pxt−1 + Qvt and remains time invariant for
any periods, t ≥ T since Pt = P,Rt = 0 applies.
2. Using the equation xT = PxT−1 and equation 4.11, the
solution in period T − 1 satisfies: A∗PxT−1 + B∗xT−1 +
C∗xT−2 + D∗ = 0, whereby the underlying assumption
that agents expect no shocks beyond the first period is
carried out. Solving the equation for xT−1 results in the
decision rule for xT−1 as a function of xT−2: xT−1 =
−(A∗P + B∗)−1(C∗XT−2 + D∗).
3. As a next step, use the last decision rule xT−1 = Pt−1xT−2+
RT−1 with Pt−1 = −(A∗P + B∗)−1C∗ and with RT−1 =
−(A∗P + B∗)−1D∗ to solve for xT−2 given xT−3. In doing
so consider either model R1 or A1 implied by the current
guess.
4. The iteration back proceeds until x0 is reached consider-
ing the prevailing regime by the guess.
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5. Depending on whether R1 or A1 is guessed to apply in
period one, Q1 = −(AP2+B)−1ǫ or Q1 = −(A∗P+B∗)−1ǫ∗
is chosen.
6. Using the guess for the solution obtained in steps 1. to
5., compute the paths for x to verify the current guess
of regimes. If the guess is verified, stop. Otherwise, up-
date the guess for when regimes (R1) and (A1) apply and
return to step 1.
The resulting approximated policy function to the model is highly
nonlinear because the shift in regimes is associated with a change
of the path of the endogenous variables. More specific, the
period of time the model remains in one regime depends on
the expectations regarding that regime, which in turn depends
on the state vector. This interaction between expectations and
the state vector generates the nonlinearity. The approxima-
tion based on a first-order perturbation approach has the limita-
tion that it discards all information concerning future shocks.3
However, the algorithm has is capable to render large scale
models and is computational fast.
3As agents are unable to foresee the rare possibility of a binding zero lower
bound of nominal interest rates, they do not accumulate precautionary sav-
ings as lined out in appendix section 3.B.

5 Conclusion
This thesis examines to what extent macroprudential policy con-
tributes to financial and macroeconomic stability using a New
Keynesian DSGE model. Adopting countercyclical rules as in-
struments, the caps on borrowers’ LTV ratios are flexible by
changing in a countercyclical manner. Thus, the regulation
aims to contain the build-up of leverage before a crisis and
reduces fire sales of collateral during a crises. Whereas fixed
credit limits lead to a procyclical amplification of shocks. To
learn more about the explicit policy configuration and its func-
tioning, borrowers face a credit constraint tight to their housing
collateral in the underlining model of the following papers.
According to the results of chapter 2, that analyzes borrowers
with high and low debt levels, a countercyclical rule attached
to the LTV ratio is destabilizing if the leverage level allowed
by the rule is relatively low. Simulation results show that dur-
ing a housing demand boom the tight credit limit induced by
the rule impede any economic activity and create a conflict be-
tween macroprudential and monetary policy. That is because
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the amplification effect of collateral constraints coming from
less indebted borrowers makes the countercyclical rule irrele-
vant. However, my insights reveal that a rule on highly indebted
borrowers permits a larger policy scope to achieve financial and
macroeconomic stability at once and improves total welfare. In
addition, credit growth shows to serve as a good indicator for
an overheating of the financial sector.
Extending the former model by a banking sector, the paper
of chapter 3 tests both, end-borrower regulation in form of a
rule on borrowers’ LTV ratio and a lender related instrument,
namely a rule on the BC ratio of banks. I find that the rule on
the LTV ratio mitigates the volatility of mortgage credit more
effectively than countercyclical BC regulation during financial
and economic downturns. Thus, the LTV rule shows to suc-
cessfully avert a credit crunch. The rationale behind the dy-
namics is that the rule on the LTV ratio relaxing the credit limit
of borrowers curtails the drop of credit demand, which stabi-
lizes the credit-to-output ratio and the BC position. Further,
I uncover that mild countercyclical rules are socially optimal.
The welfare gain of borrowers through consumption smooth-
ing with either rule compensates the welfare loss of savers. In
conclusion, regulating borrowers credit behavior represents an
important complement to macroprudential BC regulation.
My findings in chapter 3 also predict that both rules fail to
achieve macroeconomic stabilization if the financial shock oc-
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curring in the banking sector affects the macroeconomy exclu-
sively over the private mortgage market. The financial shock is
indeed a demand shock moving inflation and output in the same
direction that is expected to induce the amplification effect of
collateral constraints (Iacoviello, 2005). However, I stress that
the amplification of output due to borrowers’ collateral con-
straint arises first and foremost, if the shock occurs on the bor-
rowing agent’s utility objective function and changes a variable
that is relevant for the collateral constraint, e.g., a housing de-
mand shock.1
In chapter 4, I modify the otherwise standard model of chapter
2 to study the consequences of zero interest rates for the macro-
prudential policy transmission. An exogenous shift of house-
holds’ preference to consume in the future induces a demand-
driven recession in the model, so that output declines sharply.
Monetary policy counteracting the abated availability of loans
lowers the nominal interest rate until the ZLB binds. The sub-
sequent deflation pushes borrowers to deleverage more. In the
light of this debt-deflation cycle, a countercyclical rule on the
LTV ratio of borrowers attenuates the acute deflation and sup-
ports the recovery of output. Thus, the macroprudential rule
corrects the aggregate demand externality that arises if prior
to a bust, borrowers do not reflect the economic impact of their
1Walentin (2014) provides evidence for the collateral effect of housing de-
mand shocks, but states that the amplification effect is negligible for shocks
originating in the housing market.
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leveraging during times of a binding ZLB. However, if the ZLB
is non-binding, FMR has no effect on the macroeconomy. The
findings reveal asymmetries in the macroprudential policy trans-
mission caused by the interaction with either an efficient or a
non-efficient monetary policy stance.
In summary, this thesis provides the following research contri-
butions: First, I find that a countercyclical rule on the LTV ratio
of borrowers is a powerful instrument to curb the amplification
effect of collateral constraints to the real economy that arises in
response to shocks emanating from household’s behavior. Sec-
ond, the effectiveness of the rule increases in the presence of
highly leveraged borrowers, with the use of credit growth as
indicator variable, and when monetary policy is constrained.
Third, the countercyclical LTV regulation performs better in
moderating the risk of a credit crunch than countercyclical bank
capital regulation and is hence capable in strengthening the sys-
tems resilience. Overall, the main conclusion from this thesis
is that countercyclical tools in the mortgage market success-
fully enhance financial stability when optimally designed. In
addition, they are capable to provide macroeconomic stability
during times of a binding ZLB. These insights aid the develop-
ment of comprehensive macroprudential policy framework in
order to reduce the likelihood of a future crises.
My results underline the relevance of macroprudential instru-
ment design for specific mortgage market characteristics and
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thereby open up new gaps for future research. Research re-
mains to be conducted on the interplay of macroprudential pol-
icy and specific mortgage loan properties as, e.g., multi-period
loans, variable rate, and fixed loans, and occasionally bind-
ing collateral constraints, as well as the interaction with other
tools like the borrowers’ debt-service to income limit, or the
requirements on the amortization period of a mortgage. Re-
search needs also to be done on the specific characteristics of
demand shocks which lead in the presence of collateral con-
straints to the financial multiplier effect on output. Understand-
ing the mechanism behind the collateral effect allows to con-
struct more goal-oriented macroprudential policy measures.
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